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Abstract
Scaling food security: a political ecology of agricultural policies and practices in Bukidnon,
Philippines
by
Ryan Ehrhart
Advisor: Professor Cindi Katz
Debates over food security strategies in the Philippines have pitted the neoliberal
paradigm of trade liberalization, export cropping, and chemical and biotech agricultural
methods against the food sovereignty paradigm of protectionism, staple cropping, and
sustainable agriculture methods.
The Philippine government has long pushed for yield increases of staples. However,
there has been dissonance between governmental desires for rice self‐sufficiency and
pursuit of a more export‐oriented agricultural economy. The World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Trade Organization have
pressured the government of the Philippines to adopt various tenets of neoliberalism
(trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and budgetary austerity), which have
hindered the achievement of Philippine goals for self‐sufficiency in its staple foods and
stunted the potential benefits of land reform.
Through ethnographic research of the social and ecological conditions in three rural
villages in the province of Bukidnon, this examination of agrarian change explores how
various actors—small farmers, collectives, large planters, and agribusiness corporations—
have been scaling their projects in the agricultural economy.
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The use of chemical inputs has damaged soils and saddled farmers with debts. In
many cases, control of land has been lost to elites through sales or pawning arrangements.
Relatively egalitarian corn‐ and rice‐farming areas have given way to a stratified landscape
of sugarcane and banana plantations, as former smallholders have been forced to work as
wage laborers. Multinational agribusinesses have steered the area away from staple
production and threatened human and environmental health with pesticide exposure and
erosion.
Some farmers though have organized against these prevailing trends. Production
and social reproduction have been rescaled through collective marketing, reciprocal labor
arrangements, and more equitably gendered divisions of labor. Agroecological methods,
such as composting, organic fertilization, seed saving, and indigenous pest control have
scaled the reproduction of environmental conditions more locally and increased farmer
incomes because their inputs are created on the farm. Protecting local control of the means
of production—seeds, fertilizers, and especially land—has become an important method
for preserving a smallholder class, maintaining more self‐determination, and working
toward greater food sovereignty.
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Part One: Scaling food security
“We were growing corn with chemical fertilizer, but the costs got so high that
we were losing money and we were going into debt. That is when we started
selling and pawning our land to the sugarcane growers. Now we are worried
that we will not have the money to pay back our pawning debt. We may not
be able to get our land back. We will rely on my sister in Germany, who
works as a cook in a convent, to send us money to cover our debts. But what
if she gets homesick and decides to return to the Philippines? If we do not
have the money to pay the debt, then the person we pawned the land to will
just keep farming it. We used to plant rice, corn, camote [sweet potato], and
white beans and we did not experience hunger because we fed ourselves.
But now we are hungry because we cannot grow our own food.”
— a resident of a village in Bukidnon that has largely transitioned
from small owner‐operated corn and rice farms to large sugarcane
and banana plantations.
“The big change I noticed is that when the big companies came over here,
they changed the crops from corn and rice to sugarcane and banana
plantations. There is globalization. Our crops are not for our consumption
anymore. Our government must not allow the multinational corporations to
rent so much land for commercial types of crops. The government should
make staple foods a priority instead.”
— a resident of the same village who had his own farm and had tried
working for a Dole banana plantation before quitting because of
health concerns.
“What we try to do in our organization, Makakabus, is to improve the quality
of the environment. Chemical agriculture has been destroying the land.
Makakabus instead requires its members to make their own organic
fertilizer. People watched the way we farm and they saw that we do not burn
our rice straw. We compost it and use it as fertilizer. People saw that we
were making more money this way since we did not have to pay for fertilizer.
In our organization, even the laborers, not just the landowners, are more
food secure than they used to be. In the chemical farms, the laborers are
having difficulty with food security.”
— a member of a rice growing collective called Makakabus (in a
different village in Bukidnon) whose members employ sustainable
farming techniques and collective labor strategies.

1

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security

Figure P1.1: Philippines Regions and Provinces (Philippine Maps 2012): the province of
Bukidnon, in tan, is in the north central portion of the southern island of Mindanao.
2

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security

Figure P1.2: Relief map of portions of the province of Bukidnon and environs (Google Maps
2012). Interviews were conducted in small villages near Pangantucan and Valencia City,
which are both visible in the southern portions of this map.
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Figure P1.3: A tapasero (sugarcane cutter) returning to work in a sugarcane plantation in
Bukidnon (photo by author).
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Thousands of two‐meter stalks of freshly cut sugarcane sat in tightly spaced rows
like planks forming long boardwalks across the hillside. The meticulous organization that
was evident from the morning’s labor seemed incongruous with the spartan camp where
the tapaseros (sugarcane cutters) were eating their lunch. Like an afterthought, a tattered
blue plastic tarp fastened to tree branches was the only form of shelter from the elements.
Throughout the six‐day workweek, the laborers slept there in a dozen makeshift cots.
Packed together without any space between them, the cots were constructed from
discarded fertilizer sacks pulled taut over crude bamboo frames. After the simple meal was
over, the tapaseros sharpened their cutting tools and proceeded back into the field, their
hands gloveless and their feet only protected by flip flops (referred to as slippers in the
Philippines). The pay they would receive for the day was one hundred Philippine pesos, or
the 2009 equivalent of US$2.13. Cutting sugarcane was considered men’s work, though
this group, like most, included boys who had dropped out of high school to supplement
their parents’ incomes. Women and girls worked in the sugarcane fields too, performing
the tasks of weeding and stalk gleaning, often for wages even lower than what the
tapaseros earned. Working as a tapasero only provided employment during the November
to May harvesting season. Throughout the rest of the year, other jobs were sought, but
relying on agricultural day labor was risky since work was often unavailable and even
when there was work to do, getting rained out was a frequent occurrence. Hunger was
commonplace among the families of the agricultural wage laboring class.
The aforementioned group of tapaseros was just one of many work crews that were
hired by a local planter who had acquired control over a large amount of land in the area.
He had accumulated this patchwork of land parcels via purchases, rental agreements, and

5

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
especially pawning arrangements with indebted smallholders who had relinquished
control of their land to him as collateral for loans they were using for short‐term living
expenses. It was doubtful that these smallholders would ever regain control of their land
from him since the use of the land itself had formerly been their main source of income.
I had already interviewed this planter, but I was curious to meet the other main
sugarcane haciendero in town. When I visited the compound where he kept his trucks, I
found that he was conducting business with an M16 assault rifle strapped matter‐of‐factly
around his shoulder. He agreed to an interview, but said it needed to be Sunday at 7:00
AM. I was suspicious that he was trying to pick a time I would sleep through. When I
arrived at 7:00 AM the following Sunday, unsurprisingly he canceled the meeting.
Besides sugarcane, another ascendant crop in the area was the Cavendish banana,
an export variety that was being grown solely for foreign markets by the American
multinational fruit corporation Dole. Dole’s presence in the community was controversial
because of the pesticides to which workers and the community in general were exposed,
but also because it meant that local land was not being used for staple crops that could
directly ensure the food security of the area. Dole was expanding rapidly in the rural
Philippine province of Bukidnon as hilly, high‐elevation villages like this one provided ideal
locations to grow their sweet ‘mountain bananas.’
What had happened in this village that had made it transition from an egalitarian
community of small farmers growing corn and rice to a region that was dominated by
sugarcane and banana planters? Why had so much local land fallen under the control of
just a few people and why had whole families transitioned from working their own plots to
working as wage laborers for someone else? What were the factors that aided
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multinational exporters, seed purveyors, and fertilizer companies in this agricultural
economy? Some of the answers had local explanations, though many of the economic
processes occurring in this agricultural village had very distant influences.
For the members of a women‐led organic rice‐growing collective in another village
in Bukidnon, a different narrative was unfolding.1 The group took the name Makakabus,
which means ‘pro‐poor’ in the Visayan language and is also an acronym for ‘Malahutayong
Kahiusahan sa mga Kababayenan sa Bukidnon’, which translates to Sustainable Unity of the
Women of Bukidnon. These farmers were successfully challenging the consolidation of
land in their community and maintaining more socio‐economic equity within their group.
Using sustainable agriculture techniques, they were producing their own farming inputs
and relying on each other for reciprocal labor. In a region where typically one‐fifth of
children in the general population were underweight, their communitarian group dynamic
had eliminated hunger within their organization.

Throughout this study, the term organic will refer to growing without the use of chemical
fertilizers and chemical biocides (pesticides, herbicides, fungicides). Organic can also mean
a focus on social reproduction and community, which was certainly the case with the rice‐
growing collective mentioned above, however, in this document, those social processes will
be discussed separately from the word organic. Organic can also refer to third party
certification of crops, though this will be discussed separately in Chapter Four, which
addresses how sometimes governmental organic certification is a neoliberal process that
actually has the potential to thwart the types of environmental and social reproduction
taking place in small communities that have embraced sustainable methods. I use the term
chemical agriculture (rather than conventional agriculture) to refer to the practices that
include chemical fertilizers and chemical biocides since that is the dominant term among
farmers organizations in the Philippines with whom I worked.
1
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Figure P1.4: Makakabus members working in a rice field (photo by author).
How were the members of Makakabus able to achieve relative equity and food
security? What were the social and ecological processes that were promoting economic
stability in this community? And how were the differences in practices between the rice‐
growing collective and the sugarcane‐ and banana‐dominated village illustrative of broader
debates in rural development and food security?
The answers to these questions are complex, but control over the means of
production (seeds, fertilizers, and most importantly farmland itself) was the most
significant variable to analyze and the most significant source of struggle in Bukidnon’s
agricultural economy. Individual choices, farmers organizations’ goals, government
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policies, and corporate power all influenced who controlled the means of production in an
increasingly contentious rural landscape.
By the time of my field work in 2008‐2009, the Philippines had become a
battleground between a vision of food security based on trade liberalization, export‐
orientation, and reliance on chemical and biotech agriculture, and a vision of food
sovereignty based on sustainable agriculture, local self‐sufficiency, and diversity of
production. This study analyzes the social and ecological effects of these differing
agricultural approaches as well as the ways in which various actors attempt to scale their
projects to their advantage.
The debate over the benefits or dangers of globalization and neoliberal economic
reforms is too often constructed in strictly economic terms. Globalization is not simply an
economic rearrangement, but a geographic issue that alters the spaces of production,
reproduction, and everyday life. How does the neoliberal project attempt to scale the
agricultural economy? Conversely, how do resistance movements, such as the food
sovereignty movement, not simply struggle for land and self‐determination, but also
attempt to scale the agricultural economy in their interest?
This research integrates issues of agriculture and food security with the
underexamined realm of social and environmental reproduction. The debates on
geographic scale as socially produced have focused increasingly on social reproduction
(Marston 2000; Marston and Smith 2001), but there has been a call to expand the
discussion to address the reproduction of environmental conditions as well (McCarthy
2005). The inseparability of the social and the environmental is an important part of a
political ecology perspective (Blaikie 1985; Grossman 1984). For example: What are the
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political and economic reasons that chemical fertilizer use becomes more or less common?
How is soil fertility connected to changes in the social order? How do the cycling of
nutrients and the flows of energy differ between farm types, and how does this influence
the social fabric of the agricultural region? These are ways this research inquires into the
interplay of social and environmental forces in the context of competing food security
strategies and the construction of geographic scale.
It is important for us to conceive of scale as something that is continually
constructed and contested rather than naturalized or ‘given’ (Smith 1992; Marston 2000).
Rather than thinking of scale as something with ontological validity, it is more important to
explore the ways that actors engage in scaling (Moore 2008; McCarthy 2005). In other
words, scaling describes how actors attempt to manipulate their environments and/or the
environments of others in ways that benefit them or promote their worldview. Chapter
Two will explore the idea of scaling in more detail, but in brief, it can be thought of as
undertaking actions that have spatial outcomes. Some examples are as follows: 1) an
agribusiness markets the same seed internationally, without regard to variations in
geography; 2) the World Trade Organization (WTO) enforces a trade policy among all
member states; 3) a small farmer chooses to use composting rather than external fertilizer
inputs; 4) a group of farmers use reciprocal labor and market their products collectively.
Through an examination of agribusiness strategies combined with an ethnography
of a rural area in the Philippines, this project explores: 1) how the production of scale
intersects with power relations in particular ecological contexts; and 2) what the results of
different food security strategies are in terms of gender relations, class relations,
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agricultural productivity, and the health of the farms’ biotic communities, which are
important for long‐term security.

Figure P1.5: Adults and children walking to work in sugarcane fields in the morning in
Bukidnon (photo by author).
The story that emerges out of this rural area is one in which the sugarcane‐ and
banana‐dominated community, which is influenced most strongly by neoliberal policies, is
experiencing significant social, economic, and environmental problems. In the mean time,
the tenets of food sovereignty (food self‐sufficiency, democratization of land control,
sustainable farming practices, gender equity, and class equity) are practiced by the
members of the women‐led organic rice‐growing collective, who are succeeding in
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generating a better quality of life. The experiences in a third community where interviews
were conducted demonstrated a middle ground in terms of both practices and results. All
three of these villages in Bukidnon were founded in the second half of the 20th century
through the settlement of people who were originally from other parts of the Philippines.
Thus, kinship networks are not what unite the experiences of the members of each of these
communities. Rather the economic trajectories of the communities themselves are the
stories to be analyzed, as well as how these different paths fit into broader contexts of
Philippine agricultural development.
The food price crisis of 2008 made many Filipinos food insecure as prices for staple
foods like rice soared. In response, the federal government of the Philippines set out
ambitious goals for achieving food security through national self‐sufficiency, yet these
efforts have been hampered by the institutional apparatuses of agribusinesses and the
influences of neoliberal capitalism on governance. Specific government policies are in
place and government agencies on a variety of levels have an array of programs to help
ensure that staple production is prioritized, yet this study will show that these efforts are
undermined by corporate expansion of export cropping, privatization schemes, trade
liberalization, deregulation, and austerity measures. These global forces have impacts on
every level of governance as well as on the decisions and options available to individuals in
the Philippine agricultural economy.
The debate over protecting internal production of staple foods is increasingly
politicized for many governments in the global South. Retaining higher degrees of food
sovereignty can arguably preserve national security, foster environmental sustainability,
provide continued employment and income for small farmers, and promote land tenure
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continuity in the farming sector. However, the WTO, exercising the neoliberal philosophy
of trade liberalization, challenges protectionist measures that some governments use to
discourage importation and encourage local self‐sufficiency. The WTO argues that free
trade of cheap food is the path toward ending hunger. Yet, food sovereignty advocates
argue that imports of highly subsidized, artificially cheap grain from the global North need
to be curtailed to keep local farmers from being undercut pricewise. The food sovereignty
position is that when a nation’s residents lose their ability to be self‐sufficient in their
staples, they are highly vulnerable to losing their food security.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Defining food security and food sovereignty
The FAO (2002)—Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations—in The
State of Food Insecurity in the World 2001, describes food security as "a situation that exists
when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and
healthy life."
There is a tension in many places in the world between two fundamentally different
food security strategies. One is a strategy that is essentially economic: concentrate on
comparative advantage, focus on exports, and bring in the maximum amount of revenues,
which will be used to purchase the maximum amount of food, much of which will be
imported. The second is allied with the concept of food sovereignty, and is based on
internally producing the food that will be consumed by the members of a nation, so that it
is not necessary to rely on imports, which can be volatile in price and supply.
Food sovereignty is a concept that was advanced at the 1996 UN World Food
Summit by La Via Campesina, a broad international coalition of farmers, peasants,
agricultural wage laborers, and landless workers (Rosset 2003). In addition to
emphasizing self‐sufficiency, food sovereignty takes the concept of food security a step
further by looking at how food is produced and exchanged (Bachmann, Cruzada, and
Wright 2009). Autonomy and self‐determination are important principles in food
sovereignty. This is not only relevant for farmer independence, but for regional and
national autonomy in setting agricultural production and trade policies.
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Like food security, the concept of food sovereignty includes the issues of food
provision and security in terms of getting enough calories and proper nutrition, but it also
emphasizes promoting the means to grow food, protecting the economic viability of food
producers, and respecting the independence of the cuisines of a region (Roberts 2003).
Food sovereignty also exposes the political nature of food issues, which go beyond and can
affect its technical or managerial aspects.
Food sovereignty is a political response to the ways in which the term food security
has been watered down and gives no guidelines on how food procurement is going to
happen. The FAO conditions for food security could be met through undemocratic or
coercive means, so many food sovereignty advocates feel that there must be an expansion
of the guidelines to ensure that self‐determination is possible. McMichael (2005) goes as
far as saying that the term food security has been wholly co‐opted and institutionalized by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a global market relation. However, most food
sovereignty advocates I worked with in the Philippines generally accepted and worked
with the term food security, but they saw food sovereignty as the preferred path toward
food security. Sustainability is also a fundamental aspect of the food sovereignty
framework. A major goal of the movement is to combine both environmental sustainability
and community sustainability through the creation of locally based food networks that
support diverse local economic systems (Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009).
While the food sovereignty approach is advocated by a broad, international base of
small farmers, agricultural laborers, and activists for sustainability and labor rights, it is
sometimes more difficult to discern who promotes the more limited framework for food
security or even a name by which the approach should be known. This research will refer
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to it as the neoliberal approach, since most actors who have promoted it, such as WTO
officials, trade representatives, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
personnel, and some Northern government officials, have advocated the benefits of trade
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and market solutions to food security issues.
The criticism from free trade advocates of the food sovereignty and self‐sufficiency
approaches is that they do not capitalize on comparative advantage and are therefore
inefficient. As United States Trade Representative to the WTO, Susan Schwab, said, “If
every country in the world decided it wanted to produce its own food for consumption,
there would be less food in the world, and more people would be hungry” (Bradsher and
Martin 2008). Arguably, Schwab’s statement against food self‐sufficiency is hypocritical
when one takes into account how the United States itself has pursued self‐sufficiency
strategies as a matter of national security (Hollander 2005). The American stance against
food sovereignty in the global South can be seen as early as 1986, during the GATT‐WTO
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – World Trade Organization) Uruguay Round
negotiations when US Agriculture Secretary John Block said, "[The] idea that developing
countries should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better
ensure their food security by relying on US agricultural products, which are available, in
most cases at much lower cost" (quoted in Bello 2000).
One criticism of the neoliberal approach and Susan Schwab’s stance on the benefits
of comparative advantage is that a more locally oriented food production system may
actually reduce the amount of wasted food, since a globalized system has a vastly more
complicated supply chain with more links and transfer points at which waste and spoilage
might occur.
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Variability of fuel costs pose one of the most serious challenges to neoliberal food
security. Present day food security in most nations is increasingly brittle, with food
systems reliant on just‐in‐time deliveries of far‐flung foodstuffs (Steel 2008). The food
sovereignty framework argues that more locally oriented food systems are a precaution
against volatility in food and fertilizer prices caused by sudden increases in the price of oil
and natural gas. Indeed, the exploitation of comparative advantage and the practice of free
trade inherently depend on cheap transportation costs. If the price of fuel becomes more
expensive, the shipping of food and fertilizer long distances will become less and less
logical. The neoliberal framework has been criticized for its efforts to curb environmental
regulations that could drive up fuel prices, since the expansion of free trade is dependent
on low transportation costs.

1.2 Food sovereignty and food security strategies
One of the challenges of evaluating the merits or drawbacks of the food sovereignty
and neoliberal approaches to food security is that the two sides do not simply have
different ideas on the means to achieve food security, but arguably they have different
views on the ends they are trying to achieve. One way of exploring the contrast between
these two paradigms is to consider whether the neoliberal approach sees social and
environmental reproduction merely as incidental to achieving the ends of well‐matched
production and consumption, and whether the food sovereignty approach sees well‐
matched production and consumption as one of the means to achieving the ends of
harmonious social and environmental reproduction. Put another way, the neoliberal
approach may be using utilitarian ethics to solve a production‐consumption problem, while
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the food sovereignty approach is using communitarian virtue ethics to solve social justice
and ecological sustainability problems.2 This section will therefore organize the arguments
of the two paradigms in three subsections: production and consumption; social
reproduction; and environmental reproduction. First though, a brief overview of the Green
Revolution is in order.
1.2.1 The Green Revolution
Many aspects of the clash between the food sovereignty and neoliberal approaches
to food security are essentially an ongoing referendum on the past, present, and future
promises of the Green Revolution, which is a set of agricultural technologies and
techniques that have radically changed the face of commercial farming since the 1960s.3
Hybrid seeds, often termed high yielding varieties (HYVs), were developed to respond well
to the application of chemical fertilizers and chemical biocides. IR8, an HYV also known as
‘miracle rice,’ created by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines
in the 1960s, increased rice yields dramatically across Asia in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Innovations like IR8 were promoted as a solution to growing needs for food production as
populations exploded in the global South (Singh 2011; Easterbrook 1997).
The term Green Revolution was coined by William Gaud (1968) of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). In a Cold War milieu, he specifically
An even more critical view of the neoliberal approach would question if agribusinesses
are actually concerned about meeting societal consumption needs necessary for food
security, and if most corporate decisions are actually concerned with more than just
boosting production and generating profits. Deciphering motivations of corporations is for
the most part beyond the scope of this research. Thus I will restrict my analysis of
corporations to observable actions and outward projections of discourses.
3 See Shiva (2000) and Pollan (2006) for details on how the fertilizer and pesticide
industries expanded as the result of post‐World War II surpluses of petroleum and
ammonium nitrate in the United States.
2
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described a Green Revolution that stood in opposition to red revolutions. Mark Dowie
(2001) argued that the Green Revolution was pushed by philanthropic foundations, USAID,
and the World Bank as a counterinsurgency strategy to prevent the spread of communism.
Rather than addressing hunger through social means, such as land reform or reducing
economic inequality, the Green Revolution was an attempt to depoliticize the issue by
making the narrative about using the power of science to increase yields.
The term Green Revolution is used less now because since the 1990s there has been
a shift in corporate emphasis toward promoting agricultural biotechnology. The ‘Gene
Revolution,’ however, can be seen as simply a new phase of the Green Revolution, since
seed purveyors like Monsanto, Syngenta, and Pioneer are involved with both new
genetically modified organism (GMO) technologies as well as the hybrid seed technologies
from earlier decades. GMOs have been touted widely for higher yields, as well as traits like
herbicide resistance and pest resistance. Yet the full promise of biotechnology has for the
most part, not been fulfilled, as yield gains have been no more significant with GMOs as
compared to other types of seeds (Gurian‐Sherman 2009). The evolution of herbicide
resistant weeds (Kaskey 2011) and pests that can withstand the toxins engineered to come
out of GMO Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) crops (Tabashnik et al. 2008) also call the future of
GMO crops into question.4 Biotech crops have also been controversial because there are

Glyphosate is a popular herbicide (trademarked as Roundup by Monsanto). Roundup
Ready seeds are GMOs that are resistant to the herbicide, so farmers are encouraged to
douse their fields in Roundup to kill weeds, but the crop will not be killed. Kaskey (2011)
has described the appearance of ‘superweeds’ that are resistant to glyphosate. Bt crops,
the other most popular GMOs that are marketed, are engineered to exude a toxin that
deters pests, but reports are beginning to build of ‘superpests’ that have resistance to Bt
(Tabashnik et al. 2008). Efforts to create GMOs that have enhanced nitrogen uptake are
only in the developmental stages.
4
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fears of genetic contamination of non‐GMO plants, potentially resulting in the elimination
of some traditional seed varieties (Shiva 2000). The preservation of biodiversity is a
contentious topic between agribusinesses and sustainable agriculture advocates.
The Green Revolution has pushed agriculture towards a more industrial model in
every region of the world, even if this was not the original intent of some of the instigators.
By promoting higher‐tech seeds, monocultures, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides, the
emphasis has been on minimizing labor, but these technologies are capital‐intensive and
frequently water‐intensive. Thus, where Green Revolution approaches may have originally
been geared toward helping smallholders, land has been consolidated by wealthier farmers
who have the capital to use the technologies, and economic inequality has increased (Shiva
1991, 2000; Gupta 1998; Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009). Capital‐intensive Green
Revolution technologies have led to more involvement from transnational investors, which
increases the likelihood that value is captured by the foreign company financing the
project, leaving local laborers with meager benefits.
The motivations for the Green Revolution may have been diverse. Certainly some
saw increasing yields as a mission to help end hunger in the developing world. Yet
corporate penetration of new markets was also likely an important motivation for the
agribusinesses that have been involved in providing the inputs and processing the outputs.
To put it more cynically, many have accused the multinationals of purposely enslaving the
farmers of the developing world into a cycle of dependency on external inputs: seeds that
cannot be reused; pest control that ultimately requires more intense pest control; and
fertilizers that ultimately lead to more fertilizers (Shiva 2000; Wright 2003; Yap 2003;
Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009).
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Yapa (1996) argued that the Green Revolution promoted a narrative of a scientific
imperative for ‘improved’ seeds and chemical inputs that socially constructed a sense of
scarcity in the developing world, devaluing the ‘reproductive power’ of socionature by
substituting the ‘productive power’ of industrial inputs.
1.2.2 Production and Consumption
Malthusian concerns5 about population have haunted the food security debates for
decades. As global food production has more than kept up pace with population growth,
Malthus’s predictions have thus far not been borne out, but the question remains whether
gains in food production will continue to outstrip gains in population. Various analysts
(Harding 2010; Stuart 2009; Lawrence 2008) argue that the era of food abundance is
drawing to a close. It may become increasingly important to regularly assess world stocks
of staples. World population, which passed 7 billion in 2011, is still rising rapidly, yet at a
decreasing rate of increase since total fertility rates have declined significantly. The United
Nations Population Division (2011) predicted that world population may reach 9.3 billion
around the year 2050, according to their medium variant scenario. This could still pose
serious problems for food security, but it seems to be far short of the doom scenarios that
were predicted in the 1960s (Ehrlich 1969).
Resources and scarcity are culturally constructed concepts and are inherently
political (Harvey 1974). This is not to say that world production of food will always be
limitless, but certainly thus far world hunger has had much more to do with a lack of

Thomas Malthus (1998) predicted in 1798 that because human populations increase
geometrically, while increases in food production merely increase arithmetically, famines
would result. However, human population patterns have proven to be much more complex
and food production capabilities much more advanced than he predicted.
5
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political will to address hunger and inequalities in distribution than with an actual shortfall
of food supplies. It is also important to remember that resources and scarcity are culturally
constructed when we are considering how land is used in regard to food production. In
other words, although traditional farmland may be somewhat limited, agricultural use of
less obvious spaces will be one aspect of the changing food systems of the future that will
partially negate some of the alarmist predictions of a sudden loss of capacity for food
production. With that said though, loss of prime farmland could potentially jeopardize
long‐term food security, and this problem is occurring in many places around the world.
The food sovereignty framework emphasizes local control of resources, food systems, and
land use planning. This approach does not necessarily solve local problems, but suggests
that there may at least be more political responsiveness if problems develop.
The neoliberal framework, on the other hand, emphasizes more top‐down
approaches that rely on technological solutions: if population goes up, then so must crop
yields. Whether earnestly or cynically, corporations (Monsanto 2011) and governments
(Butler 2004) have used population concerns to justify large‐scale technological
interventions in agriculture. Vandana Shiva (2000) has argued that the yield increases
stemming from Green Revolution technologies have been illusory. Although outputs for a
given single crop may be impressive, these have to be put into a context that monocropping
(which is the norm in Green Revolution strategies) does not provide the farmer with
different outputs from the same field the way that polycropping does. Also, polycropping
may offer more sustainable yields through advantages like more varied harvesting times,
fewer pest infestations, and a more ecological approach to soil fertility based on
intercropping and/or crop rotation.
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Badgley et al. (2007) have shown that organic and sustainable agriculture
approaches actually have better potential than chemical agriculture to produce higher
yields, with the obvious extra benefit that not only do these approaches work in the
medium term, but they are the only approaches that are going to work in the long term,
since the chemical agriculture approach does not preserve soil fertility (IAASTD 2008;
Gurian‐Sherman 2009). Rotation of organic leguminous crops, composting, and other
strategies, can easily provide the nitrogen and other nutrients necessary.
The majority of those experiencing hunger in the world are in the rural areas of the
developing world and ironically it is most commonly those families who are directly
involved in the production of food who have difficulties getting proper nutrition (Lappé et
al. 1998; World Bank 2007). This is because of the shift away from subsistence agriculture
that has made rural agriculturalists dependent on the market for their food security.
Instead of growing the staple foods of their diet, their food security is reliant on producing
enough income from the products they sell or from their wages in the case of wage
laborers. However, low farmgate prices6 drive them into poverty and keep them hungry.
Hunger is not usually due to a general lack of food in a society, but rather to poverty (Holt‐
Giménez 2009). So, while agribusiness and neoliberal rhetoric stresses the importance of
increasing yields to fight hunger, an alternative viewpoint is that it is overproduction that
often causes rural hunger because it keeps farmgate prices low for farmers (Patel 2008). In
situations where farming is oriented toward commodity production and international
trade, producers are at the whim of global markets and compete with a multitude of

6

A farmgate price is the unit price a farmer is paid for their output.
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others.7 Food sovereignty advocates argue that if production decisions are coordinated
with local, regional, or national governments on the basis of need, then overproduction
would be much less likely and farmers could get fair prices for their crops.
The neoliberal claim is that trade benefits all parties, as comparative advantage can
be exploited by people in the North or the South, and as wealth and abundance are created,
a rising tide lifts all boats8 and everyone gains. Furthermore, the argument is that trade
leads to foreign investment, innovation, efficiency, and modernization in the South, and this
has been the basis for the WTO’s branding of the Doha Round as the ‘Development Round.’
Director‐General Pascal Lamy characterized the Doha Round as the WTO’s method of
“delivering on the Millennium Development Goals” of the UN (World Trade Organization
2008). The food sovereignty framework is skeptical of the blanket claims of the benefits of
international trade, arguing that if labor and environmental relations are exploitative and
extractive, then trade may lead to poverty and especially inequality, which could actually
lead to an increase in food insecurity, particularly in rural areas where staple production
has been supplanted by export. In developing areas, free trade has benefited some large
producers who have advantageous locations and the capital to expand production, but the
majority of small producers are not benefiting from trade liberalization, and thus rural
poverty persists (Barndt 2008; Patel 2008).

Monopsony control of food processing and distributing means that even though farmers
might be getting low prices for their crops, this does not necessarily translate into low
prices for consumers.
8 This phrase was used frequently by Robert Rubin, the US Secretary of the Treasury under
President Clinton, who promoted neoliberal policies and free trade. Robert Reich, Clinton’s
Secretary of Labor, dissented, saying, “The rising tide is lifting all yachts, but rowboats and
dinghies have had a harder time” (Bai 2007).
7
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Looking at the era of neoliberal globalization, statistical analysis of changes in gross
national income per capita shows that in 1980 the wealthiest decile of countries had 60
times the income than the poorest decile of countries, while by 2005, the wealthiest decile
of countries had 122 times the income of the poorest decile of countries, effectively
doubling their dominance (Pogge 2008). Furthermore, the amount of intranational
inequality had increased during the era as well in nearly all of the countries that showed a
clear trend. In other words, the poor had a declining percentage of the overall income,
while the wealthy had an increasing percentage of the overall income. These types of
trends often make it more difficult for the poor to attain the things that might help them
with upward mobility, such as education, health care, and influence over the political
process (Pogge 2008).
The FAO (2012) estimated that between 2007 and 2012 the number of
undernourished hovered around 870 million, or roughly one in every eight people on the
planet. The FAO (2010a) stated, “Global cereal harvests have been strong for the past
several years, even as the number of undernourished people was rising” and that deep
structural problems are preventing governments from addressing the needs of their
populations. They said governments should “encourage increased investment in
agriculture, expand safety nets and social assistance programmes, and enhance income‐
generating activities for the rural and urban poor.”
1.2.3 Social Reproduction
Marston (2000) described social reproduction as the “social relations, objects and
instruments that enable the maintenance of everyday life within capitalism.” Though the
neoliberal paradigm might view land and labor as concerns that pertain to production, in
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the food sovereignty framework, land control is an essential part of constructing the
consciousness of a community and reproducing its social relations (Vergara‐Camus 2009).
Furthermore, in the food sovereignty framework, the social reproduction of labor is an end
in itself. Discussions below will first consider issues of land control, and then the interfaces
between labor and issues of knowledge, rootedness, and self‐determination.
Food sovereignty advocates argue that retaining higher degrees of food sovereignty
can preserve national security, provide continued employment and income, and promote
land tenure continuity in the farming sector. Promoting both economic stability and
political stability can build an agricultural middle class, and it is progress on these fronts
that can advance social justice concerns such as issues of income equality and gender
equality. La Via Campesina and other organizations that advocate for food sovereignty
have done a great deal to advance gender issues in peasant movements in recent years
(Desmarais 2008; Menser 2008). Chapter Seven will deal with the construction of gender
in a community in Bukidnon that is working toward food sovereignty goals.
The control of territory is of central importance for effectuating food sovereignty
projects. Likewise, land policies are essential concerns in the neoliberal paradigm as well.
There is a limited amount of quality farmland in the world and some countries are
especially lacking in fertile areas to cultivate. Food demand is predicted to rise faster than
the availability of land. Indeed, availability of land may shrink as suburban sprawl converts
farmland to residential and commercial purposes. Thus land use will become an
increasingly contentious issue.
Wealthy or cash‐rich nations, especially those with a dearth of agricultural land, are
concerned about their own food security and are interested in the agricultural areas of the
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global South. Especially since the food price crisis of 2008, these wealthy countries have
strategized to make land purchases, long term leases, or contract arrangements in
developing areas in order to secure dedicated food production that will be shipped to the
wealthy nation (Rice 2009). This global land rush has been “fueled…by a growing sense
that world markets cannot be trusted” to provide a stable and predictable food supply
(Goering and Rodriguez 2008). Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.2) details some of the land deals that
countries have pursued in the Philippines.9
The neoliberal paradigm has facilitated foreign investment in agricultural lands by
working to liberalize investment policies, as well as liberalizing trade policies by reducing
tariffs and trade barriers. The argument for these investments is that injections of capital
will modernize agricultural productivity and provide jobs in the process. The food
sovereignty framework, on the other hand, “promotes a genuine agrarian reform and
defends access to, and the sharing of, productive territories free from the threat of
privatisation and expulsion” (Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty 2007). This
democratization of territories is intended to facilitate the equitable reproduction of social
relations. Thus the issue of the concentration of land control has become very contentious
between food sovereignty advocates and the governments and investors who are involved
in making these land deals.

As for other countries, The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2010) has
detailed the investments of Sweden in Tanzania, and various Gulf oil states in Pakistan.
Chinese, Indian, and Saudi investors have attempted land deals in Tanzania, Madagascar,
Mozambique, Sudan and Mali, while Saudi investment plans in Ethiopia are on an especially
large scale, with reports of scant compensation for local people, such as lease arrangements
of $10 per hectare per year (Butler 2010).
9
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Neoliberal policies on foreign investment and liberalization of markets drive
increases in plantation agriculture that change the types of labor available in rural
communities. Farmland ends up getting sold, rented, or pawned to more large‐scale and
capital‐intensive operators that utilize wage labor to perform the farming tasks (Borras
and Franco 2005). This labor is usually less skilled, less rooted to the community, and
lower paid. In many places around the world, the average age of smallholders is increasing.
Younger rural people are not seeing enough income opportunities in family farming and
are leaving for urban areas. Vital agricultural knowledge is being lost when it does not get
passed down to younger generations.
The food sovereignty framework prioritizes labor concerns, as the movement
springs mainly from small‐scale food producers themselves. The Nyéléni declaration, from
a food sovereignty conference in Mali in 2007, states, “Food sovereignty promotes
transparent trade that guarantees just income to all peoples” (Nyéléni Forum for Food
Sovereignty 2007). They promote a more communitarian approach focused on
sustainability, land tenure continuity, local markets, and fair compensation for the laborers
that can re‐stabilize rural communities.
Both the neoliberal framework and the food sovereignty framework use the rhetoric
of self‐determination to argue their positions. The neoliberal position stresses the choices
that are made available to farmers and consumers. The idea is that science and industry
have provided superior seeds and other inputs, and that the freedom of the market has
made these things available. Likewise, the freedom of the market supposedly gives the
farmer nearly limitless choices on where to sell the outputs. Farmers can supposedly
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determine their own fate by using self‐interest to decide what are the best crops to grow,
the best methods to employ, and the best place to market their products.
The food sovereignty framework challenges the accuracy of that picture. First of all,
the choices that corporations offer in regard to inputs are not as wide as they appear.
Agribusinesses actually market a relatively small number of choices to farmers. But more
importantly, opting into the inputs they offer often means to tether oneself to a particular
set of techniques that require substantial capital investments, and because of the nature of
the seeds and the persistent need for increased applications of chemicals (fertilizers
and/or biocides), the farmer must keep returning to the products of the agribusiness
season after season. The food sovereignty advocates say this is not freedom at all, but
rather enslavement.
The food sovereignty framework argues that a different picture of self‐
determination can be achieved through an approach based on low external input farming.
Seeds can be developed on site instead of relying on the high tech seeds that are peddled by
agribusinesses. Local organic farmers associations and NGOs often have seed banks that
they offer in order to help people convert to sustainable methods. Then, with some crops,
if the farmer is willing to use seed selection and simple cross breeding, they can develop
their own new varieties that are tailored to their exact geographic specificities, such as
climate, moisture content of the soil, soil type, mineral content of the soil, topography,
availability of light, and whatever other factors might be unique to their parcel of land
(Frossard 1994; Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009). They achieve self‐determination
in both the sense of not having to purchase seeds externally and in creating their own
unique methods that benefit them the most. Another similar process of self‐determination
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may come when farmers choose to compost on‐site materials, such as crop waste, to create
their own fertilizers, rather than opting for external inputs of chemical fertilizers for which
they must pay.
Producing for a local community or region does not give the sort of limitless
possibilities that are hypothetically part of the trade liberalization paradigm. Yet food
sovereignty advocates argue there is probably more freedom involved in the more
localized model. If a farmer is producing for their locality or region, they have much easier
access to market signals about what the community wants and needs. This means it is less
likely that they will be shut out or undercompensated for their products. This can be seen
by farmers as a way to increase their levels of self‐determination. Furthermore, when
farmers are not producing export‐oriented cash crops, they are less likely to be engaged in
monocultures. Some might even be very diversified in their production, which means they
have greater means for ensuring their own food security and the food security of their
region, which are both essential elements in constructing communities where reproducing
social relations in an equitable way is a central focus.
1.2.4 Environmental Reproduction
Environmental reproduction can be defined as the socio‐ecological relations that
reproduce the environmental conditions of a community or system. Agribusinesses have
frequently promoted their products using the language of ecological sustainability.
Monsanto (2011), for example, argued that their advances in seed technology reduce
tillage, conserve water and nitrogen, and increase yields, which means less deforestation
for new cropland. However, food sovereignty and environmental advocates tend to
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criticize large agribusinesses for promoting an industrial agriculture paradigm
characterized by a variety of negative ecological impacts.
Controversies persist on the extent to which safety standards for developing,
testing, marketing, and assessing health impacts of GMOs should be based on the
precautionary principle. The Rio Declaration of 1992’s principle 15 describes the
precautionary principle: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost‐effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation” (United Nations Environment Programme 1992).
Chapter Four (Section 4.2.1) explores the conflicts between pro‐ and anti‐biotech advocates
in the Philippines.10
The supposed advantage of using chemical fertilizers, besides saving labor, is that a
farmer can add nitrogen when they need nitrogen, phosphorus when they need
phosphorus, etc (Baligar and Bennett 1986). However, sustainable agriculture advocates
argue that this atomistic approach does not respect the complexities of soil chemistry
(Altieri and Nicholls 2003). The nutrients in soil are not simply a triumvirate of nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potassium (NPK). There are numerous other micronutrients and
organisms that contribute to soil fertility. Unfortunately, not only do the chemical
fertilizers often not provide these other nutrients, the chemical fertilizers even kill off soil
organisms that produce these nutrients (Verma and Katiyar 2009). As the amount of
organic matter is progressively reduced over cropping seasons, then the soil has a greater
See Lieberman and Gray (2008) about European and American interpretations of the
precautionary principle that were respectively stringent and weak. Developing countries
such as the Philippines have increasingly moved toward acceptance of GMOs in the wake of
a WTO dispute resolution that did not recognize the precautionary principle as a significant
reason to impede the international trade of GMOs (Winham 2009).
10
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and greater need for NPK inputs to take up the slack. Farmers complain that they have to
spend more and more money on fertilizers in order to get the same results that they did in
the past. As one Philippine government official explained to me, much like a drug addict
with a need for an increasingly strong fix, the soil can become addicted to the chemicals,
and at some point, the yields simply come down, even if the chemicals are provided (see
also Gruhn, Goletti, and Yudelman 2000).
Climate change may jeopardize certain farming ecosystems, or at least curtail their
reliability and yields with the unpredictability of weather patterns and water supplies. In
industrial agriculture, monocropping is the norm and biodiversity is typically reduced.
This reliance on one crop creates more vulnerability if weather stresses cause crop failure.
Sustainable agriculture typically keeps farm diversity at higher levels and reduces both the
economic and ecological vulnerability of the farm.
Agriculture itself is often a major contributor to greenhouse gases (Lappé 2009;
LEAD 2006). The creation, processing, and transport of chemical fertilizers result in the
emissions of greenhouse gases. Sustainable agriculture curtails emissions for a number of
reasons. Sustainable farmers are likely to rely on saved seeds rather than high‐tech seeds
that have traveled long distances. They may compost crop wastes to produce their own
fertilizers, and they rely much less on mechanization. When sustainable farmers produce
for local markets, this means less fuel is used in the transport of their goods to market.
If they are including animals in their farm systems, sustainable farmers are more
likely to raise them using methods that cycle energy within the system rather than
demanding outside inputs. For example, sustainable farmers may use animals for plowing,
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use their manure for fertilizer, and feed them using crop wastes or on‐site grasses rather
than externally sourced grains from faraway locations.
The global need for agricultural development planning spawned the International
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD),
a committee of scientists, UN representatives, governmental and nongovernmental
officials, farmers groups, and industry representatives. The recommendations of the
IAASTD (2008) included both a push for the financial recognition of the positive ecosystem
services that sustainable farms perform as well as a search for ways in which chemical‐
intensive and export‐crop farms could be made to financially internalize the negative
externalities that are the result of the chemical/export paradigm. The execution of these
courses of action would drive agricultural production in many places closer to the local
scale. Many economists and environmentalists have favored a global carbon tax as a
potential way to implement some of these changes (The Economist 2011), but recent
international climate summits have not produced any agreement toward this end.
With the dramatic fluctuations in the price of fertilizers and the future possibility of
an international carbon tax and/or environmental taxes, the calculus of efficiency in
farming is changing. While fertilizer‐intensive export‐cropping may in some instances
bring high gross yields, if analyzed instead in terms of return per unit of energy
expenditure, localized sustainable farming may be far more efficient because transport is
not necessary for the chemical inputs and the commodities themselves travel shorter
distances when going to market (Hecht 1987). Furthermore, HYVs and biotech crops may
in some cases produce higher yields in a decontextualized, reductive comparison with
traditional crops, but when farming systems in general are compared, the interactions
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among soil, water, and plant genetic resources in a traditional mixed farming system can be
superior to monoculture (Shiva 1991; Grossman 1984; Watts 1987).

1.3 Historical and geographic background of the Philippines
Spread over latitudes ranging from 4.5˚ North to 21.5˚ North, the land area of the
Philippines (~300,000 km2) is roughly equivalent to the state of Arizona and had an
estimated 2010 population of 93 million (United Nations Population Division 2010).
After more than 300 years of Spanish colonialism (1565‐1898), the Philippines
became a territory of the United States as a result of the spoils of the Spanish‐American
War. Although eventually achieving full political independence in 1946, the Philippines has
continued to be manipulated economically by American interests, particularly
agribusinesses that seek to profit from its tropical agricultural potential.
The American colonial period of the early 20th century solidified the power of
landlords at the expense of the peasantry. “To maintain stability in the colony, the U.S.
made an alliance with local landed elites and forged them into a national ruling class”
(Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982: 7). But by the late 1960s, friction between classes was
increasing. In 1968, during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, the Communist Party of
the Philippines was revived along with its military arm, the Maoist rural insurgency
network known as the New People’s Army (NPA) that still operates in the countryside
today. By 1972, in an effort to consolidate his power, Marcos declared martial law. In
response, the US adhered more to its concerns for protecting trading interests than
protecting democracy: “The legitimacy of the government was eroding, yet all likely
alternatives to Marcos were unpalatable since they would probably follow nationalist
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economic strategies” (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982: 14).
In the meantime, the agricultural sector of the Philippines was becoming more
oriented toward exports. The World Bank, motivated by a desire to integrate the
Philippines into a world capitalist trading system, promoted foreign (especially American)
investment in export agriculture and facilitated the creation of pineapple and banana
plantations, among other crops (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982). The Philippines was the
object of American attention for its strategic military position and because development
programs were designed as counter‐insurgency strategies in places where there were left‐
wing rebel movements (Molle 2007). As opinion soured on the Vietnam conflict, the
American public grew weary of direct bilateral involvement with countries in the global
South. Thus policy and influence were instead channeled through international financial
institutions.
The late 1960s and 1970s were also the years when Philippine agriculture became
increasingly oriented toward the Green Revolution technologies of the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) in Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines (Burley 1973; Roumasset 1976;
Nazarea‐Sandoval 1995). By 1973, the World Bank threw its weight behind the Philippine
government’s Masagana 99 credit program, which bundled credit for Filipino farmers with
a package of HYVs, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, presenting a technical
solution for the persistent poverty of the countryside, while ignoring the long‐standing
need for redistributive land reform (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982; Borras et al. 2009).
Although yields from Green Revolution crops did increase under certain ideal conditions,
by the 1980s some Filipino farmers were complaining that the Green Revolution was a
scourge (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982; Aerni, Phan‐Huy, and Rieder 1999). Even when
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yields went up, the increasing price of the inputs lowered farmers’ incomes and poverty
worsened. Monocropping left farmers susceptible to market irregularities (Scott 1976; see
also Grossman 1984), pest infestations, illnesses from pesticide exposure, reduced
biodiversity levels on the farms, and soils with nutrient imbalances and deficiencies.
By the 1990s, Filipino farmers were polarizing in their attitudes toward the new
developments in crop biotechnology. While some wanted to take advantage of cutting edge
techniques, others held that genetically modified (GM) crops were another ploy of the
transnational corporations to make farmers dependent on outside technology, noting that
GM seeds are ill suited to the peculiarities of their specific lands (Aerni, Phan‐Huy, and
Rieder 1999) and threaten the biodiversity of their ecosystems (Altieri 2005). The biotech
approach has been criticized as top‐down and global, whereas many farmers want to
employ solutions tailored to their distinct needs. Since 2000, resistance to the biotech
paradigm in the Philippines has included uprootings of GM test fields (MASIPAG 2001),
hunger strikes (de Quiros 2003), and mass protests against the WTO’s projects of
agricultural trade liberalization and its support of biotech corporations (Ronquillo 2005).
Although GM corn (such as Bt corn and Roundup Ready corn) has been commercially
grown amid controversy in the Philippines since 2003, GM rice is not yet formally
approved and will prove to be a contentious issue as there are plans for both its
importation and domestic commercialization (Clapp 2004; Abano 2007; Ociones 2007;
Lynn 2008; Reuters 2008; McKie 2013).
The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the Philippine Rice Research
Institute (PhilRice), adopting the logic of the WTO, promoted trade liberalization in their
publication Why Does the Philippines Import Rice? (Dawe 2006). The Institutes argued that
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the importation of more rice, the internal production of less rice, and the production of
more High Value Commercial Crops (HVCC) are the best paths to pursue since this will
drive rice prices down and the poor will benefit. In light of what was about to occur in
2008, it is troubling that one of the chapters of the book was titled, “The world rice market
can be trusted” (Dawe 2006).
Severe global increases in food prices catapulted issues of food security into public
debate in 2008. Rice prices especially soared (Buerkle 2008; von Braun 2008), with the
Philippines seeing increases of 50% from February to April 2008, due to export restrictions
from the major rice exporting countries. Rice is the most important staple in the
Philippines and in recent years, the Philippines has been at or near the top of the list of the
world’s largest importers of rice. Poor people were especially vulnerable to these price
shocks, and violent protests occurred in the country (Buerkle 2008; Bradsher and Martin
2008). The Philippines had been a rice exporter in the early 1990s, but there was a steady
decline in the percent of production in relation to consumption, with 104.7% in 1990‐1992
declining to 87.7% by 2005‐2007 (FAO 2010b). Thus the Philippines has been a net rice
importer every year since 1995 (Ignacio 2005), the year the Philippines acceded to the
WTO.
In the 2005‐2007 period, the Philippines only exported 85.9% as much food as the
overall amount of food that they imported, which is shocking for a country with a 36.5%
rural population and a labor force that is 36% agricultural (FAO 2010b). The FAO (2011)
reported that the countries hit hardest by the 2008 food price crisis were those that were
import‐dependent. FAO (2010b) data showed a reduction in the percentage of
undernourished Filipinos from 1990 (24%) to 2007 (15%), but the 2008 food price crisis
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reversed that trend and 21.5% of the population experienced hunger in 2011 (Social
Weather Stations 2011).11
In reaction to the food crisis, the heads of the World Bank and IMF committed to
further opening world markets (Dunphy 2008). Trade and technology were touted as the
way to attack the problem, with the exploitation of comparative advantage to pave the way
toward food security.
What is the connection between trade policy and the local farmers of the
Philippines? The reason it matters, especially in the case of rice, is that the Philippines is
not an especially cheap place to produce rice, and if internally produced rice is not
competitive with imported rice, then domestic producers are at risk in a liberalized market.
Some have argued that there are significant geographic obstacles, such as varied
topography and a lack of large river deltas (such as the Chao Phraya in Thailand, the
Irrawaddy in Burma/Myanmar, and the Mekong in Cambodia and Vietnam) that restrain
the Philippines from being a top rice producer (Dawe 2006). However, other factors are
probably far more important. Land use decisions, quality of infrastructure, and
government investment in agriculture, such as subsidization, all play important roles in the
production and pricing of rice. The United States, for example, can sell cheaper than the
Philippines in a variety of crops, as the 2008 US Farm Bill is just the most recent in a long
line of pieces of legislation that have given major agricultural subsidies, especially to staple
crops like corn, wheat, soybeans, and rice, encouraging production on a huge scale (Monke
Robert Paarlberg (2008), political scientist at Wellesley, argued that the 2008
fluctuations of food prices did not cause hunger among the poor since “most of the world’s
hungry people do not use international food markets.” The statistics above show how
misinformed his assertion was, since international prices do indeed affect the poor,
especially in countries that are not self‐sufficient in their staples.
11
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2008). The rice subsidies alone have been nearly a billion dollars per year in the US
(Environmental Working Group 2011).
Liberalization would result in a flood of cheap subsidized rice, which would
undercut Filipino farmers. Chapter Five (Section 5.3) will deal with more of the specifics of
liberalization’s present and potential effects on the agricultural economy of the Philippines,
particularly in regard to the staples of rice and corn. If staple farmers are undercut, then
this can result in more crop conversions and a further erosion of the food sovereignty of
the Philippines.
The conflict between the strategies of export‐orientation and local self‐sufficiency in
the Philippines grew more complex in April 2008 when President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
set a goal of 98% rice self‐sufficiency by 2010 (but later modified it to 100% by 2013).
Food sovereignty advocates have welcomed this commitment, but they remain skeptical
about the productionist orientation of the self‐sufficiency plan that is based on yield
increases rather than land policies. What is lacking in the government’s plans are
strategies to reverse the trend of land conversions that have turned former rice and corn
fields into plantations of bananas, pineapples, and other export crops (Gamolo 2008).
Agribusinesses and large landowners have continued to acquire or lease superior
farmlands (Franco and Borras 2007), gradually wresting control of agriculture from
peasant farmers, leaving many of them only with the options of leaving their land,
migrating toward land with marginal soils, or accepting employment as agricultural
laborers for the plantations. This process is leading to the proletarianization of many rural
populations in the Philippines (see Breman 2000 and Scott 1976). The current situation is,
thus, not only a battle over decisions about agricultural techniques and whether or not to
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produce for local needs, but it is a battle over territory as well. This study seeks to answer
the following questions. Can farmers produce geographies wherein they can achieve self‐
determination? Can communities farm collectively rather than as virtual employees of
transnational seed companies and agribusinesses? Can the means of production—
particularly land and seeds—be controlled locally? Each of these questions raises dynamic
issues of geographic scale.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical frameworks
The choices that people make about agricultural practices are not carried out in the
abstract; they take place in a wide array of contested spaces. They are intrinsically and
overtly spatial activities, and it is for this reason that a geographical analysis is especially
needed. Competition and cooperation are produced and mediated in part through
productions of geographic scale, and illuminating the intricate differences in power
relations that are involved in scalar relationships is an important aspect of this project.
Globalization is not just an economic rearrangement, but it is a spatial project as well.
This chapter will look first at the theoretical debates surrounding geographic scale.
Then there will be shorter sections on theorizations of neoliberalism as well as the
frameworks through which food security and food sovereignty are debated.

2.1 Scale theory: social construction of scale
Scale has become one of the most debated concepts in human geography over the
past thirty years. Are notions of scale simply tied to the spatial extent of a thing, process, or
interaction? Or does scale also pertain to notions of hierarchical structuring of sociospatial
relations? Are scales real ‘things’ in the world or are they simply discourses without
ontological grounding? This section will look at some of the ways that scale theorization
has changed and grown and will explore key issues such as scale‐as‐size (a matter of
‘horizontal’ spatial extent) versus scale‐as‐level (a hierarchical, ‘vertical’ arrangement of
space), as well as discussions regarding ontology and epistemology.
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2.1.1 Review of the literature on scale theorization
The one point of consensus forged among human geographers in recent decades is
that hierarchical scales are socially produced or socially constructed. They are not ‘given’
or ‘natural,’ but instead are the outcomes of human activity, contingent on the interactions
of different actors and expressive of the power relations between these actors. Peter
Taylor (1982) proposed that the emergence of scales has been closely connected to the
expansion of capitalist production. Neil Smith (1984) gave scale theory more explanatory
weight by analyzing the uneven movement of capital across space and noted that “the
hierarchical ordering of scales [is] a certain candidate for abolition in a revolutionized
social geography” (1992: 66). Yet Smith (1996) warned that the fetishization of “spaces of
flows,” which is a common alternate spatial metaphor, can obscure the politics of scale.
For Smith (1993), distinctions such as local, national, and global have become
‘intuitive fictions,’ yet Smith (1992; 1993) pushed scale theory to analyze not only
economic and governmental concerns, but social and cultural issues as well, while
advocating for research on the scales of the body and the home. Sallie Marston (2000)
argued that scholarship on the social construction of scale had been focusing on capitalist
production, whereas scale scholarship needs to address the processes of social
reproduction and consumption as well. The gendering of these processes has been an
important part of the story of how scale is produced. In the context of my study, gender
relations and various types of development influence each other and simultaneously
influence how households and communities are scaled. Marston and Smith (2001) argued
that households should not be considered “relatively stable background structures” since
they are contingent on a variety of processes and power dynamics, just like the state.
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One of Erik Swyngedouw’s important contributions has been to include questions of
nature and ecology in scale theory inquiries (1997; 2000; 2004). Rather than focusing
simply on human phenomena, Swyngedouw’s work has helped spur interrogations of scale
in a wide variety of political ecology contexts. When considering water resources for
example, the watershed can make a simple spatial scale (Molle 2007), even though we must
still consider how these arrangements are mutable and that problems within a certain
watershed may have originated from outside the watershed. Likewise, solutions to these
problems may come from outside of the watershed as well. Compared to hydrological
issues, it is even more difficult with food systems to fall back on a natural basis for the
boundaries of a scale of interaction. This surfaces in debates over how to define local food.
Still, it can be beneficial to analyze how ideas of natural boundaries, in tension with
political and cultural boundaries, influence discourses of scale, as well as discourses about
the problems of food production. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) conveyed how political
ecology issues can be influenced by processes at local, national, and international levels,
which has been an important starting point for many political ecology projects, but even
these spatial distinctions or levels themselves need to be problematized by scholars, since
they are not simply backdrops to the action, but rather a part of the processes themselves
(Rangan and Kull 2009).
Katherine Jones (1998) was one of the first theorists to advocate approaching scale
as an epistemological structure—“a way of knowing or apprehending.” This helped open
up the debates on whether scale was being reified by some theorists. In my research, I feel
it is important to focus on the politics of the scaling activities of various actors without
reifying their scalar constructions. Do scales have ontological validity? Sallie Marston, John
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Paul Jones III, and Keith Woodward (2005) reviewed how confusing notions of scale and
the politics of scale had become. Discussion of hierarchical scales had, in their opinion, too
often reified faulty notions of scale. Their assessment was that scales do not have
ontological validity and that a ‘flat ontology’ should replace the idea of scale in human
geography.
The first reason that Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005) chose to abandon
hierarchical scale is that there has been confusion between “scale as size—what is also
called a horizontal measure of ‘scope’ or ‘extensiveness’—and scale as level—a vertically
imagined, ‘nested hierarchical ordering of space’ (Howitt 2002, 305).” An illustration of
this potential confusion would be if Alaska and Rhode Island are referred to as being at the
same scale, even though in reality, they are simply at the same level (i.e., they are both
states), since they have drastically different spatial extents (McCarthy 2010). Marston,
Jones, and Woodward (2005) argued that there are “insufficient grounds to maintain the
distinction” between scale‐as‐size and scale‐as‐level. I argue that collapsing the distinction
would be an error, since scale‐as‐size can reflect real, tangible changes in the spatial extent
of something, while scale‐as‐level is an epistemological construct.
Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005) argued that epistemological ordering frames
are encountered not “in a vertical imaginary, but on the ground, in practice, the result of
marking territories horizontally through boundaries and enclosures, documents and rules,
enforcing agents and their authoritative resources.” It is a salient point that the
manifestations of scale are experienced physically. Thus it is all the more perplexing that
Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005) wished to get rid of scale in human geography. The
fact that the effects of epistemological ordering frames can be experienced viscerally

44

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
should mean that we want to study them all the more (Moore 2008; Leitner and Miller
2007). Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008) said the removal of scale from critical geography
would have the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing unequal power relationships
because scale would be taken for granted rather than analyzed for how and by whom our
ideas of scale are produced. Gonzalez (2006: 838) noted that political actors and
movements try to make the scaling of their projects as “natural, normal and legitimate as
possible,” concealing how those actors may benefit from the project. Paasi (2004) stressed
that spatial categories like scale need to be kept ‘theoretically visible.’
The second reservation Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005: 421) had about scale
regards problematic binaries such as local‐global. Notions of verticality tend to privilege
the causality of the global over ‘smaller’ scales such as the urban or the community. This
privileging is especially problematic if a theorist falls back on ideas of the force of abstract
global capital. So it is admirable that Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005) wanted to
remind us that hegemony and power are not monolithic abstractions, but the acts of
individuals, usually working in concert with others. Critical of researchers looking ‘up’
rather than ‘sideways’ for the sources of restructuring, they worried about “eviscerating
agency at one end of the hierarchy in favor of such terms as ‘global capitalism’,
‘international political economy’, ‘larger scale forces’ and ‘national social formations.’” In
other words, there are real individuals who are responsible for restructuring.
Rearrangements do not occur because of some invisible hand of neoliberal capitalism.
This is an excellent point, though I do not think it is grounds to abandon the study of
hierarchical scale. Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005: 421) admit that these “most
privileged social actors” who are doing the restructuring typically are “more efficacious in
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spatial reach.” I think this extended spatial reach is important and shows the way that
scale‐as‐size and scale‐as‐level are tied together. It is precisely this extension of spatial
reach that creates the discourse, or the illusion, if you will, of hierarchical scale. We need to
refrain from theorization that masks the responsibilities of individuals. However, at the
same time, we need to recognize that these actors may be using discourses of hierarchical
scales (and/or horizontal networks) in order to execute their projects.
Marston, Jones, and Woodward (2005: 422) claimed, “In a flat (as opposed to
horizontal) ontology, we discard the centring essentialism that infuses not only the up‐
down vertical imaginary but also the radiating (out from here) spatiality of horizontality.”
Yet what understanding does the flat ontology help us accomplish? The authors “propose
that it is necessary to invent—perhaps endlessly—new spatial concepts that linger upon
the materialities and singularities of space.” Liberating perhaps, but what a lot of work!
Their approach has value since a hazard of looking at vertical and horizontal
categorizations is that we might slip into accepting these categorizations. Yet, by relying on
the invention of new concepts, the transferability of the analysis from one project to
another is more challenging with the flat ontology. It may provide accuracy for a specific
subject, but may be worse than scalar approaches for providing any general theoretical
tools for understanding the politics of sociospatial processes. With analysis of the social
construction of scale, one should avoid simply channeling things into the same old
categories (which is the criticism that Marston, Jones, and Woodward make), but when one
does see a similar pattern of actors manipulating the discourses of scale, then an analysis of
the power relations that are involved in this discourse makes sense. For example, if one
can identify the ways in which international financial institutions (IFIs) have used loan
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conditions to mandate scalar changes in the power structures of governments in one part
of the world, it may be possible to recognize these strategies in other parts of the world and
seek to redress or counteract this hegemonic pressure.
Saussure (1966) and Foucault (1971; 1977) showed that language plays a part in
constructing reality rather than simply reflecting it. Categorization is a means of control.
In the article, “Rethinking scale as a geographical category: from analysis to practice,”
Adam Moore (2008) skillfully argued about the pitfalls of using scale as an academic
category of analysis in human geography, while showing that we still need to engage with
the ways that discourses of scale are used in the real world. Moore (2008: 203) felt that it
is important to draw distinctions between scale as a category of analysis and scale as a
category of practice:
In adopting scale as a category of analysis geographers tend to reify it as a
fundamental ontological entity, thereby treating a social category employed in the
practice of sociospatial politics as a central theoretical tool. I argue that this
analytical manoeuvre is neither helpful nor necessary, and outline its consequences
in analyses of the politics of scale.
When we do use scales as analytical categories, Moore argued that it “directs attention
away from the various social actors and practices involved in scale politics” (2008: 211).
Treating scale as a category of analysis is theoretically problematic. “The tendency
to partition the social world into hierarchically ordered spatial ‘containers’ is what we want
to explain—not explain things with” (Moore 2008: 212). Yet treating scale as a category of
analysis is a methodological roadblock as well. “As long as scale as a substantial category of
analysis is the focal point of geographic research, the scalar practices of social actors will
tend to remain at the margins of disciplinary attention” (Moore 2008: 212). If we think of
scales as material entities or processes, then there is a risk that scalar representations will
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be treated as corroborative evidence “rather than socio‐spatial projects and political
manoeuvers to be interrogated” (2008: 211).
Moore (2008) agreed with part of Marston, Jones, and Woodward’s (2005)
‘intervention’ in scale theory, however, he argued that “their proposal to do away not just
with a hierarchical scalar ontology, but to ‘eliminate scale as a concept in human
geography’ (2005: 416) – and thus presumably any reference to scale politics is a
misguided case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater” (Moore 2008: 213). I am in
agreement with Moore, who went on to argue, “It is not necessary to retain a commitment
to the existence of scales in order to analyse the politics of scale. Just as we can research
nationalist practices without assuming that nations are real entities, it is possible to
develop theories of scale politics without scales” (2008: 213). As Brubaker, Loveman, and
Stamatov (2004: 45) asserted, nations “are not things in the world, but perspectives on the
world—not ontological but epistemological realities.” To take another example, many
would agree that race is a socially constructed category with no ontological validity, but it
makes no sense to refrain from analyzing racial categorization. Instead we need to talk
about what are the processes and political projects that have created our conceptions
about race and that continue to construct the category of race. Likewise, regarding scales, I
am in agreement with Moore, who argued, “To claim that scales are epistemological—not
ontological—realities does not diminish their importance. Rather it alerts us to the real
and important ways scalar categorization structures not only personal perceptions but
social relations” (2008: 214).
Like Neil Smith’s assertions that the politics of scale are motivated by individuals’
and groups’ efforts to remake sociospatial arrangements to their benefit, Moore (2008:
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218) said, “Scale politics is … always connected to spatial projects—attempts to crystallize
certain sociospatial arrangements in consciousness and practice in order to further social,
political or cultural aims.” Transnational corporations sometimes invoke the scale of the
‘global’ to legitimate their presence as fundamental players in the economic landscape
(Kelly 1997; Moore 2008).
Moore (2008: 215) asked, “What makes it more or less likely for particular scalar
categories and categorizations to take hold in practice?” Huber and Emel (2009) said this
depends on social actors’ and organizations’ power to manipulate both the discursive and
material dimensions of scale. If we see scales as sets of discourses and practices instead of
concrete entities (Paasi 2004), we can concentrate on how “specific scalar configurations
solidify in consciousness and practice” (Moore 2008: 214). This is not simply some
poststructuralist exercise in analysis, because as Moore (2008: 214) said, “there are very
material consequences when specific scalar formulations are successfully disseminated and
utilized by powerful political actors and institutions to further specific political projects.”
Danny MacKinnon (2011) proposed to replace the term ‘the politics of scale’ with
‘scalar politics.’ Using the adjective scalar as opposed to the noun scale may help push us to
not reify the idea of scale, and instead to think of processes that are informed by people’s
ideas of scale. I appreciate this direction taken by MacKinnon, however, I advocate that use
of the verb ‘scaling’ is an even more appropriate way of stressing that when people pursue
a particular project, this is an action. Scaling is often a combination of making material
changes in spatial arrangements along with making discursive use of spatial categories and
ideas of hierarchies and networks. This idea will be expanded upon in the next section.
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2.1.2 Scaling
I would like to address when we may want to use the term scale (in both scale‐as‐
size and scale‐as‐level contexts), as well as propose when we might use the terms scaling
and hierarchical scaling. If scale can be defined as the relative size or extent of something,
we can use the term scale (in this scale‐as‐size context) in a real‐world descriptive way if
we are simply describing the size or spatial extent of a thing, process, or interaction.
However, because scale‐as‐level is an epistemological construct, then we should use the
term carefully because this type of scale lacks an ontological basis. If we do use the term
scale to refer to scale‐as‐level, then it should be in the context of describing a discourse that
people are using, trying to manipulate, or to which they are being subjected.
In order to emphasize the active quality of socio‐spatial interactions, I propose that
we use the active verb scaling to describe the actions that people are taking in their
environments. In regard to scale‐as‐size, we can define scaling as the act of trying to alter
or establish the relative size or extent of a thing, a process, or an interaction. For example,
one might scale a thing such as a farm by making it larger or smaller. One might scale a
process, such as the cycling of nutrients by either composting on‐site materials or seeking
out external inputs. Or one might scale an interaction, such as a trading relationship by
dealing either with neighbors and other nearby people or by dealing with distant
commodity processors. Each of these examples is consistent with the simple idea of scale
relating to the size or extent of something.
In regard to scale‐as‐level, it is common to see discussion of scale where there is
reference to hierarchically nested structures. Scale in this sense exists as a discourse, not
always in an overtly conscious way, but nonetheless as a way people have of organizing
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space that is imbued with the power relationships in their lives. Here we need to discuss
what is referred to as the production of scale or the social construction of scale. While the
term ‘production of scale’ focuses our attention on the material outcomes of capitalist
processes, the term ‘social construction of scale’ more readily includes both these material
dimensions as well as the discursive dimensions of scale construction (Huber and Emel
2009).
I argue that hierarchical scales may be epistemological realities (albeit sometimes
vague realities), but not material realities in the broader sense of tangible, touchable things.
Common examples are the official manifestations of governmental power, which in the case
of the Philippines could be hierarchically arranged in a nested fashion as nation, region,
province, municipality, and barangay. Although these may have some duration over time,
they are still socially constructed levels. They are certainly not ‘given’ or fixed since they
are contested and malleable. The question is whether we should refer to these levels as
scales. I argue that we need to avoid reification of hierarchical scales as things in
themselves. Hence it is often more appropriate to discuss the hierarchical scaling of
different projects. This terminology stresses the discursive nature of notions of
hierarchical scale. Hierarchical scaling can describe the situations in which actors attempt
to use, construct, alter, or obliterate social constructions of scale that are classifiable as
epistemological constructs.
Scaling, as a verb, should be emphasized, to show that we are considering an action
or a process, whereas scale as a noun is a more fixed term that can lead to reification if we
are not examining it critically. I prefer to use the term scaling over the politics of scale or
scalar politics because it is a more dynamic word that emphasizes the actions of various
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actors. Although the politics of scale does not necessarily reify scale, many readers
instinctively read in an ontological grounding of scale, even when authors explicitly reject
that framework. Scalar politics is less prone to misinterpretation from readers, yet
MacKinnon (2011), who proposed this term, does indeed argue for the ontological basis of
scales, which I believe is problematic.
Hierarchical scaling is connected with the simple scaling of spatial extent or size.
This connection is based on the commonality of changes in areal extent that are typical in
either of these senses of scaling. It is important to resist the conflation of scale‐as‐size and
scale‐as‐level, and at the same time I think we need to recognize a tension between scaling
in the context of size and scaling in the sense of hierarchical scaling. If we are rigorous in
the refusal to reify scale‐as‐level, we can separate, but yet recognize the connections
between the two. The tension exists because it is not often that simply one type of scaling
is occurring in isolation; they usually occur in tandem. Manipulation of spatial extent and
the discursive construction of ‘scale’ come together, sometimes for fleeting moments, but
also sometimes with lasting ramifications when the construction of scale is reinforced by
various power relationships.
In regard to production, I look at policies on export cropping vs. staple cropping as
scaling issues. Are there governmental policies to protect lands devoted to staple crops
from conversion to export crops? Is there support for internal production that leads to
food self‐sufficiency? What are the government’s policies on staple crop price supports?
Likewise, there are scaling issues around consumption. Trade liberalization is touted in the
neoliberal camp as the method through which cheap food will be supplied. Food
sovereignty advocates argue that protectionism is sometimes necessary. Will the
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government be scaling the food system more toward international trade or will the
government try to promote national self‐sufficiency or even regional self‐sufficiency? Will
government regulations on organic agriculture be oriented toward facilitating the
exportation of organic foods or will regulations encourage small farmers to produce
organic foods for domestic markets?
There are also scaling issues in the government’s relationship to social
reproduction, affecting such things as equity in the provision of social reproduction. Will
men be more involved in tasks such as childcare, eldercare, and domestic activities? As
women become more involved in economic development projects, will the government do
more to provide daycare and healthcare? How do development projects rescale, or fail to
rescale, the tasks of social reproduction?
While earlier scale scholarship dealt mostly with production (Taylor 1982), and
then subsequently consumption and social reproduction (Marston 2000), McCarthy (2005)
has stressed the need for scale scholarship to include the reproduction of environmental
conditions. In the context of this study, we need to think of different actors involved in
scaling processes. Do government agencies support locally‐focused organic fertilization
programs or do they encourage the use of distantly‐sourced inputs through things like
hybrid seed subsidies and chemical fertilizer subsidies? How are soil organisms
themselves actors in these processes? How does water district management affect the
success of organic growing areas? In agricultural decision‐making in the rural Philippines,
there are different strategies that result in different scales of the reproduction of
environmental conditions. Some agriculturalists orient their enterprises to fit into global
networks of capital as they source inputs from multinational seed, fertilizer, and pesticide
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companies. Others orient themselves more locally to the farm and the community as they
use traditional open‐pollinated seeds, compost crop residues, create their own fertilizer,
select seeds for future planting, and recycle nutrients on a farm‐wide scale.

Figure 2.1: Bukidnon rice fields: sustainable agriculture groups like Makakabus in
Bukidnon scale their reproduction of environmental conditions very locally by using open‐
pollinated seeds and composting rice straw into organic fertilizer (photo by author).
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Figure 2.2: Vermicomposting is an increasingly popular way for sustainable farmers in
Bukidnon to produce organic fertilizer on‐site (photo by author).
One of the challenges in the field of scale theory is to resist splitting the human and
the non‐human and instead to emphasize the agency of both human and non‐human actors
in the ecology. In this sense, non‐human nature takes part in the scaling of the
reproduction of environmental conditions. Animals (such as pests), plants (such as seeds
and weeds), and organic matter (in soil) all influence socionatural processes.
One might ask why should we analyze various projects of scaling? Why should we
be concerned about the changes in spatial extent of various things, processes, or
interactions? So what if the spatial extent or size changes? Scaling matters because it
influences how individuals and groups relate to each other, and affects the variety of ways
that people experience (or potentially do not experience) self‐determination. When we
think of the process of scaling from the perspective of a farming family, there may be issues
of spatial extent, such as whether the farm size is growing or shrinking, whether the area
under cultivation is changing, whether hectarage is maximized, or whether land use is
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geared toward sustainability or diversification. Furthermore, the distance traveled for the
transaction between farmer and buyer may be changing. Yet there may be more
thoroughly discursive factors in play as well. Is the farmer engaging in production
marketed to a ‘local’ community or are they oriented to ‘global’ export markets and what
factors influence that decision?
Multinational corporations may help socially construct the global scale, as can be
seen by their cooperation with the World Trade Organization, a global federation of
member states, yet corporations may also invoke the idea of networks, in which farmers,
distributors, processors, consumers, etc. are linked together in what may be portrayed as
mutually beneficial relationships. We need to think critically about what drives the
particular metaphors that are used. Are horizontal metaphors employed to obscure the
large inequities that may exist in those relationships? Alternately, are hierarchical
metaphors employed in those situations where certain actors want to maintain the
structural power relationships that have been socially constructed?
Moore (2008) emphasized how epistemological ideas about scale influence material
realities. Moore was concerned with how actors use scale categories “to construct space
and social relations for specific political aims” (2008: 217). In the example of Philippine
restructuring of governance with the Local Government Code of 1991, some powers of the
central state were devolved to the (local) municipalities. The legislation came as a result of
pressure from the IMF, which could be considered a ‘global’ governance institution, which
was likewise under the pressure of ‘global’ corporations. These manipulations might be
considered what Smith (2004) called ‘scale bending,’ as there is a rescaling of the state.
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This incident and its ramifications for the rescaling of agricultural development will be
discussed further in Chapter Five (Section 5.2.1).
In a political ecology project such as this, it is necessary to engage scale construction
in contexts of production, consumption, social reproduction, and the reproduction of
environmental conditions. We need to explain how power flows through a socionatural
system by looking at how different actors (both human and non‐human)—sometimes
allied and sometimes oppositional—manipulate their environments. In this way, scale
theory can be a tool to help facilitate projects for social justice and ecological sensitivity.
Exploring the politics behind the decisions to establish, reinforce, challenge, alter, or even
overturn various notions of scales can illuminate these workings of power. Our ideas of
scales are socially produced and it may be important that strategies for social and
environmental change both work within existing scalar arrangements and at the same
time, work to modify or overturn them (McCarthy 2005). Understanding scaling struggles
can be an important way of comprehending and advancing struggles for food sovereignty
and more progressive class and gender relations.

2.2 Neoliberal economic reforms
A ‘remake’ of nineteenth century laissez‐faire for the twentieth century (Peck 2008),
neoliberalism has been characterized in a variety of ways: political doctrine, economic
project, regulatory practice, or even as a process of governmentalization (Bakker 2010). In
the wake of Keynesianism and especially since the fall of the Soviet Union and other
eastern bloc governments, neoliberalism has become the most dominant political‐
economic ideology, not just in the capitalist countries of the former First World and the
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post‐socialist countries of the former Second World, but also among the elites of Southern
(formerly Third World) countries as well. While neoliberalism takes different forms in
different contexts, some of the key projects that have related to agricultural development
have been trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.
Neoliberal policies on agricultural development are often couched in the language of
poverty reduction, food security, and increased production (Escobar 1995; Clapp 2005).
Neoliberal reforms are promoted as depoliticized reactions to economic issues, since they
are presented as modifications that allow markets to operate naturally, yet they are
inherently political‐economic and ecological projects (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; see
also Harvey 1974). Neoliberal projects on the national scale are frequently hybridized with
remnants of Keynesianism and are neither purely an “inside job,” nor simply an “external
imposition” (Peck 2004).
In the Philippines, implemented and proposed neoliberal reforms that have
influenced agriculture have been of a variety of types: price and market liberalization;
governmental structure reform; privatization of land; privatization of agricultural agencies;
promotion of export cropping; environmental deregulation; and removal of agricultural
subsidies. Even an action such as land reform, which is ostensibly progressive, has been
rendered through a neoliberal framework and has arguably been engineered to result in
‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2005a, 2005b) as elites pluck parcels of privatized
land when smallholders fall into debt. This process is a sort of ‘two‐for‐one’ for
accomplishing the neoliberal project since, in addition to moving land into the hands of
those who can use more ‘modernized’ and highly capitalized agricultural approaches, it
also creates a dispossessed labor class for the plantation wage‐labor economy (McMichael
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2008a). In this sense, privatization and the de‐peasantization of the rural landscape are
purposeful strategies of capital accumulation where agribusinesses benefit from lowered
wages (McMichael 2008b).
The neoliberal position on food security, which focuses on trade liberalization, is,
arguably, as follows: if hunger is a global problem, it requires a solution with a global
approach. Producing more food and producing it more cheaply is the answer. This way
there will be enough food to go around and the poor will be able to afford to buy it. When
barriers to international trade are removed, people can produce what they produce best
and trade it internationally. Efficiency is gained, prices come down, and free trade provides
the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people. Hunger will be eliminated through
trade (Glipo 2006).
Critics of neoliberalism argue that international trade does not necessarily benefit
all parties since not every country is on even footing, so trade relations may become
skewed. Food sovereignty advocates argue that more localized planning for food systems
creates more accountability for meeting the needs of hungry citizens. Sometimes
protectionism for domestic producers is part of this approach.
Karl Polanyi (1944) described how the economic logic of capitalism could become
increasingly detached and ‘disembedded’ from social relations as there is a focus on
commodities and the market, but this does not mean that the actual practices of neoliberal
capitalism are somehow separate from material realities. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore
(2002) wrote about how neoliberal rhetoric should not obscure the fact that specific actors
carry out neoliberal reforms in order to achieve their own projects:
In contrast to neoliberal ideology, in which market forces are assumed to operate
according to immutable laws no matter where they are “unleashed,” we emphasize
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the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects insofar as they
have been produced within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the
legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices,
and political struggles.
Of course this applies in the Philippines, and my study tracks some of the specific actions
and modifications through which neoliberal reforms have been implemented there.
Many scholars have analyzed neoliberalism and changing conceptions of the role of
the state in the economy. The neoliberal ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Jessop 1994;
McCarthy and Prudham 2004) has been described as a project of denying power to the
national scale in order that corporations may operate with fewer restraints. The creation
of the WTO has been interpreted by some as an attempt to restrict the power of national
governments since governments can act as barriers to free trade. The structural
adjustment programs of the IMF and other IFIs can also be seen as ways of restricting the
power of national governments. With this said though, Mansfield (2005) asserts that the
national scale is still a potent force in many political and economic arenas, and even
institutions like the WTO and IMF routinely rely on the state to execute their projects. As
Hughes (2006) noted, “political intervention and forms of regulation continue to govern
transnational trade despite the laissez‐faire logic of neoliberalism.”
Capitalism’s accumulation project has been geographic and it is important to
understand the scaling of processes of capitalist expansion. Vinay Gidwani (2008)
described capital’s parasitic existence: “it draws its force by attempting to divert or attach
itself to other kinds of energy or logic—cultural, political, nonhuman—whose
contributions, like those of history’s subalterns, are erased from conventional accounts.”
Parasite derives from a Greek word meaning something or someone who is eating at
another’s table. In this context of a political ecological analysis of a neoliberal global food
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regime, I would like to focus on the ways in which capital has attached itself to, firstly, the
energy of hydrocarbons in fossil fuels used in the chemical/export agriculture paradigm,
secondly, the abundant energies of both sun and water that can be found in tropical places
like the Philippines, and thirdly, the energies of human labor in the agricultural economy.
Here, in an export oriented agricultural system, we see where the agribusiness
corporations of the North are nearly literally eating at another’s table. It is precisely this
situation that the food sovereignty paradigm wishes to remedy.
Liberal (and neoliberal) property law is geared toward freedom to accumulate
rather than freedom of self‐sufficiency. Agrarian reform programs using community land
titling could help guarantee community food self‐sufficiency. However, in places like the
Philippines, agrarian reform is generally based on individual titling of land parcels. Since
the (neo)liberal model is dominant, the freedom to accumulate is prioritized and made
possible by private property norms that are protected by the state. In neoliberalism,
notions of equality are based on equality of opportunity, not equality of distribution. In
other words, inequity is permissible. Those who have control over the most land (and the
most advantageously‐placed land) are in the best position to both produce and accumulate.
In liberalism in general, and especially neoliberalism, conceptions of freedom and rights
are geared toward the individualistic concerns of protecting surplus rather than
communitarian concerns of subsistence for all.
What is ‘liberal’ about neoliberalism? The rhetoric is that neoliberalism offers less
coercion and less direct pressure from the state. Yet, is this freedom real or illusory? The
liberalizing project may ostensibly set people free from their obligations to state and to
community. But is it truly emancipatory? Or is the illusion of self‐determination part of the
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game of neoliberal capitalism? By broadening scales of economic interaction out to ever
more distant levels, it is ever more difficult for the citizen to see the forest through the
trees. Where does consumption match up with production? Globalization and
specialization make the economies of different countries and regions more dependent on
each other and this can make it more difficult for citizens to exercise political influence
because they may need to scale their political projects on a greater number of levels and
connect to a greater number of other groups than they would if their economies were more
localized. Many peasants link the intensification of rural poverty to the onslaught of
neoliberal economic reforms; thus the scaling of peasant political activism is increasingly
global rather than local or national, as has traditionally been the case.

2.3 Perspectives on food sovereignty and food security
If the population of a country must depend for their next meal on the vagaries and
price swings of the global economy, on the goodwill of a superpower not to use food
as a weapon, or on the unpredictability and high cost of long‐distance shipping, then
that country is not secure, neither in the sense of national security nor in the sense
of food security. Food sovereignty thus goes beyond the concept of food security,
which says nothing about where food comes from or how it is produced (Rosset
2009).
As described in Chapter One, food security is about a population having its food and
nutrition needs met, while the concept of food sovereignty deals more specifically with
how those needs will be met—to what extent will there be food self‐sufficiency; what
agricultural trade policies will be in effect; what level of coordination will exist between
producers and consumers; what economic protection will exist for those who are
producing the food; and what environmental protection will exist for those areas where the
food is grown.
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As we can see from this list of concerns, efforts to promote food sovereignty are
fundamentally political economic rather than simply technical or managerial. Thus
exploring the meaning of the word sovereignty is important, since it can mean different
things in different contexts. It can mean hegemony, supremacy, or dominion over a people
or a territory. Yet it can also mean freedom and self‐determination, as in freedom from the
rule of someone else.12 It is interesting how we can see the relationality of sovereignty in
the sense that in the former example, it is about exercising power over a domain, top‐down,
while the latter example is about exercising power bottom‐up against a potentially
controlling force. An appeal for support of self‐determination can be made through Article
25 of the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
that deals with the right to self‐determination and citizens exercising sovereignty over
“their natural wealth and resources” (United Nations 1966).
How does sovereignty relate to both government and to food? What is the purpose
of government? Is it to dominate people? Or is it to empower people who are being
governed? We can see that food sovereignty movements are bottom‐up movements that
resist control from distant places. In the food sovereignty framework, the WTO challenges
to protectionism are often viewed as infringements on national sovereignty. Fighting
global organizations by engaging politics at the national level is one of the strategies used
by food sovereignty advocates. Food sovereignty “puts those who produce, distribute, and
consume food at the heart of the food systems and policies rather than the demands of
markets and corporations” (Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty 2007).
Menser (2008) defines self‐determination as “the right of a particular group of persons
to define, justify and concretely articulate the normative framework under which they act,
deliberate, and plan with others.”
12
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The neoliberal and food sovereignty frameworks offer competing discourses of
‘freedom.’ Neoliberal rhetoric focuses on freedom where producers have the ability to
choose their path, sell what they will, and buy what they will. Food sovereignty rhetoric
espouses freedom from external influence over national and/or local food policy (Menser
2008). Self‐determination is a central concern for those who are pursuing food
sovereignty. Ultimately the fight for food sovereignty is a fight for political sovereignty in
general (Nyéléni Forum for Food Sovereignty 2007) and is one of the principal facets of a
greater ‘Global Justice Movement’ (Menser 2008). To the extent that the movement may
attract not simply more food producers, but consumers as well, it has the potential to be a
revolutionary force.
With over 130 organizations in over 60 countries, and tens of millions of members,
La Via Campesina (‘the way of the peasant’; LVC) advocates for land reform and is one of
the most ambitiously transnational social movements in the world (Desmarais 2003). By
operating in so many places and coordinating so many geographically diverse groups, it
illustrates an extremely broad strategy of scaling the project of food sovereignty. LVC
seeks to “expose and oppose” neoliberal land policies promoted by institutions like the
World Bank (Borras 2010). In Chapter Four (Section 4.3), I will detail some of the
experiences of Philippine groups that have been associated with LVC.
According to Holt‐Giménez (2009), there are many smallholders around the world
involved with horizontally oriented farmer networks practicing agroecological13 methods,

Agroecology is a mode of agricultural production that “draws upon local and traditional
knowledge in combination with laboratory studies to farm in such a way as to meet local
cultural needs, provide for human health, and conserve biodiversity” (Menser 2008).
Agroecology shares much with organic agriculture, such as a preference for organic
13
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but these groups are not necessarily involved with the social movements that address the
underlying political and economic conditions that support neoliberal and chemical
agricultural paradigms over the sustainable paradigm. Some smallholder organizations
may be associated with NGOs that are themselves tied to neoliberal projects. Other NGOs
might be ideologically open to joining broader social movements, but for various reasons,
do not choose to scale their projects in this way. In this study, I will analyze how these
different concerns and approaches to sustainable agriculture play out in the context of the
Philippines.
The human right to food is one theoretical framework in which food security
questions get debated (Mechlem 2004; Hussein 2002). First of all, there is a stance among
some right‐to‐food advocates that food is not like other commodities. They argue that food
should not be commoditized at all, since it is fundamental to our existence. So when we are
devising trade policies, to subject food to the same economic logic that we use for other
consumer products is questionable. In many places around the world—and the Philippines
is no exception—farmers are the hungriest segment of the population (Chavez, Manahan,
and Purugganan 2004). This contradiction arises in part because food is commodified and
fetches a relatively low price on the market and in part because many farmers are growing
food that they themselves do not eat.
The right to food is often considered to be protected by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Article 25 (1) states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well‐being of himself and of his family, including food…”

fertilizers, traditional pesticides, open‐pollinated seeds, intercropping, crop rotation, and
polyculture.
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(United Nations 1948). Yet the World Food Summit in 2002 failed to produce any strong
resolutions on the right to food. Wright (2003) explained: “If understood as a human right,
access to food would constitute an individual claim against the state generating not only
individual entitlements but also state obligations.” US negotiators at the Summit showed
strong opposition to the right to food and suggested instead trade liberalization and
structural adjustment programs of budgetary austerity and privatization to ensure food
security for indebted nations (Wright 2003). It is debatable whether the US objections
stem more from pragmatic reservations about the difficulties of implementing a right that
leads to entitlements (see Alston 1984) or whether the reluctance derives from ideological
commitments to the tenets of neoliberalism. Issues of scaling the right to food could
become contentious as appeals for entitlements could be claimed nationally or even
internationally (Wright 2003), and it may be precisely because of these scale issues that the
US wished to avoid potential responsibility for fulfilling entitlements coming from other
countries, or even simply from within the US. Liberty rights simply need to be guarded
from being infringed upon. Yet a welfare right, such as the right to food, must be provided,
and of course this begs the question of who is required to provide that right (O’Neill 2005).
Is it the farmer, the local government, the national government, or is it a global
responsibility? How is the provision of a welfare right scaled?
Does the right to food work in the context of a technical‐managerial approach to
food security? There are both ecological and socio‐political considerations. First, in regard
to the ecological ramifications, there is a potential blind spot in the right‐to‐food discourse
if it assumes the production of food is a given. It is important to remember that food
production is always an ecological issue (as well as a labor production issue, which I
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discuss in the next paragraph). The production of food is an ecologically embedded
process that depends on myriad factors. The right to food arguably has to be pursued along
with an agroecological agenda. If not, then governments are liable to use lax regulation or
promote production shortcuts to achieve food security for their people in the short term,
which could result in serious ecological damage.
Secondly, if the economic well‐being of food‐producing communities is not taken
into account, the right to food could result in government abuses such as the appropriation
of land from producers or forced sales where farmers are not able to get fair prices for their
crops. Just as monetization can obscure the value of food, food as a right can obscure its
social relations and processes of production and distribution. Also, if a government that is
responsible for ensuring the right to food relies on international commodities markets for
procuring food, it will likely deal with great fluctuations in food prices, which can create
budgetary problems, if not outright political instability. Furthermore, the right to food can
be satisfied through food aid and/or the ‘dumping’ of commodities, yet these practices can
lead to the disintegration of local production systems, necessitating continued dependency.
It is for these reasons that I am leery of accepting a rights framework without
interrogating what will be the overarching political‐ecological and political‐economic
relations through which the food system is conducted. Food as a human right can be
politically expedient and socially progressive, or alternately it can be socially and/or
ecologically disastrous. Some food sovereignty advocates argue that the problems that
would arise through the application of the right‐to‐food in a technical‐managerial food
security strategy would not arise if the right‐to‐food were applied in a food sovereignty
framework, because localized planning would obviate the need for outside intervention.

67

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
Alternately, Jacqueline Mowbray (2007) argued that in order to curb hunger, food
sovereignty should be used as a legal principle, because national sovereignty can be more
readily included in frameworks of international relations.14 Countries or sub‐national
groups would be able to challenge those parts of the international economic order that
restrict their food sovereignty. The right to food, on the other hand, can be nebulous in
terms of how it would be operationalized. Again we see here the difference between the
feasibility of welfare rights as opposed to liberty rights.
The food sovereignty framework may also be legitimized through another appeal to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 23, Title 1 states: “Everyone has the
right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and
to protection against unemployment” (United Nations 1948). We need to consider whether
the WTO’s directives for eliminating protectionism can be challenged as violations of the
human right to work. Telling nations what they can and cannot do with their trade policies
can be interpreted as a violation of their sovereignty. Protecting the jobs of domestic
producers is a way of adding more certainty and local accountability into food systems.
In addition to labor issues, land policies are a fundamental concern for food
sovereignty movements. In general, the food sovereignty framework calls for policies that
reflect a ‘land‐for‐the‐tiller’ philosophy. In other words land should not be controlled by
elites who are not actually doing the farming themselves. To the degree that elites do have
control, then land reform programs are necessary. However, there is not necessarily

While groups like LVC might readily use this type of strategy in the future, they would
not be satisfied with manifesting food sovereignty in simply a legal context, since they view
it as an intrinsically social movement as well that is premised on an overhaul of the
relations of social and environmental reproduction.
14
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agreement within the food sovereignty movement on the specifics of land reform (Akram‐
Lodhi 2007). For example, should there be individual titling of agricultural land deeds? Or
should there be community titling, in order to discourage elites from picking off parcels one
by one, as well as to encourage more community planning in terms of crop selection,
environmental protection, marketing, and labor arrangements? Land and labor policies are
always going to be mutually constitutive.
The phrase ‘scaling food sovereignty’ can describe more than one process. First,
there is the more fundamental decision that groups must make in terms of the areal extent
of the functional region of food self‐sufficiency, such as national, regional, provincial,
municipal, bioregional, or watershed. This is of course complicated by the decision of what
food(s) to include—a primary staple food; an array of important staples; or the majority of
the social group’s food needs. One example of a national‐level primary staple food goal is
the Philippine government’s goal for 100% rice self‐sufficiency by 2013.
Yet, another way of conceiving of the phrase ‘scaling food sovereignty’ is to describe
how to politically operationalize the goals of the movement for food sovereignty. Will this
entail the empowerment of farmers to cultivate with fewer external inputs? Will it mean
linking together different farmers’ organizations and coordinating their marketing
strategies? Will it mean enlisting one or more of the different levels of government to
formally commit to: promoting integrated production and consumption systems; enforcing
and/or modifying land reform policies; creating trade policies that protect internal
production; and/or enforcing environmental policies that secure the long‐term
sustainability of farming ecosystems? Organizations struggle with deciding how exactly to
scale their projects. For example, when should there be international networking; when

69

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
should there be calls for national sovereignty in terms of trade policy; and when should
there be a focus on ‘local community’ efforts for food self‐sufficiency?
In conclusion, not all of the actors in agricultural systems are either neoliberal
corporate expansionists or food sovereignty warriors. There are plenty of people who do
not fit into either camp. But these two opposing discourses do exert considerable influence
on the politics of the food system of the Philippines. So I have articulated here some of the
opposing forces at work. Looking spatially at practices of production, consumption, social
reproduction, and environmental reproduction—as I do in this study—gives us insight into
how food is regarded in everyday life and politics. Neoliberalism is an economic program
that is based on scaling more producers and consumers into wider markets, yet certain
producers, some independent and others organized into networks, challenge these
attempts at vertical integration and work for food sovereignty through self‐sufficiency in
the realm of production, provision for local people in the realm of consumption,
progressive gender politics in the realm of social reproduction, and environmental
protection in the realm of the reproduction of environmental conditions. These concerns
are at the core of my project.
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Chapter Three: Research methodology
In this chapter, Section 3.1 will give background on how and why the specific
interview sites were selected, as well as some demographic information on the residents of
the communities. (Before Chapter Six, the introduction to Part Three will give more
complete descriptions and histories of the communities where interviews were
conducted.) Section 3.2 will detail the specific research questions and methodologies used
to conduct the research.

3.1 Selection and description of field sites
In late 2005, I developed an interest in how the history of Spanish and American
colonialism in the Philippines in the late 19th and early 20th centuries might be mirrored by
a sort of American corporate neo‐colonialism going on in the Philippines in the 21st
century. Though now there is no colonial presence in the sense of an occupying power, the
arrangements designed to extract surplus from the agricultural economy of the Philippines
are arguably similar to what existed in previous eras.
I spent six weeks from June to August 2007 in the Philippines to select a site for my
field research. I met with the leadership of a number of NGOs. Amihan (National
Federation of Peasant Women) provided background information on issues facing the
peasantry in general and women especially. KMP (Peasant Movement of the Philippines)
provided me with further background and helped in the logistics of site selection. I also
went to the triennial general assembly of MASIPAG (Farmer‐Scientist Partnership for
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Development), a national organization that encourages economic independence for
farmers via diversified organic farming.
Although transnational corporations are active in many parts of the country, I
looked for a research site on the large southern island of Mindanao because it is there that
foreign agribusinesses have conducted some of their most vigorous expansions in recent
decades. The island has a number of areas that are more recently settled than other parts
of the Philippines. Mindanao is similar in land area to the state of Kentucky or the country
of Hungary, and had an estimated 2007 population of 22 million (National Statistics Office,
Republic of the Philippines 2007).

Figure 3.1: A Cavendish export banana plantation in Bukidnon on the island of Mindanao
(photo by author).
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On Mindanao, the province of Bukidnon is largely agricultural and suitable for the
production of the staple crops of rice and corn, but in many spots there have been large‐
scale land conversions into plantations for export crops such as bananas and pineapples.
Bukidnon is not unique in this sense, but is more heavily oriented to plantation agriculture
than the average province. The Philippines ranked second in world banana production
with 9% of global production, and third in banana exports with 10% of global exports
(Macabasco 2011). In 2010, Bukidnon had 20.8% of the Philippine hectarage of Cavendish
bananas, which are the main fresh export variety. Bukidnon also had 34.2% of the national
hectarage of pineapple and 15.6% of the national hectarage of sugarcane. In comparison,
Bukidnon had only 1.7% of white corn hectarage and 1.9% of rice hectarage (Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics 2011). Bukidnon is similar in land area to Delaware and Rhode
Island combined, or the country of Jamaica, and had a 2007 estimated population of 1.2
million (National Statistics Office, Republic of the Philippines 2007). Bukidnon is divided
into 21 municipalities (analogous to counties in the US), which are subdivided into
barangays (comparable to townships or villages in a rural context).15
I investigated a number of farming villages in Bukidnon, focusing on places whose
economies were close to being exclusively agricultural. I chose three different locations on
which to focus during my twelve months of fieldwork in 2008‐2009. These were selected
on the basis that one community embodied the organic and staple crop paradigms very
well, while another embodied the chemical and cash crop paradigms, and yet another

A barangay is the smallest unit of government with a formally elected government. In
addition to a main (eponymous) village, a rural barangay may have smaller villages,
sometimes called sitios. However, purok is the term for a sub‐unit of a barangay and puroks
have informal leadership.
15
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occupied a middle ground between paradigms. Furthermore, each community was distinct
in its types of social differentiation and styles of communitarianism. Working in these
settings afforded a unique opportunity to observe the differences in labor and agricultural
practices in the different villages, while holding some other variables (such as ethnicity,
religion, linguistic family, and education) relatively constant.
I was introduced to the governor of Bukidnon in a formal meeting arranged by the
leadership of a provincial NGO that focuses on rural and agricultural issues. The governor
graciously provided a letter and a literal stamp of approval for my project, which facilitated
meetings with provincial government agencies and the mayors of the two municipalities in
which I did research. The mayors also gave letters of approval that were used to facilitate
meetings with municipal government agencies and punong barangay (barangay captains).
Two of the communities in which I did interviews had farmers organizations, so I relied on
a core of four people in the leadership of each organization to introduce me to interview
subjects and arrange meetings. In the other village, I relied especially on the barangay
secretary and the chair of the barangay agriculture committee to facilitate meetings and
provide guidance in finding the most accurate cross‐section of the community possible.
I interviewed 24, 45, and 32 heads of households respectively from the three
communities, for a total of 101 farming family interviews. Occupational and income data
was collected for all members of the households. I interviewed all of the residents of the
first village, all of whom were members of the same farmers organization. In the second
village, which did not have a strong farmers organization, I strove to get a representative
sample of the community. I made sure to interview a spectrum of people involved in the
local agricultural economy: large landowners, small landowners, tenant farmers, renters of
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farmland, and wage laborers. In the third village, I interviewed all of the members of an
organic farmers organization and a sampling of additional people in the village who were
engaged in chemical farming.
It was typical to interview both members of a married couple, though in instances
where one partner was absent, just one partner was interviewed. There were also a small
number of households that were unmarried or widowed individuals (though in some cases
these were still multigenerational households). In multigenerational households, typically
the oldest individual or married couple of working age was chosen as the main interview
subjects. In each of the communities, 4% of the interviewees were retired. In the different
locations, I noted differences in occupation, land tenure, farming methods, crop choices,
geography, and organizational affiliation or lack thereof.
Table 3.1: Overview of three villages.
Agbalo

Butong

Cabangkalan

Number of households
interviewed

24

45

32

Population of households
interviewed

93

224

145

Total population of village

93

2,282

6,015

Total population of barangay

3,920

2,282

6,015

% of households in key
farmers organization
interviewed

100%

N/A

100%

White corn Sugarcane, white
corn, yellow
corn, bananas

Rice

Main crops
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In order to protect the privacy of the interview subjects, I have changed the names
of all three villages. The first location I will refer to as Agbalo, which is the village of the
organization that I will give the pseudonym AAC (Agbalo Agricultural Collective). Agbalo is
the community already mentioned whose farmers occupied a middle ground in terms of
their methods and were thus not generalizable as a whole into the organic or chemical
paradigms. Some residents, particularly the leaders of the community, used organic and
sustainable methods, while other residents did not use chemical fertilizers simply because
they lacked the budget. A small number of the community’s farmers did use chemical
fertilizers. Erosion of the soils in this hilly area was a problem. White corn, Agbalo’s staple,
was the leading crop, but many people grew cassava and a mix of other cash crops and
staple crops as well. Although AAC’s 28 hectares were collectively held, land parcels were
divided by family and AAC members did not market their crops collectively. Though they
were primarily subsistence farmers, many residents also supplemented their income
through agricultural wage labor in nearby sugarcane fields.
Butong is topographically similar to Agbalo and in the same municipality. Whereas I
interviewed the entirety of the households in Agbalo, I simply interviewed a representative
cross section of Butong, about 10% of the households, since time did not permit
interviewing the entire barangay. This is a community that has no strong farmers
organizations. In the 1950s and 1960s, in order to quell unrest in other regions of the
country, landless rural dwellers were offered 12‐hectare parcels of land in relatively
unsettled parts of Mindanao, and this was the origin of most of the current population of
Butong. In the mean time, most of these land holdings have since been subdivided among
latter generations and subsequently pawned, sold, or rented to those in more privileged
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positions. In the process, the community has changed from an emphasis on smallholder
agriculture (mostly corn, but rice as well) to an economy that is now mostly devoted to the
sugarcane plantations of a local elite and the banana plantations of Dole. Consequently
wage laborers now constitute a large part of the community. Most of the farms and all of
the plantations in Butong operate in the chemical agriculture paradigm.
Cabangkalan is in a neighboring municipality. Whereas the first two villages are in
hilly uplands, Cabangkalan is mostly a flat, lowland river valley that has been irrigated for
rice production since 1984. The focus of the interviews here was on an organic rice
growers organization named Makakabus. (As mentioned above, in order to protect the
anonymity of community members, the names of the three villages have been changed.
However, the members of Makakabus expressed their desire to have their true
organizational name used in this study.) Makakabus has strict farming rules for its
members and an ambitious program to reclaim pawned land that was previously in rice
cultivation using chemical inputs. One of their objectives is to return land control to small
farmers. Makakabus is an organization led entirely by women, though membership
numbers are fairly equal by gender. I also interviewed some chemical rice farmers and
laborers outside of the organization to provide contrast.

Table 3.2: Demographic data for main interview subjects.

Number of households interviewed
in each village*

Agbalo

Butong

Cabangkalan
(Makakabus
members only)

24

45

24
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Total number of residents in the
households interviewed

93

224

98

Average number of people per
household

3.9

5.0

4.1

Average age of residents in
interviewed households

26.9

27.7

30.1

Average age of primary interviewees

46.4

50.0

49.9

Percent of residents in interviewed
households between 15 and 59

53.8%

61.2%

53.1%

Number of residents aged 15 to 59
per household

2.1

3.0

2.2

Percent of residents in interviewed
households under the age of 15

41.9%

32.1%

32.7%

1.6

1.6

1.3

4.3%

6.7%

14.3%

Number of people age 60 or over per
household

0.2

0.3

0.6

Percent of interview subjects born in
the municipality

20.8%

22.2%

29.2%

Percent of interview subjects born in
other parts of Bukidnon

20.8%

11.1%

4.2%

Percent of interview subjects born in
other provinces

58.3%

66.7%

66.7%

Number of children under the age of
15 per household
Percent of residents in interviewed
households age 60 or over

* Eight more households were interviewed in Cabangkalan who were not affiliated with
Makakabus. These households are not included in this data chart.

3.2 Research questions and methodology
In order to answer my research questions, I drew heavily on structured recorded
interviews, usually approximately two hours in length. The interview questions can be
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seen in Appendix A. I supplemented the structured interviews with casual conversations,
participant observation in the villages and fields, and attendance of farmers organization
meetings.16 I also interviewed on‐site supervisors of plantations, management
representatives of agribusinesses, input (fertilizer, seed, and pesticide) dealers, and
academics in relevant fields. I interviewed elected government officials and appointed
agency personnel at levels including the barangay, municipality, province, region, and
nation. I supplemented this with archival research of local government administrative
units (in both Pangantucan and Valencia municipalities and at the barangay level of each
village) and government agencies (Department of Agriculture, Department of Agrarian
Reform, and Department of Environment and Natural Resources at the municipal,
provincial, and regional levels, as well as the Department of Agriculture at the national
level).
I worked with a translator for the interviews with farming families. Visayan (also
known as Cebuano in its core region on Cebu) is the language used most commonly
throughout Bukidnon. Most interviews were conducted in Visayan, though Ilonggo, which
is another language from the Visayas region (in the central part of the Philippines), was
used for some interviews in Cabangkalan.17 Tagalog, which is the basis of the national
language Pilipino, was present in some advertising materials and other miscellaneous
contexts, though was not the first language of any of the farming families interviewed. The
translator was fluent in all of these languages. English (which is also an official language of
I attended two meetings each with Makakabus (January and April 2009) and AAC
(October 2008 and July 2009) where all members were present. Butong did not have a
regularly functioning farmers organization.
17 For all of the villages, those interview subjects who were born in other provinces were
overwhelmingly from the Visayas region.
16
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the Philippines) is a standard language of government and higher education, so all
interviews with government agency personnel, elected officials, agribusiness management
personnel, and academics were conducted in English.
Through a fine‐grained analysis of agency and agricultural decision‐making and
practice, we can see ways that social differentiation is constructed within a small
community (Rankin 2003). I pursued this approach in each village, while also examining
how each community was (and was not) differentiated from wider spatial scales in terms of
issues like gender equity, class relations, productivity, and the health of its people and its
farming ecology. At the same time, I investigated how the multiple effects of the uneven
social relations of trade, finance, and policy development alter land use, cultivation
patterns, and land tenure relations in Bukidnon. The study assesses how different
agricultural strategies in this part of the Philippines enhance or reduce food security, and
analyzes how sociospatial relations are altered in the process.
3.2.1 Research Questions
1) How does the production of scale intersect with power relations in
particular ecological contexts?
A scale may not be a thing in itself, but examining the process of scaling can reveal
shifting relations of cooperation and conflict. This study sought to elucidate how the
everyday practices and struggles among local farmers and other social actors involved in
agricultural production and marketing in the area, as well as actors in non‐local places,
produce and reproduce the scalar relationships that affect the local farming economy. In
order to understand the political‐ecological scaling strategies of various actors, I made
detailed observations of the everyday activities and rhythms of agriculture in Bukidnon
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with particular attention to their spatiality. My observations and casual and structured
conversations focused on the following subtopics:
1.1) How are the neoliberal and corporate agribusiness projects being scaled?
I explored how corporations were scaling their projects in Bukidnon. For example,
how did Dole negotiate its entry into the vicinity of Agbalo and Butong? Was there a high
degree of open planning and consultation with local residents or were the arrangements
made simply with local government leaders and other power brokers? What have Dole’s
strategies been in the way they acquire land and join parcels together to form plantations?
I was able to speak with a number of present and former Dole employees, municipal
leaders, and local residents who have been most affected by the arrival of Dole about Dole’s
interactions with the community. I asked questions about what Dole looks for when they
are scouting locations, how much rent they offer to land owners, what the terms of their
contracts are, and what are the regulations they need to meet when they are registering for
an environmental compliance certificate.
I also looked at the practices of Chiquita in the vicinity of Agbalo and Butong. How
were their strategies different in terms of contracting with local elites rather than setting
up their own banana plantations? What did this mean in terms of labor and compensation
for workers? What did this mean in terms of environmental impacts? And what did it
mean for the size of the plantations?
I was interested to see whether agribusiness corporations were framing the issues
of development as technological rather than political‐economic. Is there a corporate
fixation on yields and efficiency that ‘depoliticizes’ (Ferguson 1994) the food system? In
interviews with leaders of agribusinesses, such as seed companies, would their discourses
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be about production gains or community development? Are they scaling their strategies to
connect with farmers atomistically? Or do they attempt to cultivate connections with
entire villages or regions through outreach programs or educational efforts? In order to
answer these questions, I asked managers of agribusinesses about their companies’
activities and collected the variety of their advertising and informational materials
circulating in the area. I also asked farmers what drove their decisions about seeds,
fertilizers, and other inputs, as well as how they perceived the corporate input providers.
I also looked into the history of agricultural development in the Philippines to see
how corporations have scaled their concerns in matters such as WTO trade disputes with
other countries or navigating through the complexities of the land reform laws. How have
corporations promoted and protected gains in the export orientation of the Philippine
economy? The production of scale is never politically neutral (Swyngedouw 1997), so it is
necessary to look at how agribusinesses attempt to integrate local agricultural economies
with global commodities markets. Furthermore, by looking at records of cropping patterns
(on national, provincial, municipal, and barangay levels) as well as government
environmental inspection records, I assessed the ways that corporate activities alter both
the economic and the ecological landscape.
I asked people in Bukidnon how the privatization of agricultural land has affected
their lives. Who benefits from these processes and who loses and how are communities
spatially reconfigured when these types of conversions occur? Likewise, what happens
when agribusiness projects are abandoned?
How do international institutions, such as the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and
the Asian Development Bank attempt to scale agricultural economies? How do neoliberal
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policies like trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation affect the local, regional,
and national agricultural economies? I researched a variety of documents pertaining to
these international institutions’ interactions with the Philippine government and spoke to
agricultural development personnel at a variety of government offices (from the national to
the local), NGOs, and universities, as well as the farming families themselves, to find how
these broad policies affect spatial (re)arrangements in Bukidnon, and what sorts of specific
impacts they have across scale. I looked at national import/export agricultural trade
imbalances; fluxes in the amounts of imported staples; fluxes in farmgate prices (through
national historical records as well as interviewing local people); and the various struggles
over the existence and responsibilities of a state trading enterprise (STE).
1.2) How are small and medium sized farmers scaling their operations?
In the three villages, I looked at different strategies and experiences in terms of
labor arrangements, marketing plans, food self‐sufficiency, activity spaces, and farming
techniques.
In terms of labor, I was able to observe and record a wide range of practices, such as
collective and reciprocal labor arrangements; being paid in kind or paid in cash; tenant
farming; sharecropping; and simply nuclear family farming.
As for marketing strategies, there was one example of an organization acting as a
local market consolidator for 24 families. Yet, most small farmers simply sold to local
commodities processors or middlemen and thus had very little bargaining power.
To determine the scalar relationships in the food system, I researched how much of
the agricultural output is consumed locally, and whether this amount has changed over the
years. In order to do this, I engaged in detailed discussions with interview subjects to
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ascertain what foods they were eating and what percentage of their diet was purchased
and what percentage came from the crops that they were growing. I also addressed where
and to whom the output is sold, and the relations (personal or otherwise) between grower
and buyer. I also looked at records for what was being grown in each community and
whether these crops were local staples or cash crops bound for distant markets. Among
the questions I sought to answer were, are the peasant land struggles and attempts to farm
sustainably challenging the scales that larger landowners and agribusinesses are trying to
establish? In what ways are these challenges understood by the local population and by
those in positions of influence locally and regionally? Who is having success—unaffiliated
individual farmers or groups of families that are bound together in cooperatives or
collectives?
In order to determine how people’s occupational activities have changed, I had
interviewees give family histories with a special focus on their work experiences. I asked
them how much time they devote per week to each of their work tasks to see whether they
had hybrid occupational identities. For each job, I asked about the commuting distance so I
could understand how different agricultural approaches affect commute times and the
areal extent of people’s activity spaces.
What are the relations between local people’s conceptualizations of space, people’s
activity spaces, and their scalar constructions? At the end of each interview with a farming
family, I gave the interviewee an instruction: “Draw a map of what is important to your
work.” I was interested to find what were the scales of the maps the people drew, what
features were included in the maps, and how the maps revealed the ways people conceive
of their laboring and environmental relationships. I was also interested to see whether
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there would be differences in the responses and maps between occupational categories,
such as agricultural wage laborer, farm owner/operator, etc. I examined what differences
emerged in their representations of such things as the local environment, the
transportation infrastructure, the detail in its agricultural landscape, its community
infrastructure, and the areal extent of their maps. Analyzing the respondents’
representations enabled me to ascertain their sense of sociospatial relations and how they
positioned themselves in them.
In order to understand the diversity of fertilization practices in the communities, I
asked farmers what specific fertilizers they used, whether the fertilizers were created by
themselves or purchased, and how much they paid. I was also interested to see whether
people fit neatly into either the organic or chemical paradigms or if they were using
hybridized approaches.
In order to understand whether farmers were using proactive strategies for their
food security, I asked people whether they felt they had any special agricultural knowledge.
Some farmers may engage in sustainable agriculture and use traditional techniques to
create new seed varieties suited to their specific locations. Identification with and
knowledge of a local place and the establishment of a local scale of interaction reinforce
each other. I asked farmers such questions as: whether they save seeds or buy new seeds
with every planting; what types of seeds do they use; from whom do they get them; and
what influences their choices. I also asked farmers whether they were familiar with
genetically modified (GM) crops, whether they use GM seeds, how they feel about
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), whether they are interested in using biotech crops,
and why or why not.
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1.3) How are changes in land use decisions affecting the construction of scale
in Bukidnon?
The push for biofuels in both the global North and South is already having
substantial effects on land use decisions in many countries, and the increases in global food
and grain prices are partially attributable to the conversion of cropland to biofuel
production (Naylor et al. 2007). Since sugarcane, which is ecologically suited to Bukidnon,
may be one of the main environmentally viable sources of ethanol/biofuel in the future
(Quitério 2007; Rosenthal 2008), this may result in a decrease of good agricultural lands
being used for growing staple crops, thus orienting the farming economy further from local
food self‐sufficiency. I interviewed management personnel from BUSCO, which is the
Bukidnon Sugar Company, one of the largest sugar millers in the Philippines, and recorded
information about the fluctuations in their output in the years since they began operating
in 1976. Even though BUSCO is not heavily involved with the creation of biofuels, if the
national demand for sugarcane is kept high by biofuel demand, then this will influence
cropping decisions in Bukidnon. Philippine legislation on biofuel quotas was also
consulted. An assessment of the role of BUSCO and local sugarcane hacienderos in the
changing economy of Bukidnon appears in Chapter Six.
Land struggles in the Philippines have become widespread as the government has
adopted an economistic stance on land, promoting market‐oriented land transfer schemes
that benefit large landowners (Reid 2005; Weekley 2006; Franco and Borras 2007), while
local groups of peasants frequently band together on the basis of place connections. State
and private intimidation and violence against the peasant groups are commonplace
(Franco and Borras 2007). By analyzing these situations, we can better understand how
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state and local government actors, landowners, agribusinesses, and local farmers all scale
their projects and assert their competing interests. By taking detailed oral histories from
farmers, large landowners, elected officials, and government personnel, as well as
analyzing the records on cropping choices, I assessed whether there have been significant
changes in land ownership and cultivation patterns in the communities where I did
interviews. I investigated the variety of responses to these shifts on the part of local
farmers and their families, ranging from support for the conversions, to struggle against
them, to disengagement from the process. I researched local government records and
interviewed local people to understand local migration patterns and assess what relation
they have to changing economic and land tenure arrangements, such as increasing
privatization or influence of large landowners.18 I researched what resettlement programs
of the past have affected the area, as well as programs for the redistribution of land to
peasants, such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which has a
variety of different procedures for land transfer. I looked at how outside actors, such as
international financial institutions, have influenced which types of land reform get
practiced most. When I gathered farmers’ family histories, I asked about the history of the
I was able to interview the municipal tax assessor for Pangantucan. He gave detailed
accounts of the history of settlement for the area and the changes in land tenure that have
occurred. Government personnel were frank though about the fact that land ownership
records do not reflect who is truly in control of many parcels of land because of the
prevalence of pawning and the use of ‘dummy’ landowners (where a landowner will use a
relative or a sharecropper or other henchman as the official landowner even though they
are actually in control of the land), because people are not allowed to have more than 12
hectares of land. So oral histories are often more reliable than the government records in
this respect. In rural areas in the Philippines, the municipal mayors are often large
landowners themselves (along with members of their family), so they do not have any
incentive to clean up the corruption in land deals. Vote buying at election time is routine,
so this prevents anti‐corruption candidates from winning or usually even entering into
races for local offices.
18
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land on which they work, whether they had less or more land in the past, and whether
there has been generational continuity in the land tenure.
2) What are the results of different food security strategies in terms of gender
relations, class relations, agricultural productivity, and the health of the farms’ biotic
communities?
Though mixing different styles and paradigms of agriculture is fairly common (and
this will be detailed in later chapters), there are two major competing agricultural
paradigms, the first being that of cash cropping, export‐orientation, monocropping,
intensive use of chemicals (fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides), and use of high‐tech
hybrid and/or biotech seeds. The second paradigm is that of sustainable agriculture,
consisting typically of organic or IPM (integrated pest management) production
techniques, relatively low levels of external inputs, diversity of cropping, and a focus on
local or regional food needs rather than distant or foreign markets. My research studies
the results of the different food security strategies in terms of the following subtopics:
2.1) Gender relations in the farming economy of Bukidnon
I traced the gender dynamics of migration patterns, nutritional allocation,
household labor, plantation labor, and farm labor in the communities where I did
interviews. I also documented what foods are routinely purchased and what are produced
at home, and how the allocation of household budgets may differ between groups. By
asking interviewees about the different work tasks they do and recording the number of
hours spent at each work task, as well as asking about changing gender roles, my research
assesses how the social relations of production and social reproduction vary by group
and/or community.
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The burden of rural changes in the global South typically falls disproportionately on
women. Women are often not recognized as sources of agricultural knowledge and their
agency is denied as men dominate market interactions or exchanges with development
representatives (Mosse 2005). This is the case in many parts of the Philippines, but in one
of the communities I researched, women were well recognized for their agricultural
knowledge and they were working closely with a development organization. This afforded
an opportunity to see very interesting contrasts in the ways that gender was being
constructed in the settings where I worked. In the interviews with farming families, I asked
how family structures might be changing and how the gendered division of labor might be
altered as the agricultural economy moves in new directions. I did this by asking if and
how women’s and men’s work tasks (in terms of agricultural work and house work and
child care) in the community might be changing and what was changing for them
personally.
In the Philippines, rural women are not only involved in the crop farming that men
are, but are also usually responsible for most of the ‘backyard’ farming, raising things like
vegetables, poultry, and small‐scale livestock. As trade liberalization opens markets to
these items, their prices tend to fall, making many women’s income‐producing activities
unprofitable (Oliveros 1997). In the meantime, shifts toward large agro‐enterprises tend
to affect women more adversely than men in terms of working conditions, earning
potentials, educational opportunities, and control over resources (IAASTD 2008). I
investigated how shifting labor away from family farming and toward agricultural wage
work has changed women’s and men’s roles in the community and in the household.
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When looking at gender mobility and how it influences the construction of scale
(Silvey 2004), the Philippines is an important area to analyze considering the extreme
gender mobility in the society. Women constitute a majority of recent Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) in the 15‐34 age group (Basa, Villamil, and de Guzman 2009). I asked
farming families questions about family structure, gender composition, and mobility that
could reveal whether and how these national trends are apparent in the local area. I asked
about income derived from remittances of OFWs or relatives in other parts of the
Philippines, and whether the household has any members in other parts of the world. I
also looked at recent census records to analyze the sex ratios in the different municipalities
and barangays to see how balanced the gender composition was. Furthermore, I kept track
of the gender of all members of the households that I interviewed.
2.2) Class relations in the farming economy of Bukidnon
In order to compare how much vertical integration of the production process occurs
on the different types of farms and plantations, I asked about labor arrangements and the
movement of agricultural inputs and outputs in the area. In order to understand local
political‐economic structures, I tracked the origins of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides;
recorded the purchases of harvests; and investigated credit arrangements, commodity
processors, markets, and distribution networks. This was done through interviews and
conversations with farmers, input dealers19, informal lenders, corn and cassava processors,

For input dealers, I asked the names of the best selling fertilizers (broken down by crop
and whether they are chemical or organic), pesticides, herbicides, and seeds; their prices;
their countries of origin; and their special characteristics. I also asked the input dealers
what changes they have noticed in terms of variability of sales over the years and what
changes they have noticed in the cropping choices of the region.
19
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market vendors, seed producers, an organic products marketer, a conventional rice buyer,
sugarcane mill managers, and local and regional NGO personnel.
Among the questions I investigated were: What are the decision‐making structures
of the local food economy? Where do farmers get agricultural information? Where do they
see decisions affecting their lives as being made? Are government agricultural extension
programs aiding rural residents equally or are there class (and other) discrepancies in the
accrual of benefits? In the interviews with farmers, I asked people’s opinions on whether
they benefited from government programs and whether there were certain segments of
their community who were especially helped or hurt by programs that might steer farmers
toward particular agricultural strategies. I also discussed the matter of equity of benefits
and access to information with local elected officials from the level of barangay to
municipality to province.
I asked people about their family histories and their assessments of social
differentiation and land tenure arrangements in their communities. I also spoke with
government agency personnel and elected officials about the varied histories of land tenure
arrangements and land reform programs in the area.
To assess how the pursuit of different food security strategies relates to labor
arrangements along a spectrum from communitarianism to hierarchy, I asked questions
about paid labor, workplace hierarchies, reciprocal labor, and cooperative arrangements. I
compared the responses to these questions with what type of cropping and growing
practices were being used. I looked for variance in the degrees to which agriculturalists
were involved in cyclical modes of the reproduction of environmental conditions by asking
them about their strategies in planting, fertilization, weed and insect control, and saving
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seeds or not. How do farmers understand their security? In what ways do notions of
wealth or independence figure into their calculation of security? To answer these
questions, I listened to the ways that people spoke about what makes them food secure or
why they or other members of their community are not food secure. I also asked people
what they would like to see for the future of their communities, particularly in terms of
what types of agricultural development they think will benefit their village the most. Will
farmers negotiating shifts in the agricultural economy be able to rely more on a network of
people whom they know or will their fates be largely in the hands of people in other places?
To answer this question, I paid attention to matters such as to whom they are selling their
agricultural products, how far these products are traveling, and how different
governmental policies (from the local to the national) are influencing their lives and their
agricultural decisions.
2.3) Productivity and profitability
I asked interviewees about the various income‐producing activities of each member
of their household and how much income each activity produces. I also gathered data on
the time allocations for each of these activities in order to understand what were their
primary and (if applicable) secondary occupational orientations, as well as what work
tasks were most efficiently bringing them income. I asked about their farming inputs,
outputs, farmgate prices, profits, and how commodity price fluctuations may influence
their income and how the fluctuations of prices of consumer goods may influence their
daily expenditures. For agricultural laborers, I asked their earnings, how many landowners
they work for during the year, how they get paid, and how they find employment. From
these questions, I was able to build a better picture of the economic risks and benefits of
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the various agricultural strategies being pursued in the area. In order to determine
people’s perceptions of the economic changes their communities were experiencing, I
asked the open‐ended question of whether life is better in the community now or was it
better a generation ago.
2.4) Health of the local farming community
Determining the level of food security and the level of malnutrition in the different
communities was done partially through using official data gathered by the local
government units (LGUs). But I did not want to simply rely on government data20, so I used
a variety of other methods to analyze the issues. One was to talk to barangay health
workers who see the problems on an immediate and frequent basis.
It was admittedly somewhat difficult to know exactly how interviewees understood
terms like food security and malnourishment/malnutrition. In each village I would bring
up these questions with key informants to be sure that usage of the terms was consistent
from one village to the next. Malnourishment/malnutrition was understood to mean below
the range of normal weight (for a specific age and gender) because of lack of access to food.
This was what children were being tested for by the LGU in each community, though the
problem was definitely seen in some adults as well. The term food insecurity was based
less on being underweight and more on people experiencing hunger during at least
portions of the year.
I was curious if I would obtain similar findings as the LGU, but more importantly, in the
case of the members of AAC and Makakabus, I was examining the entire membership
(coincidentally 24 households in each case) of groups who were merely fractions of their
overall barangay populations (3% and 1.5% respectively) and were somewhat atypical of
the barangay overall, especially in the case of Makakabus. In the case of Butong, I
interviewed 10% of the households (45 households) in the barangay and the cross section
was meant to be representative of the entire barangay.
20
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One of the difficult decisions I had to make about my interview questions was
whether to directly ask people whether they had experienced hunger in the last year. I
ultimately took the advice of people in local NGOs who said that this could be a very
sensitive question and that some respondents would feel ashamed to talk about their own
experiences. Furthermore, some might not answer the question openly. So I decided to
rely on other proxies for determining the level of hunger in each community. The most
important of these was to ask whether the level of food security for the community was
improving or declining, followed with the question of why, which was answered in great
detail by a number of respondents. I also asked people whether there was a problem in the
community with malnutrition and if so, what percentage of the community experienced
problems, and whether there were certain age, gender, or occupational groups that were
especially likely to be experiencing problems.
The vast majority of interviews took place inside people’s homes, so I was able to
see living spaces up close. Often we would be in a kitchen area and in some instances food
preparation was occurring. Only a handful of interviewees had refrigerators or closed
cabinets, so I was often able to see what foods people had on hand.
I asked people to describe their families’ diets, the percentage of their food they
grow themselves, their overall food budget, and where they get their purchased food. Do
they make adjustments in their activities or their consumption patterns when times are
good or bad? How do seasonal variations affect them? I compared the groups of
agriculturalists on their diets, their reliance on purchased food, and any apparent health
problems related to these dietary practices.
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I also collected information on the health impacts of the farming inputs used in the
area. Through interviews with farmers as well as local health practitioners and authorities,
I researched local people’s experiences with and narratives of exposure to the pesticides,
fertilizers, and genetically modified crops (cf., Gima 2004) used in the area.
2.5) Health of the nonhuman biotic communities in the area
To develop a sense of the effects of the different food security strategies on the
diversity of flora and fauna and the reproduction of environmental conditions in the
ecology of different cropping systems, I asked the agriculturalists questions about the
area’s biodiversity, soil fertility, and erosion, and I consulted with extensionists and soil
scientists on the cropping patterns and soil quality of the area. What changes have there
been in cropping? Are there differences between multicropping and monocropping
farmers in their attention to microenvironments and other environmental factors (Watts
1987)? I asked farmers how they deal with soil erosion; what is done to fertilize the land
on which they work; is crop rotation or letting fields lie fallow used to enhance the health
of the soil; and what kinds of problems do they encounter with pests and what strategies
they use to deal with them. This data helps explain whether rural land use strategies to
minimize risk and maintain the resource base are being destabilized by shifts toward cash‐
cropping and export agriculture (Watts 1983; Watts 1987; Grossman 1984; Gudeman
1978).
3.2.2 Research Schedule
I was invited by the Geography Department at the University of the Philippines‐
Diliman to be a Visiting Research Fellow for the period of September 2008 through August
2009. With that arrangement I was able to network with the faculty of the department and
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I was invited to be the keynote speaker for the National Conference on Geographical
Studies in December 2008. I also presented the findings of my research at the end of the
year in a speaking engagement on campus.
In the Manila/Quezon City area, in September 2008, I was able to reconnect with the
NGOs, Amihan, KMP, and MASIPAG, that I had worked with in 2007. In September 2008, I
traveled to Bukidnon, where I reconnected with local NGOs who temporarily housed me
while I searched for permanent living space in the area where I did my interviews.
The rest of the year proceeded as follows:
•

October 2008 – November 2008: Field research in Agbalo.

•

November 2008 – February 2009: Field research in Butong.

•

March 2009 – April 2009: Field research in Cabangkalan.

•

May 2009 – July 2009: Interviews and visits to agribusiness plantations and
headquarters, agricultural supply dealers, seed companies, universities in the
region, and offices of local, provincial, and regional government units and
agencies.

•

August 2009: Consultation and debriefing with local government units and
Amihan. Interviews with national agribusiness representatives and government
agencies. Presentation of findings to: University of the Philippines‐Diliman
Department of Geography; University of the Philippines‐Los Baños School of
Environmental Science and Management; and the national secretariat of
MASIPAG at Los Baños.
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Part Two: Incongruities of agricultural
policies and practices in the Philippines
The Philippines has been caught between two different agricultural paradigms, both
in terms of the policies pursued by its government and in terms of the practices of
agricultural development that are taking place in the rural areas. On one hand, there has
been a grassroots movement for agriculture based on local self‐sufficiency, staple cropping,
sustainable methods, family farms, and land reform. On the other hand, agribusiness
corporations have pushed for agriculture that is export‐oriented and focused on cash
cropping, chemical and biotech methods, plantations, and land privatization.
The significance of the contrast between these paradigms was intensified by the
food price crisis of 2008. Suddenly the issues were more politicized and many citizens
were asking the government to pursue policies of self‐sufficiency in rice and a greater
general degree of food sovereignty. The national government responded and the
Department of Agriculture (DA) issued The Blueprint for Food Security, of which the
following is an excerpt:
Food security and poverty alleviation top the political agenda of the present
administration…Thus, making the country self‐sufficient in food becomes the
principal strategy in attaining food security. Adopting the strategy of self sufficiency
enhances the country's capability in producing most of its food requirements and
protecting them from the vagaries and uncertainties of the world market (Republic
of the Philippines Department of Agriculture 2008).
This was a bold change of discourse for an embattled government that had previously been
putting its trust in the world market. However, effectuating these changes proved to be
difficult. Government personnel at a variety of levels were caught in a conundrum since, at
the same time that they were under new directions to promote staple cropping, they were
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still under great budgetary pressures, which caused many of them to seek export‐oriented,
investor‐driven, highly‐capitalized agriculture to bring greater tax revenues to their
jurisdictions.
Under new leadership, in 2011, the Department of Agriculture (DA) replaced The
Blueprint for Food Security with the Food Staples Sufficiency Program (FSSP). The DA was
allotted a 61% higher budget for 2012 than 2010 to carry out its programs (Republic of the
Philippines Department of Agriculture 2011). The plans focused on building farm to
market roads, providing better post‐harvest facilities, building new irrigation works, and
rehabilitating and restoring existing irrigation works (providing water for a total of
224,850 hectares of farms). These are positive measures that provide infrastructure rather
than soft subsidies. However, the new policies still do not address the issues of stalled land
reform and the increasing use of land for export cropping.
At the same time, debates have intensified over the means by which food security
can be achieved. Will sustainable agriculture and organic practices be encouraged or will
chemical and biotech methods be viewed as the right approach? Are land reform,
communitarianism, and the promotion of family farms the correct routes to ensure
Philippine food security? Or is it more important to promote productivity through
privatization and expansion of large‐scale plantations? These are some of the questions
addressed in Chapter Four.
Chapter Five details some of the specific impacts that neoliberal reforms have had
on the agricultural economy of the Philippines. Privatization, deregulation, trade
liberalization, and budgetary austerity have hindered the potential for The Blueprint for
Food Security and the Food Staples Sufficiency Program to be fulfilled.
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Chapter Four: Food security strategies in
the Philippines
Food security debates in the Philippines can be organized around three major
questions: 1) Is food security best gained through cash cropping and export orientation or
through self‐sufficiency in staples?; 2) Is food security more easily achieved through
sustainable agriculture or chemical and biotech agriculture?; and 3) What kinds of land use
decisions and land policies are best for achieving food security? In the following sections, I
will look at Philippine policies from the 1980s to the early 2010s, with a focus on the
debates in the most recent years, using sources such as the Department of Agriculture, the
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, the Department of Agrarian Reform, the World Bank, the
Philippine national press, various peasant activist groups, academics focusing on food
security and agrarian issues, and the interviews I did with farmers, corporate
representatives, and government personnel in 2008‐2009.

4.1 Cash cropping and export orientation vs. selfsufficiency in staples
4.1.1 Cash cropping and export orientation
The logic of globalized capitalism is based on the exploitation of comparative
advantage, which often requires long distance transport of commodities. With this logic, a
country like the Philippines does not need to be self‐sufficient in its staple foods, but
instead can concentrate on the crops in which it has a comparative advantage, such as
tropical fruits. Relying on high value commercial crops (HVCCs) is an economic means to
an end in this food security strategy. Table 4.1 (below) shows the growth of two of the
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most important export crops in the Philippines. Banana hectarage grew 32.42% from 1995
to 2010 and pineapple hectarage grew 43.52% over the same time period. To put this in
perspective, the hectarage of rice expanded 15.84% from 1995 to 2010 and the hectarage
of corn shrank 7.18% over the same time period. The growth of the hectarage of all crops
other than bananas and pineapples from 1995 to 2010 was 11.2%.

Table 4.1: Five‐year snapshots of hectarage of bananas and pineapples planted (Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics 2011).

Governments need to stay financially solvent. Because there is a perception that
export‐crop plantations will generate significant revenues, the Philippine national
government has largely looked to the export‐crop strategy to bring in foreign exchange
earnings and to generate taxes. Local government units are also motivated by financial
concerns to stimulate monetized commerce that brings in tax revenues rather than
subsistence agriculture that goes unrecorded and untaxed. However, the mayor of
Pangantucan, Bukidnon told me that the amount of tax revenue that was collected from
multinationals by his local government was disappointingly modest, despite a substantial
presence of agribusiness corporations. Many people in Pangantucan expressed to me their
displeasure with Dole for exaggerating the economic benefits that Dole would bring to the
community when they were seeking approval for entry into the Pangantucan area.
Food sovereignty advocates challenge the export‐crop strategy in the Philippines,
especially considering the tax breaks that are offered to developers. The irony is that,
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while a reason for attracting investment is to build a tax base, the Philippine government,
like so many other governments, entices foreign investment with special incentives, such as
tax holidays, exemption of payment of local government fees, simplified export practices,
and declarations of special economic zones. The direct revenue benefits of this type of
development to local communities are meager and the national benefits are often deferred
through these special incentives.
The export‐oriented strategy is criticized in the Philippines (among other
developing countries) on the basis that the foreign corporations that control the
plantations are capturing most of the value produced, while local laborers do not gain
substantial benefits (Chavez, Manahan, and Purugganan 2004; Glipo and Pascual 2005;
Quitoriano 2009; Feranil and Teves 2011). Thus the ‘high value’ in HVCC only really
accrues to the investor. Increasing minimum wages and ensuring that well‐paid full‐time
workers are prioritized over contract laborers, part‐time laborers, and seasonal laborers
can address this problem. However, many governments, including that of the Philippines,
seem hesitant to enforce labor and environmental standards strictly, since they are afraid
that the ‘race to the bottom’ mentality of multinationals will mean that investment will
leave the country in search of where labor and land can be exploited more thoroughly.
Chapter Five will detail some of the ways in which government regulation has been
curtailed and underfunded as a result of neoliberal economic reforms.
The World Bank pushed the Philippines to expand its export cropping, especially
from the early 1980s onward, and especially in Mindanao (Borras et al. 2009). Robin
Broad (1988) found, through leaked World Bank reports and confidential interviews with
World Bank staff, that some Bank personnel knew that these policies were simply
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strategies to get the Philippines to build earnings that could be used to repay loans, and
admitted that this type of development would likely induce poverty for rural Filipinos
(Broad 1998). This calls into question how many of those who have endorsed export
cropping, whether in the past or in the present day, really believe that it will have a positive
effect on food security or if they are simply promoting policies that will help the Philippines
service their debt.
Mindanao has been called the food basket of the Philippines, yet it has far higher
rates of hunger (33.7%) than the country as a whole (23.7%) (Feranil and Teves 2011).
The conventional wisdom among a number of government personnel I spoke to is that
Mindanao’s hunger is due to the poverty that stems from its history of ethnic and religious
conflict, but Feranil and Teves (2011) argue that the hunger and poverty are linked to the
region’s reliance on export agriculture, and that food security is not protected when staple
crops are not grown and agricultural wage labor jobs pay too low. In 2006, Mindanao
produced 60% of the nation’s coconuts, 80% of its bananas, 90% of its pineapples, 100% of
its rubber, and 75% of its coffee, yet only 23% of its rice (Feranil and Teves 2011).
Reliance on the whims of demand for cash crops in international markets can be a
risky strategy. It is more difficult for farmers to get market signals when they are
producing for distant markets. The collapse of coffee prices in the late 1990s and early
2000s (Hallam 2003) is an example of how relying on global commodities can leave
farmers vulnerable to drops in prices due to increases in supply that are difficult to detect
from afar. Coffee is especially problematic because it is a perennial; thus, Filipino farmers
are often reluctant to uproot and plant something else since they would then lose the initial
investment, which they may still be trying to recoup. Nevertheless, coffee is one of the only

102

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
export crops in the Philippines to have declining hectarage during the 2000s. Deregulation
of the international coffee market during the 1990s led to a rapid decline in the prices
coffee producers could get for their beans (West 2010; Doane 2012).
One of the arguments for an agricultural economy that focuses on export crops is
that food security is improved through higher incomes because the wages that are paid at
corporate plantations are higher than the wages at small farms and informal plantations. I
found that it is true that in those corporate plantations that are regulated21, the take‐home
wages are moderately higher than the prevailing rates for wage laborers in operations such
as small corn farms and medium sized sugarcane plantations. However, one must compare
the banana plantation employees not simply to other wage laborers, but to the income
possibilities of the smallholders whose livelihoods have been replaced by the banana
plantation (as well as those who would be employed by the smallholder). With successful
management of a family farm, an owner/operator can ensure a more substantial income
from the land than what can be gained from wage labor on a banana plantation.22 If middle
class owner/operators are lost from the economy, local businesses receive less support and
the economy loses the multiplier effects of local people spending money within the
community. Furthermore, local owner/operators are more likely to be responsive to the
needs of the community should there be a demand for something specific to be grown.
After coconut products, bananas are the Philippines’ second largest agricultural
In Bukidnon, Chiquita was skirting labor regulations by using contract growing
arrangements for their banana exports and worker pay was no better than on corn farms
or sugarcane plantations.
22 Farms of any type that were less than one hectare were on the whole struggling in
Bukidnon, but farms were generally profitable if the farmer had more than one hectare and
was combining sustainable methods and an effective (usually group‐oriented) marketing
plan.
21
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export and production has expanded greatly since the Marcos administration pushed
exportation of Cavendish bananas (the main fresh export variety), especially to Japan. As
the Japanese market, which receives 85% of exported Philippine bananas (Glipo 2007),
became saturated though, Australia, whose local growers were not the ‘big three’ fruit‐
exporting transnationals (Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte), was pursued as an important
market to penetrate. Robert Fagan (2005) described the ‘banana war’ that erupted
between the Philippines and Australia when the latter refused imports of Philippine
bananas on the basis that the bananas could be carrying a plant disease called moko (a
bacterial wilt caused by Ralstonia solanacearum) that is prevalent in the banana‐growing
regions of Mindanao, but absent from Australia. The Philippines took the matter to the
WTO dispute resolution board in 2003 on the basis that Australia was violating global
economic agreements. Australian authorities were concerned that a loss in this decision
could set a dangerous precedent for losing their sovereignty in terms of what they could
allow and not allow in terms of a whole range of imports. The WTO never made a ruling in
the case (World Trade Organization 2013). Australia made a decision to allow Philippine
imports (Australian Government 2011), but the safety regulations on moko and black
sigatoka (a leaf disease of banana plants caused by the fungus Mycosphaerella fijiensis)
established by the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry were
burdensome enough that by 2011 the Philippines had not reapplied for an import permit.
It is interesting to see how transnational corporations like Dole, Chiquita, and Del
Monte scaled their objectives at a national level by using the Philippine government to
challenge a different state in a global forum such as the WTO. The Australian government
claimed they were justified in using SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) standards to refuse
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imports, but the burden of scientific proof was upon them to show that there was a clear
danger of contamination to their domestic producers, rather than that they were simply
engaging in protectionist measures for their own local banana growers (Fagan 2005).
While the transnationals spurred the WTO challenge to a certain extent, Fagan argued that
it was the Philippine government that pushed the issue even more, since they saw earning
foreign exchange as a priority.
There is a discourse among certain agribusinesses, development agencies, and
technocrats that countries need to shift their prime agricultural lands to more export
cropping and higher use of chemical fertilizers because it is more efficient and modern
(Paarlberg 2010). At the World Food Summit in 1996, the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) supported the idea of “subjecting national production systems to
competitive pressures as a way of spurring efficiency” (Menezes 2001). The FAO even
endorsed the same judgment as the WTO, World Bank, and IMF, that developing countries
could best achieve food security through importation from developed nations (Menezes
2001). Yet producing monocultures for export actually does not necessarily mean higher
levels of economic efficiency. Rosset (2000) and Altieri (2009) argued that small
diversified farms are actually more productive and efficient and conserve resources more
successfully than large farms. In 2009, the Valencia City Agriculture Officer told me that in
order to protect food security, Valencia was planning on adopting a policy that would limit
the percentage of agricultural land in each of its barangays that could be rented to
multinational corporations.
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4.1.2 Selfsufficiency in staples
The Philippines, which had been a rice exporter in the early 1990s, was quickly
becoming one of the world’s top importers of rice in the years after their accession to the
WTO in 1995. Table 4.2 (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011) shows, in thousands of
metric tons, the annual levels of buffer stocks, internal production, and importation of rice
from 1990‐2010. Note that the degree of importation in 1998 was anomalous because of
the combined effects of floods and droughts that caused crop failures.

Table 4.2: Rice stocks, production, and imports for the Philippines in thousands of metric
tons (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011).
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When the 2008 food price crisis resulted in countries like India and Thailand
shutting down rice exports, prices shot up in the Philippines and hoarding by some
speculators worsened the situation. It was in this climate, and as a politically expedient
response to popular pressure, that the government of the Philippines decided to pursue an
explicit strategy of national rice self‐sufficiency. The country needed to make sure that it
was not overly reliant on imports and would be able to provide for itself in terms of its
staple crops. In this sense, food sovereignty became a matter of national security. The
government was concerned about the power of labor groups, an organized national
communist rural insurgency, and simply the possibility of the urban poor rioting in
response to the high prices.
Task Force Food Sovereignty (TFFS) is a Manila‐based organization of activists,
consumers, urban poor, peasants, workers, and academics that advocates for policies on
agricultural production and trade that they believe will help the Philippines achieve a
higher degree of food sovereignty. TFFS was skeptical of the Arroyo administration’s 2008
policies, saying that aspects of the new program, such as chemical fertilizer subsidies and
rice distribution schemes may amount to nothing more than “expensive political gimmickry
that provides yet another opportunity for big time corruption” (Glipo 2008).23 TFFS
recommended instead that the government should reject trade liberalization and invest
This accusation was referencing the 2004 scandal surrounding Undersecretary of
Agriculture Jocjoc Balante’s alleged diversion of P728 million ($13 million using 2004
conversion rates) from a fertilizer fund into the election campaign of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. Marlene Garcia‐Esperat, the whistle‐blowing Department of Agriculture
employee and journalist who broke the story, was murdered in her home in front of her
family in March 2005. The convicted assailants testified that they were hired to murder
Esperat by officials in her Central Mindanao (Region 12) office of the Department of
Agriculture. Despite efforts by Esperat’s family to get an arrest of those officials, warrants
have not been served (Santos 2011).
23
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heavily in irrigation, which they argued would result in transitioning some land away from
export cropping and toward rice. In 2009, a senior official from the Department of
Agrarian Reform expressed to me agreement on this issue that the central government was
not putting enough funding into irrigation. TFFS also called on the government to declare a
moratorium on debt servicing, since debt concerns were driving an export‐oriented
agricultural economy that was leasing an increasing amount of land to foreign investors
(Doyo 2009) and not producing enough rice for the internal market.
The National Food Authority (NFA) is a government agency that purchases
internally produced rice in order to both create a buffer stock, in case of shortages, and to
provide price supports for domestic rice farmers.24 In the fall of 2011 though, the NFA
backed off of its original plan to purchase 870,000 metric tons (about 5% of internal
production) of domestically produced palay (unhusked rice) for the year. Instead, because
of budgetary constraints, the NFA stated they would significantly scale down that goal,
which meant that more farmers needed to resort to selling to private rice traders that
typically do not offer prices that are as good as the NFA price. This exerted a downward
effect on the levels of rice production and further jeopardized the self‐sufficiency goals of
the country. Members of TFFS and the National Rice Farmers Council advocated raising the
NFA procurement to 10% of internal production (Despuez 2012), which would make it “a
level which will not only provide direct support to our farmers but also allow the NFA to
effectively intervene in the market in terms of setting palay prices” (Mora 2011).

The NFA also handles importation of rice. Chapter Five will detail some of the ways that
the NFA has been targeted for neoliberal economic reforms.
24
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TFFS pushes the food sovereignty agenda at the national level, seeking to influence
decision making within the Philippine national government. The Asia Pacific Network on
Food Sovereignty (APNFS), also based in the Philippine capital region, is an umbrella group
of organizations from a number of South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. They scale
their activities as a regional bloc to promote food sovereignty and opposition to the
neoliberal influences on agriculture, with the intention of blocking any advancement of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which is the blueprint for liberalizing agricultural trade
among WTO members. In addition to involving Filipinos in international actions against
the WTO, the APNFS has circulated position papers and organized citizen resistance to the
Philippine government’s free trade deals with China and Japan. The bilateral trade deals
have gone forward, but resistance to the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture has arguably
slowed down its implementation in the Philippines. Chapter Five will detail the struggles
over protectionism.
It is interesting that even in mid‐2011, three years after the rice price crisis drove
millions into poverty and hunger, the World Bank was still pressing for the Philippines to
abandon its goals for rice self‐sufficiency. The World Bank has been critical of what it has
called “a public policy and expenditure framework that continues to emphasize the pursuit
of food security with a particular bias in favor of a single crop, namely rice” (World Bank
2011a). The Bank concluded that this emphasis on rice “has shifted the focus of public
policies away from the development of a potentially vibrant agri‐business sector and led to
lost opportunities that resulted in declining competitiveness” (World Bank 2011a). The
Bank criticized the agriculture sector for only producing 15% of economic output, while
employing nearly 40% of the total workforce. But these statistics can obscure the
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subsistence elements of the rural economies in those places where some of the farmers are
feeding themselves and engaging in local trade that does not get tracked by the national
government. In Bukidnon, among my study subjects who were growing staple crops and
were organized into collectives, well over half of the food they consumed was non‐
monetized. In effect, the majority of these interview subjects’ diets consisted of foods
grown by themselves. Furthermore, many interviewees reported receiving food as
payment for their labor.

4.2 Sustainable/organic vs. chemical inputs
The cycling of nutrients and energy in farming ecologies can have wide spatial
variance depending on the soils, the water, the biotic diversity, and especially the
techniques practiced and the choices made by the human actors in the system. Agricultural
policies have a great deal of influence on these choices and on the constructed scales.
Consequently these different practices and their different ecological effects can influence
the long‐term food security of a country like the Philippines.
Is food security more easily achieved through sustainable agriculture or chemical
agriculture? The main argument in the arsenal of the chemical paradigm is that yields will
be higher than in organic farming systems. In a wide‐ranging study of 840 farming families
over Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao (the three major regions of the Philippines),
Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright (2009) found that in 2007, fully organic rice farmers were
yielding 3,424 kilos/hectare, while conventional farmers were yielding 3,478 kilos/hectare.
This is a difference of less than 1.6%. The study though also found that the organic
farmers’ yields were increasing over time, while the conventional farmers’ yields were
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actually decreasing, presumably because of nutrient deficiencies in the soil. The study also
showed incomes were 27% higher for the organic farmers than the conventional farmers
because the input costs for organic farmers were negligible compared to the overhead
necessary in chemical farming. In a comparison of the incomes of the poorest quartile of
organic farmers and the poorest quartile of conventional farmers, the difference was even
more dramatic, with the organic farmers having 47% higher incomes. These higher
incomes, along with the practice of saving rice for personal consumption25, led to greater
perceived food security, based on “accessibility of food, quality of food (nutrition, diversity
and safety), [and] freedom from vulnerability (reliability of food sources, minimised risk)”
(Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009). For the organic farmers, 88% of them felt more
food secure in 2007 than in 2000, while only 2% felt less food secure. For the conventional
farmers, 39% felt more food secure in 2007 than in 2000, while 18% of them felt less food
secure (Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009). Food security was also higher for the
organic farmers because they reported better health outcomes from the diversified organic
cropping on their farms, which led to more balanced diets high in fruits and vegetables.
The peasant organizations of the Philippines are generally supportive of the
sustainable agriculture paradigm. The national organization that deals most specifically
with enabling and supporting farmers in their efforts to farm organically is MASIPAG (The
Farmer‐Scientist Partnership for Development, Inc.). MASIPAG, although it is a national
organization, uses tactics that are more typically executed at the level of the community or

Both organic and conventional rice farmers are likely to save part of the harvest for their
family’s consumption. However, organic farmers are much more likely to meet all of their
rice needs this way, since some conventional farmers are obliged to sell their entire harvest
to those who have extended credit to them for the inputs used in growing that crop.
25
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even individual farm. They focus on developing farmer independence through strategies of
reducing external farming inputs, increasing farming incomes, and creating more
communal and reciprocal labor arrangements in agricultural communities.
Some peasant groups simply endorse sustainable agriculture without formally
requiring their members who are owner/operators to farm organically, whereas MASIPAG
requires all of its members to be 100% organic in their production methods. Farmers
converting to organic practices generally have trouble with profitability in their first two
years, but they enjoy a definite income advantage over a ten‐year horizon (Acs, Berentsen,
and Huirne 2007). MASIPAG attempts to help farmers with that transition through the
provision of organic seeds and training on composting and farming techniques such as
creating concoctions based out of local organic materials to use as natural pesticides or
fertilizers (Broad and Cavanagh 2012). MASIPAG also trains farmers to use basic tools,
sophisticated knowledge, and assiduous labor to select favorable seeds and do a hands‐on
hybridization technique to develop stable and productive new seed varieties that are suited
specifically to their particular geographic circumstances, thus turning a present‐day
conception of technology transfer (from scientist to peasant) on its head (Frossard 1994).
“MASIPAG is about escaping the mindset of dependency” (Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright
2009).
Recognized by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity for not just preserving, but
enhancing the diversity of rice varieties in the Philippines, MASIPAG is an organization that
is based in Los Baños, Laguna on the island of Luzon. By the late 2000s MASIPAG consisted
of 672 people’s organizations representing the participation of 35,000 farming families in
45 provinces (Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright 2009). MASIPAG has a strong presence in
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Mindanao, with a regional office in Cagayan de Oro and a 9.5‐hectare test farm called the
MASIPAG Biodiversity Center located in Bukidnon. On this farm are kept 600 native
varieties of rice and 40 varieties of corn, as well as fruit trees, vegetables, herbs, native
chickens, goats, pigs, and ducks (McCrossan 2010). MASIPAG’s emphases on diversified
farming, improving farmer incomes, and ecological restoration are part of an international
trend in recognizing the importance of multifunctionality in rural communities, in the
sense that, besides producing food and fiber, farming communities can be important in
promoting both economic and ecological stability for the greater society (Wilson 2010).
The World Bank, one of the original promoters of the Green Revolution, is now going
through a gradual transition in their agricultural philosophy. Although their
recommendations on pesticides are not those of an organic purist—“integrated pest
management that combines agroecological principles with judicious use of pesticides can
increase yields and reduce environmental damage” (World Bank 2007)—this is a notable
change from the blanket support for the chemical paradigm that the World Bank showed in
previous decades. In intensive high‐input farming systems in Asia, the World Bank (2007)
found “growing evidence that soil‐health degradation and pest and weed buildup are
slowing productivity growth,” along with the problem of fertilizer nutrient runoff causing
algal blooms and wetlands destruction. The Bank suggested mixed legume‐cereal systems
to reduce the need for chemical fertilizers, as well as an end to fertilizer subsidies that
encourage wasteful use of fertilizers. Growing legumes replenishes nitrogen in the soil for
whatever is grown subsequently, and thus can be an important part of an organic cropping
cycle. In the 2000s, the Philippines was an importer of legumes like soybeans, peanuts, and
mung beans (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011). Reliance on importation was an
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indicator that the Department of Agriculture was lagging in the promotion of crop rotation
and sustainable farming techniques. However, under Secretary of Agriculture Proceso
Alcala (2010‐present), the department has promoted more leguminous cropping for soil
fertility and environmental benefits (Republic of the Philippines Department of Agriculture
Bureau of Agricultural Research 2011).
In irrigated rice farming areas in Bukidnon, I sometimes found tension between
those in the chemical paradigm and those farmers who are using organic methods. First,
the chemical farmers use more water than the organic farmers since the organic farms
have more frequent fallow periods. Also, pesticide use may change the quality of the water,
so upstream water use by chemical farms may mean that the irrigation water used in a
downstream organic farm may have pesticide residues. There are different ways farmers
may scale a response to this problem. Some of the organic farmers I spoke to said that they
would like to put pressure on a particular barangay, municipal, or provincial government
to enact legislation against the use of chemical inputs in situations where it could mean
contamination of other farms. Because of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160
of 1991), local government units have the power to determine their own policies on such
matters. However, even at the barangay level, there was not a critical mass of organic
farmers in any of the communities I visited to effect these types of changes. If legislation
would be enacted against the use of chemical inputs, it would be interesting to see if the
agribusinesses that would be affected by the changes would organize themselves into any
collective lobbying groups, potentially engaging in a new scaling endeavor.
Organic producers may also push for the enactment of new local legislation (or
enforcement of existing federal legislation) that penalizes those farmers who burn their
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crop residues.26 This may encourage many farmers to compost their crop residues and
adopt completely organic approaches. If that would lead to incorporating those farmers
into cooperatives or collectives, then this may be beneficial in terms of providing
economies of scale for the marketing operations of those organizations.
High value commercial crops (HVCC) may be able to accrue a higher profit margin to
an investor than a staple crop because the produce is sold in markets with much higher
food prices, yet it is questionable whether this can be sustained in the long term. The HVCC
plantations tend to be very capital intensive and use inputs like chemical fertilizers,
pesticides, and herbicides that hurt long‐term fertility and productivity. For example, a
number of banana plantations in the Davao area of southern Mindanao have been
abandoned due to their lack of productivity after only two decades of growing. In the
municipality of Pangantucan, Bukidnon, where I was based, I saw banana plantations that
were abandoned after only four years of cultivation. Soils were dry, granular, and red,
which denotes mineral deficiencies. It was unclear how much of this was due to the
practices of Dole, the corporation that had attempted to grow in these areas, and how much
was due to prior poor farming practices. Nonetheless, it was notable that Dole had
abandoned its investment so soon.
During my fieldwork (2008‐2009), I repeatedly found evidence that the Philippine
government was caught between two different agricultural paradigms. On the one hand

The burning of crop residues on chemical farms creates smoke, which causes pollution
for communities, but also releases the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and thus adds to
global problems of climate change, which has been blamed by many farmers for recent
climate unpredictability and extreme weather events in the Philippines. Crop failures and
erosion are associated with extreme precipitation, and the starts to each rainy season and
dry season have been hard to predict, which means farmers may plant too early or too late.
26
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evidence was mounting that soil fertility can only be sustained through organic practices,
so the government had an increasing number of programs for organic fertilization. Yet, the
inertia of decades of corporate influence and a Green Revolution mindset meant the
government continued to promote certain aspects of the chemical/biotech agriculture
approach. Corporations are adept in scaling their projects on a variety of different levels.
There are national officers, regional coordinators, and local representatives who exert
influence through advertising and outreach programs that work on these various levels.
However, sources from both corporations and government agencies also confirmed that in
many places there had been collusion between corporate representatives and government
personnel on government development programs that included the products of the
agribusinesses.
Government policy at a variety of levels influenced the scaling of the chemical
paradigm, according to whether or not hybrid or GMO seeds, chemical fertilizers, and/or
chemical pesticides were included in development programs. For example, at various
points during the 2000s, fertilizer subsidy programs were promoted by the central
government in Manila, hybrid seed subsidies came from the Region 10 (Northern
Mindanao) office of the Department of Agriculture in Cagayan de Oro, and the issuance of
hybrid seeds came from the Bukidnon Provincial government in Malaybalay.
One instance of blending paradigms I observed in 2009 was the government
promotion, in some municipalities, of ‘balanced fertilization,’ in which there is a mixture of
chemical and organic fertilizers. Another aspect of the syncretic approach of the DA is
something that would bewilder organic farming purists: the use of hybrid seeds in an
‘organic’ program. Hybrid seeds are not open‐pollinated and thus the farmer needs to
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repeatedly buy new seeds from a vendor rather than save seeds to re‐plant. Yet hybrid
seed subsidies were included in many government organic programs, a testament to the
continuing corporate influence on agriculture. Agriculture had for millennia been a
reproductive process, but non‐reproducible hybrid seeds (and now biotech seeds as well)
have created a production process requiring external inputs akin to any other industry
(Lewontin 1998); and agribusinesses that sell these seeds retain part of the surplus and
expand the scales of the reproduction of environmental conditions. When I asked the
Philippines Country Manager of Pioneer Hi‐Bred, a leading American‐based seed purveyor,
whether Pioneer would consider marketing an open‐pollinated variety that farmers could
save, he candidly admitted that there would be no incentive to do so.
When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo promoted the new self‐sufficiency goals
for rice in 2008, there was also an announcement of a new initiative for the creation of
organic fertilizer, spurred in part by the fact that inorganic fertilizer prices are tied to the
price of oil, which was skyrocketing in early 2008 (Apanay and Samonte 2008; Cariño
2008). Table 4.3 below shows five‐year snap shots of the prices of the four most popular
chemical fertilizers in the Philippines. The trios of numbers in parentheses indicate the
proportions of nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K).
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Table 4.3 (below): Five‐year snap shots of fertilizer prices for one 50‐kilogram sack of
fertilizer in nominal Philippine pesos (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011).

Progress in the organic fertilizer programs of the government was slow at first, but
more recently, there have been more substantial developments in the Philippine
government to support sustainable agriculture. The Organic Agriculture Act (RA 10068)
was approved in April 2010. One of the bill’s authors, Proceso Alcala, was subsequently
appointed Secretary of the Department of Agriculture in June 2010. This has meant an end
to subsidy programs for things like hybrid seeds and chemical fertilizers: “In general, we
shall veer away from the provision of private goods and shift to the more strategic
intervention of providing public goods which should be the role of government in the first
place” (Republic of the Philippines Department of Agriculture 2011). Bukidnon followed
the lead of the national government by passing its own organic agriculture code in 2011
that is patterned after RA 10068. The provincial office of the Department of Agriculture
dedicated P5,000,000 (~US$122,000 in 2013 conversion) into the implementation of
educational projects and demonstration farms that started in January 2013 (Balane 2013).
This is a notable development since the Provincial Agriculture Officer (the same person I
interviewed in 2009) had previously been lukewarm on organic agriculture.
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Figure 4.1: Rice fields in Cabangkalan. Although sustainable agriculture groups with strict
production standards like Makakabus were ahead of the government in the promotion of
organic agriculture, new government regulations on organic certification could criminalize
small organic producers if they label products as organic without paying high certification
fees (photo by author).
Filipino advocates of organic farming are glad to see official promotion of organic
agriculture, however, RA 10068 does not do anything to make certification more
economically feasible for small producers. In fact, there is concern that those non‐certified
farmers who have been, in good faith, using organic methods and marketing their products
as organic could face criminalization (International Federation of Organic Agriculture
Movements 2011). Makakabus successfully pursued governmental organic certification in
2005, but did not renew the certification in subsequent years because they could not afford
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the fees, so they are one of the organizations that could be criminalized for selling products
that are marked as organic but not certified by the government.
The MASIPAG Farmers Guarantee System is an example of a Participatory Guarantee
System (PGS) that uses inspections and evaluations by peers to certify organic practices,
especially with short chain commodities such as rice that will be marketed locally
(International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 2012). This allows prices to
stay within reach of consumers and allows small farmers, who make up the bulk of organic
producers in the Philippines, to control their overhead by avoiding costly government
certification. MASIPAG and other NGOs and local government units are calling for the
Philippine government to recognize PGSs so that small organic farmers have the legal right
to label their products organic.
RA 10068 may also hinder the ability of some local consumers to purchase organic
products. If organic certification can only occur through expensive government permitting
and inspections, then this could raise the price of organic products and limit the
opportunities for organic foods to benefit all socio‐economic levels of a society (Westwood
and Lefilliatre 2011).
Neoliberalism has brought new regimes of organic certification to the South (West
2012) and in the process the articulation of what organic agriculture means in local places
may change. When organic practices are pursued in a food sovereignty context, the
emphasis is on local food security, sustainable staple cropping, preservation of local seed
biodiversity, long‐term soil fertility, community health impacts, and economic
independence for farmers, whereas the overriding concern in organic agriculture for
export markets is to create a product for Northern consumption. Furthermore, new
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organic laws may be used as a marketing ploy by multinational seed corporations who
want to sell certified organic seeds to farmers or plantation owners who are new to organic
production (GRAIN 2008).
The irony of the neoliberalization of the organics industry is that it is partially
market‐driven by Northern consumers concerned about the environment, yet the new
certifications have the potential to make environmental sustainability more difficult in the
South, as small farmer and indigenous production systems are crowded out by corporate
organic producers that will simply follow the letter of the law rather than engaging in agro‐
ecological practices. A further irony is that some Northern consumers may specifically buy
organic products because they believe they are not participating in 'big agriculture,' but the
new organic laws may actually drive agriculture in the South away from small producers
toward agribusinesses.27
4.2.1 Agricultural biotechnology
KMP (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas—Peasant Movement of the Philippines) and
RESIST (Resistance and Solidarity Against Agrochemical TNCs) are two of the main
organizations that organized protests and direct actions against the 1999‐2001 field trials
that American seed companies Monsanto and Pioneer conducted in Mindanao on
genetically engineered Bt corn. Court orders were given to end the field trials in some
locations, but Monsanto and Pioneer failed to show up in court until after the initial trials
On a related note, see Jaffee (2007) for an assessment of the effects of fair trade
programs on Southern producers. One might argue fair trade is in keeping with the social
justice goals of the food sovereignty movement. However, the fair trade movement is a
market‐based solution to social ills and in this way is very much in keeping with the
neoliberal paradigm (West 2012). Furthermore, it caters to a privileged class in the North,
and thus maintains a familiar North/South dichotomy in agricultural trade relations
(Raynolds and Wilkinson 2007).
27
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were complete and harvested. As subsequent trials were underway in August 2001, eight
hundred farmers, indigenous people, and students uprooted a 1,700 square meter test plot
(Inouye 2004; Cabanilla 2007). Part of the explanation protesters gave for targeting these
crops was that they saw no reason for the government to approve an expensive seed that
would do nothing in terms of directly feeding local people, since the genetically modified
corn is only used as animal feed. This sentiment was confirmed during my fieldwork, as I
asked farmers if they were interested in using GMO corn and they said they would not since
they could not eat it. There has been opposition to genetically engineered food crops as
well though, as activists uprooted test fields of Bt eggplant in 2010 and 2011 in Mindanao
and Luzon (Fernandez 2011). Eventually, under pressure from environmental and
sustainable agriculture groups such as Greenpeace and MASIPAG, the Philippine Supreme
Court issued a writ of kalikasan (or writ of nature to defend Filipinos' constitutional right
to a healthy environment) in May 2012, stopping the field trials of genetically modified
eggplant (Felongco 2012).
USAID (United States Agency for International Development), which was involved in
the project to test Bt eggplant, also came under fire years earlier in the Philippines for
promoting the agendas of biotech companies. USAID was the main funder of a project
called AGILE (Accelerating Growth Investments and Liberalization with Equity), which was
developed in conjunction with the Philippine government in 1997. AGILE contractors
helped the Philippine Department of Agriculture develop the Plant Variety Protection Act
of 2002 (RA 9168), which established intellectual property guidelines necessary to protect
the profit mechanisms of the biotech seed purveyors. AGILE also helped in the guidelines
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for commercializing transgenic plants and took part in campaigns to disseminate
information on biotechnology to the public (Bas 2003).
The biotech agenda has also been promoted in the Philippines by the International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri‐biotech Applications (ISAAA) through the partnering of
agricultural research institutions and multinational corporations. ISAAA receives funding
not only from the biotech corporations Monsanto, Pioneer/DuPont, Syngenta, and Bayer,
but also the World Bank and USAID (Inouye 2004). In 2006, the ISAAA conducted a survey
on “Public Understanding and Perception of and Attitude Towards Agricultural
Biotechnology in the Philippines.” Bukidnon was one of the seven provinces selected
where stakeholders (business leaders, consumers, extension workers, farmer leaders,
policymakers, religious leaders, and scientists) were interviewed. The study reported,
“There is the prevailing tendency for all stakeholders to perceive agricultural
biotechnology as hazardous, but despite that they still view it as beneficial” (Torres et al.
2006). ISAAA, in partnership with the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II, the
World Vegetable Center, and the Institute for Plant Breeding at the University of the
Philippines‐Los Baños, developed a genetically engineered salad‐type tomato that they
subsequently tested in Bukidnon (Mamaril 2009), which is the top salad‐type tomato‐
producing province in the Philippines.
The Philippine provinces of Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Oriental Mindoro,
and Bohol enacted legislation that prohibited the growing of GMO crops (Cabanilla 2007).
These bans have not been overturned by the Philippine central government, nor have they
been challenged by other countries as trade barriers by means of a WTO complaint.
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4.3 Land use decisions
Land use planning and land policies can be extremely important for determining the
food security strategy a nation pursues, as they influence decisions whether to focus more
on self‐sufficiency or on export earnings.
During the time of my research in the Philippines (2008‐2009), the country was at a
critical juncture in terms of property issues. The Philippine constitution forbids foreign
ownership of agricultural lands, but President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in order to
encourage foreign investment in rural areas, proposed changing the constitution to allow
foreign ownership of agricultural land.28 This was one aspect of the controversial ‘charter
change’29 that she was advocating. Planning for food sovereignty would become
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, if great swaths of land would be sold to the highest
foreign bidders. However, due to pressure from civil society, charter change was
unsuccessful. Although the plan for foreign land sales was defeated, multinational
corporations still exert a great deal of influence over land issues in the Philippines. Land
markets are influenced when Filipino elites amass large landholdings to be leased to the
multinationals, as well as when the multinationals rent land directly from small
landowners.
When Dole looks for land in Mindanao for banana plantations, they research the
local rate for land rental, offer a price that is a bit higher, thus ensuring the interest of the
President Arroyo advocated for numerous neoliberal policy positions during her political
career. During her Senate career (1992‐1998), she worked for Philippine accession to the
World Trade Organization, foreign investment liberalization, and the creation of export
processing zones. As President (2001‐2010), she signed a bilateral free trade agreement
with Japan and eradicated hectarage limits on banana plantations (Holden 2012).
29 Charter change was abbreviated by critics as “cha cha” in order to illustrate the political
maneuvering involved in the process.
28
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land owner, and then offer five years of rent upfront to the owner. For a cash‐strapped
owner, it is an offer they often cannot refuse. The rent30, which seems favorable in the
present, is fixed into a long term contract (25 years is typical, with discretion of early
termination reserved only by Dole) and will likely not be seen as very lucrative to the
owner in the latter years of the contract. If the owner does not want to renew the rental
contract, they will probably be in a state where they have no capital to re‐start farming the
land themselves and will have lost years of experience in farming. In the meantime, the
ecology of their soil will have changed, altered by pesticides and acidified by chemical
fertilizers. When Dole plantations in Bukidnon have been inspected by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, their record on erosion control has been very poor. I
observed a variety of parcels of land in Bukidnon that had been in Dole banana production
for less than four years and the soils were generally in poor condition.
Food sovereignty advocates stress that land reform is one of the pillars of their
movement. Thus there is frustration with the Philippine government’s recent self‐
sufficiency strategies since they are generally not based on changes in land policies, but
only on increasing yields. Repeatedly when I talked to people in the Department of
Agriculture, it was as if the quantity of land that could be planted in staple crops was static.
There was seldom talk about increasing the amount of land put into rice or corn or shifting
away from export crops. Chapter Five (Section 5.1.1) will provide a short history of land
reform in the Philippines, the influences that the World Bank has had on the matter, and

In Bukidnon in 2009, Dole was offering P12,000/hectare/year, which was higher than
the usual P5,000 – P10,000 transactions that I recorded between local residents.
30
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the details and drawbacks of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), a land
redistribution program which has been in effect since 1988.
A plethora of farmers organizations in the Philippines have been involved in land
struggles against local elite landowners. Most of these struggles never leave the municipal,
provincial, or regional levels. One exception, which sprang from the province of Bukidnon,
was the Sumilao farmers, a group of 137 Higaonon (one of the indigenous peoples of
Bukidnon) who had been awarded 144 hectares of prime agricultural land through a CARP
redistribution in 1995 (ANGOC 2009). However, before the land was turned over to the
beneficiaries, the owner tried to convert the land to an agro‐industrial site, which is one of
the exemptions that CARP allows. A 28‐day hunger strike by the farmers in 1997 prompted
President Fidel Ramos to intervene. The outcome was a compromise in which the farmers
would receive 100 hectares and the landowner would keep 44 hectares.
The owner appealed to the Supreme Court, which overturned the presidential order
on the basis of a technicality, terminating the farmers’ award (ANGOC 2009; Sumilao
Farmers 2010). The landowner was ordered to proceed with the agro‐industrial
conversion, but years passed without action and in 2002 the property was sold to the San
Miguel Corporation, the largest food and beverage conglomerate in Southeast Asia. The
chairman of San Miguel is Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, of one of the wealthiest people in
the Philippines and once a principal crony of Ferdinand Marcos. San Miguel planned to use
the land to raise hogs, which would be a violation of the conversion order, so the Sumilao
farmers lodged a complaint with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), who deferred
to the office of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In October 2007, the farmers undertook
a 1,700‐kilometer march (and sea voyage) from Bukidnon to Malacañang, the presidential
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palace in Manila. The gamut of groups supporting the Sumilao farmers was impressive.
Progressive peasant groups united with the Catholic Church hierarchy, including the
Archbishop of Manila himself, in the effort to put pressure on the president.
Five months later, a compromise was reached in which San Miguel would grant 50
hectares to the farmers and purchase 94 hectares of land for them elsewhere in Bukidnon.
Full implementation of the agreement was slow though, necessitating more pressure from
the farmers. In 2010, two years after this agreement was struck, the 94 hectares of land
had yet to be secured. The farmers protested again as DAR explained that the title to 79 of
the 94 hectares had not yet been secured since some of the land was classified as
timberland. This in itself was a violation of the agreement, since the 94 hectares was
supposed to be equivalent to the prime agricultural land of the original 144 hectares. The
title to 15 of the 94 hectares had been secured for the farmers by April 2010, but when the
farmers arrived on the land for the first time, they discovered that the land had been leased
to Del Monte Philippines, Inc. and was planted with pineapples. The land had only recently
come into the possession of San Miguel and was previously owned by the family of the
mayor of Sumilao, which raised suspicions that they were profiting from the ordeal of the
Sumilao farmers. The farmers uprooted the pineapples and planted their own crops.
Shortly thereafter, a threat of legal action against the farmers for destruction of property
came from Del Monte (Sumilao Farmers 2010; Manila Bulletin 2010). It was not until late
2010 that San Miguel turned over the remainder of the land (San Miguel Corporation
2010). Over fifteen years had passed since the farmers were first told they would be
agrarian reform beneficiaries.
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The Sumilao farmers story presents a panoply of the disparate actors who might get
involved in agrarian disputes—a group of indigenous farmers, progressive activist groups,
human rights attorneys, officials in a local government unit, the Department of Agrarian
Reform, a wealthy local landowner, the Church, the President of the Philippines, a powerful
Philippine food conglomerate, and a formidable multinational agribusiness. The story is
also notable because the actors jumped scale so frequently—a regional governmental
agency deferred to the president, a wealthy local landowner sold the land to a national food
conglomerate, a multinational corporation threatened a group of farmers with a suit in a
local court, and an indigenous group marched to the national capital in their strategy to
attain food security for their community. What is the lesson learned from this seemingly
Sisyphean struggle? For the lawyer of the farmers, the importance of perseverance for
legal justice was the take home message. Yet, the KMP (Peasant Movement of the
Philippines) argued that fifteen years without justice for the farmers illustrated the utter
failure of CARP as an agrarian reform policy. It was a provision in CARP that allowed the
original landowner to use land use conversion as a strategy to avoid redistribution (Aning
2007). Furthermore, CARP policies required the Sumilao farmers to pay for the awarded
land that was originally their Higaonon ancestral land in the first place.
The way that organizations have scaled their efforts has been the subject of study by
Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. Transnational agrarian movements (TAMs) have arisen to contend
with the “apparently contradictory political directions of globalization versus
decentralization” (Borras 2010). The diversity of organizations involved in TAMs is
influenced by the class affiliations and the political ideologies of the various members. La
Via Campesina (LVC) has emerged as an important TAM, as both an actor and as an arena
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of action for peasants and landless workers who were not previously represented in
international forums. But these arenas of action are not conflict free.
Several organizations in the Philippines have had involvement with La Via
Campesina (LVC). Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP or Peasant Movement of the
Philippines) and Democratic Peasant Movement of the Philippines (DKMP) are the two
main members of LVC.31 KMP is a nationwide organization of poor peasants and farm
workers that advocates for land reform following “a more or less orthodox Marxist position
by prioritizing workers and campaigning for state farms and the nationalization of land,
although allowing for a transitional individual ownership” (Borras 2010). In place of CARP,
they back the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill (GARB), which would put an end to the
loopholes and special exemptions that many large landowners and agribusinesses enjoy
under CARP. KMP is thus scaling their food sovereignty program partially on the national
level by promoting federal legislation. KMP favors the confiscation of land (without
compensation) from large landowners and then free distribution of land to landless
peasants (Borras 2008). DKMP is a much smaller organization that differs ideologically in
the sense that they promote family farming as an end in itself. Another more recently
formed organization is the National Coordination of Autonomous Local Rural People’s
Organizations (UNORKA), which like KMP is made up mostly of landless peasants and rural
agricultural wage laborers, but unlike KMP, attempts to use CARP as a tool in its many
agrarian disputes (Borras 2010; Franco 2008). In other words, UNORKA tries to work
There are other farming organizations in the Philippines that are involved with the more
conservative international organizations, IFAP (International Federation of Agricultural
Producers) and ILC (International Land Coalition), which collaborate with the World Bank
and do not have strong critiques of standard development philosophies. See Borras (2010)
for details.
31
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within the system and get Department of Agrarian Reform personnel to follow the letter of
the law, trusting that progress can be made using this strategy. Conversely, KMP sees CARP
as a fundamentally flawed policy that should be replaced. LVC has an organizational rule
that allows current members to block the entry of new members from their own country if
the existing member does not think that the newly applying member has a philosophy that
is in keeping with the objectives of LVC (Borras 2010). KMP used this rule to block
UNORKA from becoming a member of LVC. This illustrates how member organizations can
try to influence the political direction of the larger organization, promote their specific
ideologies, and influence which of their national issues and strategies get scaled up to the
international arena. LVC is a politically and socio‐economically diverse organization, so the
decision‐making processes for organizational positions are frequently contested.
One of UNORKA’s struggles involved opposition to land transfers that were
benefiting a banana plantation on land owned by a well‐known powerful family, the
Floirendos (Borras, Carranza, and Franco 2007; Franco 2008). UNORKA’s leader and
principal organizer in this case, Eric Cabanit, was assassinated in 2006, in what was one of
the higher profile killings of activists, especially land struggle activists, that have plagued
the country, especially during the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration (2001‐2010).
The gravity of this situation was likely what influenced LVC’s decision to admit UNORKA as
a ‘candidate member’ in 2008 (Borras 2010). MASIPAG has also sent a delegation to some
LVC events, but as an observing organization rather than as a member.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip
Alston, visited the Philippines for a fact‐finding mission in 2007. The human rights
organization Karapatan estimated the number of killings of activists and members of the
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media between 2001 and 2006 to be 703 (Franco 2007). Alston (2008) found the majority
of these claims credible and stated that there exists a culture of impunity within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is suspected in many of the killings. A number of the
killings may also be attributed to private security forces or contract killers hired by
wealthy landowners who do not want to lose control of key parcels of land (Franco 2007).
The government considers itself at war with leftist insurgents, but there is
widespread public sentiment that the AFP makes little effort to differentiate between NPA
(New People’s Army, the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines)
combatants and legitimate, peaceful activists. Alston (2008) found no substance to the
AFP’s claim that the NPA was responsible for the majority of the killings because of internal
purges, and argued that the AFP was attempting to displace responsibility. The NPA has
likely been involved in some assassinations of peasant leaders, since some peasant leaders
are perceived by the NPA as reformists who are collaborating with the state, whereas the
NPA claims that they can bring a more truly revolutionary redistribution of land and
wealth. However, Franco and Borras (2007) and Alston (2008) agree that the number of
NPA‐perpetrated assassinations is quite small in comparison to the number of AFP‐
perpetrated assassinations. Opinions of Filipinos I interviewed differed on whether the
situation is more that the military is simply running amok32 or whether secret policies of
targeting activists were coming from the President herself, in an effort to crush a resurgent
left. Alston (2008) found that the AFP, in its counterinsurgency efforts, was increasingly
turning its attention on civil society organizations that it ostensibly considered ‘fronts’ for
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo certainly owed part of her continued existence in office to the
support of the military, so one theory is that she let them operate with impunity in
exchange for protection from potential coup attempts.
32
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the NPA. It is not an exaggeration to say that the country has been in a ‘red scare’
condition, where activists, particularly those who are involved in land struggles, are
frequently discredited by government and military officials at various levels as
sympathizers or collaborators with the NPA, despite a glaring lack of evidence in most
cases.33
Although KMP, DKMP, UNORKA, and MASIPAG all operate on the national scale and
have all also been part of the international food sovereignty movement through La Via
Campesina, there are numerous farmers organizations in the Philippines that organize
people at smaller scales for specific ends. Often there are connections (alternately strong
or weak) between these small farmers organizations and the national organizations. It is
the groups that are engaged in land struggles or workers’ campaigns against plantation
owners that are most likely to affiliate with KMP or UNORKA. The Sumilao farmers, for
example, received support from both KMP and UNORKA. Sustainable agriculture farmers
organizations that are not engaged in a land struggle are more likely to remain
independent, like Makakabus, or to affiliate with MASIPAG with the objective of gaining
technical expertise and marketing help. There are some people who participate in both
KMP and MASIPAG activities, but most MASIPAG members are not as politically radical as
the KMP leadership. DKMP has been active in Mindanao, but I did not find any evidence of
activity in Bukidnon in my 2008‐2009 time frame.

I personally knew one activist who had been falsely accused of murder by military
officers who filed charges in court. This resulted in that activist going into long‐term hiding
since there was an assumption that a fair trial would not be conducted. I also witnessed an
Orwellian sign in a bus terminal that asked readers to text a certain phone number if they
had information about anyone being involved with NPA activities.
33
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Often small farmers organizations do not fit neatly into the local scalar hierarchy of
governmental units. Sometimes just a few families are banded together, yet in other cases
farmers organizations may command a purok (a sub‐unit of a barangay) or even vie with an
official barangay government for influence in an area. In terms of land relations, some
farmers organizations and collectives, like Makakabus, operate within the paradigm of
privatized land, but they then manage the land in a fairly communal sense, where labor is at
least to some degree group oriented rather than individualized. Chapter Seven will explore
in detail Makakabus’s approach to scaling food sovereignty, but first Chapter Five analyzes
the top‐down countermovements of international institutions.
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Chapter Five: Neoliberal economic
reforms’ effects on the agricultural
economy and governance in the
Philippines
The 1960s and 1970s were decades when significant development loans were
granted to the Philippines with the intention of boosting agricultural production,
integrating the country more fully into the international trading system, and encouraging
an export oriented economy. At the same time, development assistance to the Philippines
was seen as a way of thwarting communism (Bello, Kinley, and Elinson 1982; Putzel 1992;
Borras et al. 2009). By the early 1980s a decade of global recession had spurred a debt
crisis among the Western powers. The response was to use the World Bank and the IMF to
institutionalize market forces and manipulate policies in the economies of Southern
nations so they could pay off their loan debts (Brenner and Theodore 2002; McMichael
2005). This repayment was to be achieved through neoliberal restructuring. Aggressive
agendas of trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and budgetary austerity were
the prescriptions for the economies of countries like the Philippines, administered through
structural adjustment programs of international financial institutions (IFIs) and eventually
through trade policies enforced by the WTO.
While the contemporary Philippine economy has already been modified greatly by
these policies, there are still outside pressures for more change. These neoliberal reforms
hinder the Philippine government in its attempts to move toward self‐sufficiency in staple
crop production. Even though Philippine government agencies have programs to promote
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staple production, a variety of forces hamper the attainment of the goal. Among these are
corporate expansion of export cropping, land privatization schemes, expanded trade
liberalization, deregulation of agribusiness ventures and environmental standards, and
fiscal austerity measures that restrict the implementation of government oversight. Every
level of governance is affected by these trends and ultimately the impacts reach the
individual farmers and agricultural wage laborers throughout the Philippine agricultural
economy.
From my 2008‐2009 field work in the Philippines, I was able to observe how a lack
of public funding for government programs means that agencies like the Department of
Agriculture (DA), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) seek private (often foreign) investors to reduce the
agencies’ burdens of providing support services to the specific communities for which they
are responsible.
The lack of resources for monitoring the investment projects that get approved and
the lack of substantive penalties for their non‐compliance to environmental regulations
sometimes result in significant ecological impacts, such as erosion, siltation of waterways,
soil acidification, and biocide contamination. Investor‐led development often means land is
shifted from forested land or staple cropping (like rice, corn, and vegetables) toward the
growing of cash crops like bananas, pineapples, and sugarcane, eroding the possibilities for
local and national food self‐sufficiency.
Austerity measures within the federal government, due to international financial
institutions’ structural adjustment programs, have resulted in the devolution and
fragmentation of government agencies, causing discontinuities in the communication and

135

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
implementation of programs across all scales of operation. At the same time, on a global
scale, foreign production subsidies and international trade policies undermine the
economic viability of Filipino farmers as they struggle to produce staples for their domestic
market, with the result that the Philippines through the 2000s was one of the biggest rice
importers in the world (Hui 2012).

5.1 Privatization
5.1.1 Incomplete, stalled, and privatized land reform
Land inequality was a legacy of the encomienda system of the Spanish colonial
period from the sixteenth century to 1898 (ANGOC 2009). Various land reforms were
attempted during the mid‐20th century, but with limited effect. After Ferdinand Marcos
was deposed in 1986, the new government headed by Corazon Aquino instituted the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of 1988 (CARP), which aimed to redistribute
millions of hectares of land in parcels no larger than five hectares.34 The efforts have been
a partial success, but loopholes for corporations, corruption35, and lack of support to
agrarian reform beneficiaries have often meant that the direction of land conversion is

Five hectares is the limit for a CARP distribution, though citizens who acquired their land
in a previous land reform program like the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) may legally own 12 hectares. For details on the different types of
land transfers included in CARP, such as compulsory acquisition (CA), Operation Land
Transfer (OLT), voluntary offer to sell (VOS), and voluntary land transfer (VLT), see Borras
and Franco (2005).
35 In practice, many elite landowners end up controlling far more than 12 hectares,
sometimes through pawning arrangements, ‘dummy landowners,’ or other fraudulent
activities. A dummy landowner is someone who has title to land, but does not actually
control the land. They are often in an economically dependent relationship with the de
facto owner. Relatives and dummy landowners are used to circumvent the hectarage limits
on land ownership.
34
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toward the plantations of agribusinesses concentrating on export crops, resulting in
displacement and loss of land control for peasant farmers (Riedinger, 1995; Borras and
Franco, 2005; Franco and Borras, 2007). Multinational corporations do not own their
plantations, but often rent from large landowners in an area, who have likely used relatives
and dummy landowners to buy land from small farmers (many of whom were agrarian
reform beneficiaries).
The Department of Agrarian Reform (or DAR) has been the agency that has handled
land redistribution in recent decades, yet its powers have been constrained by weak
legislation and its efficacy has been enfeebled by challenges from elite Filipino landowners
and multinational corporations (Riedinger 1995; Borras and Franco 2005; Franco and
Borras 2007). DAR’s redistribution program is based on individual titling, so local or
regional elites have found it easy to pick off land holdings one by one as individual farmers
have had difficulty staying out of debt. This is evidence of the social justice problems that
sometimes result from privatized land reform (Nightingale 2006; Harris 2009).36 Thus the
land retention rate for farmer beneficiaries of redistributed land has been dismal. Spiraling
input costs and a lack of strong price supports for farmers’ products have resulted in large‐
scale debt and wave after wave of pawned or sold farmland. Agbalo Agricultural Collective
exemplifies the advantage of community titling since communal control of their
landholdings has prevented any instances of pawning or selling land in Agbalo.

From the World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development
(World Bank 2007: 139) there is some indication that the World Bank may be more
supportive than it used to be of community titling in limited situations, as they admitted
that individual titling may lead to “land‐grabbing by local elites and bureaucrats.”
36
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DAR struggles to offer agricultural extension support services to the many agrarian
reform communities that have received land. To reduce their budget for providing support
services, DAR sometimes coordinates agreements between their agrarian reform
communities and outside investors who want to develop land into export‐cropping
ventures that can create profit for the investors.
Privatized land reform, influenced by the global North, is nothing new to the
Philippines. During the beginning of the American colonial period, the United States
ignored Filipinos’ desires to reclaim the lands that had been seized over a period of
centuries by the Catholic Church. Resentment of what were considered ‘land grabs’ was
one of the major causes of the Filipino rebellion against Spanish control in the late 1890s.
Franco and Borras (2007) explained how the American colonial rulers used a market‐
oriented approach:
In 1903, the colonial government purchased at market price 158,676 hectares of the
“friar lands” for the amount of $6,043,217 USD. It paid the Church cash from loans
secured from commercial banks in the United States at commercial interest rates,
and re‐sold the lands at full acquisition cost, including the loan interest cost in the
“open market.” Only the rich, including American corporations, were able to buy the
lands.
More peasant revolts occurred, especially in the 1930s and 1950s, but tenancy reform,
market‐based land transfer (Franco and Borras 2007), and resettlement were deployed
rather than land appropriation to quell the rebellions.
The Philippines, by the 1980s, had one of the world’s most unequal divisions of land.
According to Putzel (1992), 5% of the landowners in the country owned 83% of the
agricultural land. The Ferdinand Marcos administration (1965‐1986) attempted a land
reform project, but it was only focused on redistributing rice and corn lands and thus all of
the high value commercial crop (HVCC) plantations were untouched (Borras et al. 2009).
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In 1975, the World Bank Land Reform Sector Policy Paper advocated “formal land titling”
and “abandonment of the communal tenure systems in favor of free‐hold title and
subdivision of the commons” (Borras et al. 2009). Putzel (1992) and Borras et al. (2009)
argued that the World Bank pushed the Philippines to use land reform as a
counterinsurgency strategy during the Marcos dictatorship as Communist rebels were
increasing in power from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s.
In 1981 and 1983, the World Bank granted the Marcos administration the first two
structural adjustment loans, which modified the Philippine economy through trade
liberalization, tariff reduction37, financial sector reforms, and export promotion (Borras et
al. 2009). When Marcos was deposed, the World Bank was initially reluctant to support the
Corazon Aquino administration (1986‐1992) because of fear that decision‐making would
be slowed in the more democratically‐oriented and populist government (Borras et al.
2009). But eventually, as the US accepted Aquino, the World Bank established a mission in
the Philippines in October 1986.38
In the late 1980s, the World Bank was actually promoting progressive land reform
for the Philippines. When Aquino’s proposals for agrarian reform were issued, the Bank’s
local mission was even critical that the proposals were not sufficient for creating equity in
the rural areas, as the scope of the program was limited and the speed at which it would be
implemented was too slow (Borras et al. 2009). Yet these criticisms were not made public.
The lower house of the Philippine Congress had become captive of the country’s landed
From 1981 to 1985, the average nominal tariff rate was lowered from 42% to 28% (Glipo
2006).
38 Although the Philippines is a member state of the World Bank, it only has 0.44% voting
power determined through its economic weight in the world economy and its financial
contributions to and client engagement with the World Bank Group Development Mission.
37
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elite, and Aquino, perhaps to placate those who might organize against her, allowed the
scope of the reforms to be determined by these legislators who had no interest in truly
radical redistributive land reform (Putzel 1992). Congress passed the weak
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988, which established the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). As might be expected, CARP is not at all a revolutionary
program because “it does not call for the expropriation of private lands without
compensation to landlords and it does not distribute lands to peasants for free” (Borras
and Franco 2005). Corporations operating plantations were given a ten‐year grace period
before their workers were allowed to file for any type of land reform claim or leaseback
arrangement. Consequently, from 1988 to 1998, many corporations simply fired any
employees who were perceived to be potential organizers (Borras and Franco 2005).39
CARP is still in effect, but the years 1992‐2000 were the most successful for
redistributing land (Borras, Carranza, and Franco 2007; Fuwa 2000), as leadership at the
Department of Agrarian Reform was relatively progressive during these years (Franco
2008; Fuwa 2000). However, constant resistance to CARP by many landowners has held
the program back from its potential throughout its duration. By 2001, most of CARP’s
redistribution had occurred, but its accomplishments fell far short of its original goals. In
Bukidnon for example, just 34% of the agricultural land had been processed by the
government agencies, yet because of loopholes and corruption, the 34% figure gives an
inflated view of how much land was really redistributed (Gutierrez and Borras 2004). In
2002, only 11.3% of the households in Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) that owned
See Borras and Franco (2005) for a detailed explanation of how elite players in the
banana industry have used a variety of methods to retain their favorable arrangements in
the Philippines.
39
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agricultural land had received that land through CARP (Quitoriano 2009). Scandals,
corruption, and poor administration of CARP made the World Bank lose faith in the
program in the 1990s. Instead of backing land reform, they made a new push for
expanding the structural adjustment programs that called for further liberalization of trade
(Borras et al. 2009). The World Bank recommended a more export‐oriented economy, yet
even though this has been pursued, the Philippines has had increasingly negative balances
of trade in agricultural products (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011).
By the mid‐1990s, the World Bank was urging the government to terminate CARP
because they felt it was a burden to the budget and created an environment that was not
secure for financial investment from abroad. In a statement from A Strategy to Fight
Poverty, shocking for its lack of faith in democratic institutions, the World Bank (1996: 14)
argued:
The administrative complexity of land reform (e.g., the time consuming disputes
that arise over land valuation, or the granting of exemptions) probably cannot be
resolved in the context of a government‐administered program executed in a
democratic society.
This anti‐democratic attitude and the Bank’s pressure to terminate CARP have disturbed
many Filipinos, as they feel their sovereignty is not being respected. Yet, CARP is
consistently attacked from the left as well for being too slow, not using compulsory
acquisition frequently enough40, emphasizing individual titling41, and being filled with
loopholes and provisions42 that are exploited by wealthy landowners and corporations.

Compulsory acquisition (CA) and ‘Operation Land Transfer’ (OLT), which are similar, had
accounted for only 45% of CARP redistributions of private lands (Borras, Carranza, and
Franco 2007). Rather than supporting CARP, the KMP (Peasant Movement of the
Philippines) backs HB 374, the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill (GARB), which was
introduced by Representative Rafael Mariano (et al.) and includes compulsory acquisition
40
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To maximize efficiency and “reactivate the land market,” the World Bank wanted to
replace CARP with a market‐led agrarian reform program based on ‘willing seller, willing
buyer’ (Borras et al. 2009) that would essentially undermine the truly redistributive
aspects of the program. The World Bank has expressed the opinion that state‐led agrarian
reform using compulsory acquisition leads to violence, and thus voluntary and non‐
confrontational market‐led programs are preferable, though the counter‐argument is that if
market‐led programs end up being anti‐poor (Franco and Borras 2007; Borras et al. 2009),
then those programs may lead to even greater violence in the long term. The World Bank
advised the Philippines that the compulsory acquisition function, which is usually the heart
of a radical land reform program, should only be used as a last resort (World Bank 1996),
and of the funds for land programs provided by the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank, very little has been allowed to be used for land acquisition (ANGOC 2009). As an
alternative to CARP, in 2003 the World Bank initiated a market‐led agrarian reform
experiment in the Philippines named the Community‐Managed Agrarian Reform and
Poverty Reduction Program (CMARPRP). The program had even deeper problems with
corruption than CARP; for the most part, it benefited only the elites rather than the poor

by the state and no payments required from the farmer beneficiaries. The DAR officials I
spoke to were not antagonistic toward GARB, but they did not see it as politically feasible.
41 There are some examples of communities that are collective CARP beneficiaries, but by
and large community titling is the exception rather than the rule in CARP land reform.
42 Some of the complaints about CARP concern the ‘leaseback’ arrangements, wherein
beneficiaries must lease their lands to a corporation or the former landowner as a
condition of getting their land certificate; or the ‘corporative scheme’ is a situation where
the beneficiaries receive shares of stock in the landowner’s corporation rather than land
itself (ANGOC 2009). A senior DAR official admitted to me that these types of exemptions
were not really in the spirit of land redistribution.
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(Borras, Carranza, and Franco 2007)43; and contrary to its intentions, it ended up being far
more expensive in per‐hectare costs for administrative and agricultural support than CARP.
Ironically, this was true even though the government’s cost of land acquisition was zero in
CMARPRP because the land beneficiaries shouldered 100% of the land costs (Borras et al.
2009).
Agrarian reform during the 2000s slowed dramatically, as the Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo administration (2001‐2010) accepted the World Bank’s philosophy of market‐led
approaches (Borras, Carranza, and Franco 2007). Akram‐Lodhi (2007) pointed out that
while market‐led agrarian reform has been shown to be unsuccessful (Borras 2006), food
sovereignty proponents and activists have not been in agreement or have often been
unspecific in describing exactly what sort of state‐led program might be best.
La Via Campesina (LVC) has targeted IFIs in general and the World Bank in
particular for its stances on land issues. LVC works with the FAO, which recognizes them
as important partners in agrarian reform. In recent years, the FAO has increasingly
institutionalized its contact with civil society organizations and NGOs like La Via
Campesina that are working for food sovereignty, and the concept of food sovereignty has
become part of the discussion (though not part of policy) at FAO forums. Yet LVC’s ‘expose
and oppose’ strategy against the World Bank makes it difficult for the FAO to then work
with the World Bank as well (Borras 2010), which is one of its biggest financial partners. It
will be interesting to see if and how each of these three organizations bends in the coming
years or whether the LVC‐FAO or FAO‐World Bank partnerships will disintegrate. A hint of
While the ‘community‐managed’ part of CMARPRP sounds progressive, since localities
usually have entrenched elites, this practice of decentralization led to even more land
consolidation, conflict, and intimidation of peasants (Borras, Carranza, and Franco 2007).
43
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the direction things may be heading came from a Wall Street Journal editorial by Suma
Chakrabarti, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and
Jose Graziano da Silva, Director General of the FAO. Citing “the key role of the private
sector in feeding the world” and critical of “small and uneconomically sized farms”
(Chakrabarti and da Silva 2012), the arguments were diametrically opposed to the agenda
of LVC. Chakrabarti and da Silva continued:
The debate on the private sector's role in global food security needs to be heard not
only in emerging Europe, Asia and north Africa, but also in the West. It is
responsible private investment from around the globe that can fertilize this land
with money—once the local business environment is right.
LVC responded by calling the editorial “a clear call for a world wide increase in private
sector investment and land grabbing” (Via Campesina 2012) and lamented that “the FAO's
subservience to the demands and interests of greedy investors undermines all the work at
conciliation that has taken place in recent years between farmers' organisations and the
FAO.”
5.1.2 Privatization of rural development
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development
(World Bank 2007: 138) acknowledged that structural adjustment did not go as planned:
Structural adjustment in the 1980s dismantled the elaborate system of public
agencies that provided farmers with access to land, credit, insurance, inputs, and
cooperative organizations. The expectation was that removing the state would free
the market for private actors to take over these functions—reducing their costs,
improving their quality, and eliminating their regressive bias. Too often, that didn’t
happen.
But rather than a mea culpa for destroying state institutions, the report goes on to explain
that the failures occurred because privatization and marketization were just not done as
thoroughly and efficiently as they could have been.
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The World Bank saw the Philippine government’s reduction of fiscal expenditures
on agricultural programs as necessary to create the capacity to repay their debt obligations
(Glipo 2006). As Philippine budgets have tightened through structural adjustment,
government agencies do not have the money to provide sufficient agricultural extension
support services to their rural constituents, so the agencies try to reduce their burdens by
transferring parts of their responsibilities to NGOs and especially private investors, in
many instances involving foreign capital. In this sense there is de facto privatization
occurring. One vehicle to facilitate this privatization of rural development has been the
Philippine Agricultural Development and Commercial Corporation (PADCC). PADCC serves
two main purposes, the first of which is to reduce the amount of land and farmers to which
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Agrarian Reform, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources need to offer support services. The second purpose is
to create export‐cropping projects that can bring the government tax revenues. PADCC
does this by attracting investors, many of them foreign, to develop lands with highly
capitalized projects. The impetus for investors to work through PADCC includes a variety
of incentives such as special economic zones, federal tax deferrals, exemptions on local
government taxes, and simplified export regulations.
A rationale for the existence of PADCC is that they can act as the official liaison
between investors and rural communities so as to ensure that both parties secure mutually
beneficial terms for their arrangements. Yet, Task Force Food Sovereignty (TFFS) criticized
PADCC as “an intermediary for large‐scale land consolidation” (Doyo 2009), since without
them it would likely be too difficult for outside investors to broker deals with so many
different landowners and indigenous communities in the rural areas of the Philippines.
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When she was still a senator, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo introduced
Republic Act 7652, the Investors’ Lease Act (1993), which allowed these projects of large‐
scale land consolidation to have leases that are up to 50 years, with potential 25‐year
renewals (Marasigan 2009). One 50‐year land deal in Ilocos Norte province, involving
600,000 hectares to be devoted to coconut‐diesel for export to Japan (Marasigan 2009;
Arzadon 2009), exposes what Arze Glipo of TFFS calls, “the government’s lack of sincerity
in its food self‐sufficiency aims” (Doyo 2009). On the island of Mindoro, 94,000 hectares of
land have been leased to a South Korean company to grow feed corn for export (Marasigan
2009). PADCC also completed a large deal with Saudi investors for 50,000 hectares to grow
pineapples, bananas, rice, and corn for export (Loyola 2010) and worked as well with
investors from Bahrain to create an agribusiness venture, investors from Kuwait to
establish banana plantations (Olchondra 2009), the government of Qatar on a deal to
convert 100,000 hectares to agribusinesses in Mindanao (Pañares 2008), and investors
from the United States for a biofuel cropping project (Cayon 2009). As a result of these
deals and many more of a smaller scale, TFFS has called on the current President Benigno
Aquino III to abolish PADCC (Basilio 2010).
PADCC works especially with land that has not seen intensive and highly capitalized
development. Many government personnel I spoke to had a tendency to use the term ‘idle
lands’ to describe lands that are not in highly capitalized production. When I spoke to one
senior PADCC official in 2009, I said that some people would take exception to the term
‘idle lands,’ when in fact indigenous groups or people without land stewardship certificates
are using these areas. The reply was:
By definition, these areas, though [they are] under their ancestral domain claim, are
generally idle, because the nature of these indigenous peoples in our country is
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actually extractive agriculture…. [T]heir harvest [depends] on what nature will
provide them…. [In] that case, we define these areas as idle and therefore subject to
development.
The government does not want to let lands stand ‘idle,’ because if they do, then no tax
revenues are collected.

5.2 Deregulation
5.2.1 Devolution of government agencies
Local governments in the Philippines have suffered from lack of funding and
revolving personnel. Thanks in part to IMF structural adjustment programs (Perez 2010;
Lim and Montes 2002) the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted, leading to the
devolution of many central government functions to the local level as an austerity measure.
Rescaling governance in this way has ‘hollowed out’ the state (McCarthy and Prudham
2004) and de‐linked national and regional levels of government from both the provincial
and municipal levels. As a result, funding of agricultural extension has suffered in the
Philippines except in those places where the local mayor has a very proactive stance on
agriculture. But what is especially frustrating to the people at the national and regional
offices of the Department of Agriculture is the way that devolution has broken the chain of
command between different departmental personnel. One might think that the municipal
agriculture officers would report to the provincial agriculture officer, who in turn would
report to the regional director, who in turn reports to the Secretary of Agriculture. Yet in
reality the municipal agriculture officers only report to their municipal mayors, and the
provincial agriculture officers only report to their provincial governors. Therefore there is
no chain of accountability that leads up to the regional directors as there was before the
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devolution of the Department of Agriculture (DA). Thus many DA projects go
unimplemented at local levels because of lack of budgetary allocations or the passivity or
distraction of mayors who are on a three‐year election cycle (Dy et al. 2008).
The devolution of the DA has made land use policies difficult to execute. In 1997,
the AFMA, or Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (RA 8435), called for rural
municipalities to create Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones, or SAFDZs,
in order to protect rice and corn lands from conversion and reclassification. Yet the
penalty for converting irrigated rice lands into other uses is so slight as to have virtually no
effect. In the meantime, the SAFDZs have fallen by the wayside because of lack of funding
and changing personnel at the municipal levels of the DA. There is sentiment in the DA,
especially at the national and regional levels, that the department should be reintegrated.
Holding municipalities accountable for their SAFDZs is just one of the potential benefits of
this proposed reintegration.
Devolution of the DA rescaled agricultural development in the sense that more of
the burden for the funding of development was shifted to the municipalities. Yet this is not
where the taxable wealth of the country is. The wealth is more concentrated in a few urban
centers where middle and upper class people live. So rural municipalities, in their efforts
to come up with funds for agricultural development, prioritize high value commercial crops
(HVCCs) over staple crops, since there is a perception that the staple crops are unlikely to
generate as much tax revenue.44

It is also likely that many people in local politics prioritize HVCC plantations because
they can accept bribes from corporations, developers, or landowners that are involved in
the projects.
44
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The World Bank is currently involved in another devolution effort, this time of the
National Irrigation Authority (NIA) in the Philippines (Interaksyon 2011). The Bank’s
Participatory Irrigation Development Program is ostensibly an effort to turn control of
irrigation to local stakeholders rather than the NIA, a central government agency.
However, most local irrigation associations and local government units will almost
certainly not have the money to maintain systems and collect payments for use. This
situation will open the door to sales of irrigation systems to private entities; thus local
farmers who want to use the irrigation waters could be at the mercy of profit‐driven
corporations under new regulations that allow volumetric and market pricing of water.
Many fear that this could lead to more consolidation of land control for larger
agribusinesses that can afford the irrigation fees. In some locations, privatization of
irrigation systems might be immediate where the NIA sells off infrastructure to
corporations. The Bank’s program may cause unemployment to rise in rural areas as well,
since the Bank’s loan condition demanded that before program loans would be released,
the NIA needed to execute a ‘rationalization plan’ that would eliminate 51% of NIA
personnel and close numerous provincial offices. President Arroyo signed Executive Order
718 in April 2008 to allow this transition (Interaksyon 2011).
5.2.2 Lack of monitoring and oversight
Although some changes in the Philippine rural landscape happen under the auspices
of government agencies, often large multinational corporations act independently,
especially if they are already active in the Philippines, which makes it very difficult to track
their economic and ecological impacts. If a plantation is over 100 hectares, then the
corporation is supposed to apply to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
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(DENR) for an Environmental Compliance Certificate, which is a detailed agreement on the
human and terrestrial impacts of their agricultural practices, as well as a guideline for
environmental remediation if necessary. One method around this regulation, which I saw
being practiced by Chiquita for instance, is to establish contract‐growing arrangements
with banana plantations that are under 100 hectares and then simply buy from these
contract growers and ship to various international markets, such as Japan and the Middle
East. This way Chiquita or other similar operators do not have any responsibility for the
environmental impacts from the growing practices. Labor is also unregulated in these
instances and production risks are borne by the local growers.
Figure 5.1: Workers hired by a contract grower prepare bananas for export (photo by
author).
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Figure 5.2: “Naturally Sweeter Mountain Bananas” packed by a contract grower for
Chiquita (photo by author).

However, even for the larger plantations that do apply for Environmental
Compliance Certificates from the DENR, the record of their compliance has often been poor.
For example, Dole banana plantations in Bukidnon were inspected fourteen times from
2007 to 2009. Erosion regulations were being violated in each of the fourteen inspections
and there were numerous reports of siltation of rivers. Additionally, there were other
infractions for things like spraying pesticides during afternoon hours when adults and
children were outdoors, spraying near residential areas, and even spraying near a school.
There was also one confirmed death of an employee from pesticide exposure. Yet the
penalties for such violations of an Environmental Compliance Certificate were minor, the
equivalent of US$1000, just a cost of doing business for a company the size of Dole.
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Controversy erupted in 2008 over the pesticide endosulfan (generic name), a highly
toxic substance banned by most governments, but given approval in the Philippines only to
Dole and Del Monte. During a typhoon in June 2008, a Philippine passenger ferry capsized,
causing the deaths of over 800 passengers and crew members. Information came to light
that an illegal shipment of endosulfan was on board bound for Del Monte plantations. (It is
illegal to have hazardous cargo on a passenger vessel.) Recovery of the bodies had to be
halted for four months as special teams of divers had to remove the barrels of endosulfan
before the body recovery efforts could resume. Even though 135 Filipino citizen and
environmental groups have urged their government to permanently ban endosulfan
(Villanueva 2011), the DENR has only enacted a temporary ban.
In my conversations with DENR personnel, a common complaint was that the
agency does not have the budget for its employees to travel into the rural areas that they
are supposed to be monitoring. Lack of oversight has also allowed deforestation in some of
the development projects that have been established on DENR lands and the formerly ‘idle’
indigenous ancestral domain lands. Philippine government agencies have generally been
unable to effectively penalize those in the agricultural system who are causing such
environmental harms. Another example of the failure of monitoring can be seen in how
Republic Act 9003, the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, prohibits the
burning of crop wastes, but it is almost completely ineffective as the federal agencies do not
have enough staff to monitor activities and the burden of enforcement is on the local
government unit. Moreover, government entities on a variety of scales in the Philippines
have failed to enact legislation that would reward those agriculturalists that provide
positive ecosystem services.
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Weak and misguided governance is also an element in the story of the ongoing crop
conversions from corn to sugarcane. The Philippine government has tried to safeguard
against the reduction of the consumable corn crop by making a rule against using corn in
the new national biofuels program. Consequently, sugarcane is by far the main crop used
in biofuel production and the law mandates that a certain amount of biofuels must be
produced.45 Since the biofuels program increases demand for and pushes up the price of
sugarcane, it encourages the planting of this more highly capitalized crop. This situation
has caused an epidemic of land consolidation as wealthy local landowners buy or receive
pawned land from corn farmers who have gone into debt because of the high cost of inputs
and the low selling price for corn. The land is then subsequently converted to sugarcane
production.46 Thus the indirect effect of the boom in sugarcane cultivation is to cause a
decrease in the amount of corn available for human consumption. Even though it is against
the law, local elite hacienderos end up accumulating large landholdings since there is lack of
governmental oversight in the rural areas that would prevent them from this activity.
Some of the sugarcane boom has also been occurring illegally on DENR forest lands that
until recently were wooded, since those territories go unmonitored as well.

Despite evidence that many biofuels are not as environmentally benign as originally
believed, many countries, including the Philippines, have been reluctant to abandon their
policies promoting conversion to biofuels (Kanter 2008; Wald 2008; The Economist 2013).
46 The Philippines Biofuel Act was authored by Senator Juan Miguel “Migz” Zubiri of
Bukidnon and this was seen by many as pork‐barrel legislation, because it would stimulate
the production of sugarcane and benefit sugar millers in Bukidnon.
45
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5.3 Trade liberalization
Has liberalization worked for the Philippines? Has there been a net economic gain
or a net economic loss in agricultural trade? Free trade advocates argue that Philippine
agriculture needs to be liberalized even more, but there has already been substantial
liberalization, so it is prudent to analyze what have been the results so far. From Table 5.1
below, we can see that the growth of Philippine exports has not kept pace with the growth
of imports and thus they have moved toward deep agricultural trade deficits in the WTO
era. Glipo (2006) noted that this trend is typical for most developing countries.
Table 5.1: Five‐year snapshots of Philippine total agricultural exports (free on board value)
and imports (cost, insurance, and freight value) in nominal US dollars (Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics 2011).

The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008 explored the effects of trade
liberalization and who stands to gain and lose from it. Overall, the picture is quite complex
since trade liberalization may mean that consumer prices come down on certain items
when tariffs are reduced, while other items that have subsidization terminated may rise in
price. At the same time, liberalization may influence farmgate prices in either direction,
wherein producers will be positively affected by price increases and negatively affected by
decreases (World Bank 2007). Thus, a country may have either a net increase or decrease
in poverty according to the structure of their workforce—how many of the poor are net
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sellers of staple foods and how many are net buyers. It is encouraging that the World Bank
is looking at the effects of trade liberalization at this level of detail. However, what seems
absent from the analysis is the need for land reform to reduce the number of rural landless
who are most at the mercy of price fluctuations.
The World Bank (2007) has shown sensitivity to alleviating the negative impacts of
liberalization on those who stand to lose, but their suggestions focus on things like giving
support in transitioning farmers to new crops. In the case of the Philippines, if this means
giving support for transitioning rice growers to other crops, then this would take the
country even further away from food sovereignty. Essentially, the World Bank focuses on
moving toward economic efficiency without regard to whether local, regional, or national
self‐determination is being achieved. They generally advise countries to pursue food
security through international trade rather than food self‐sufficiency (World Bank 2007:
94).
5.3.1 JapanPhilippines Economic Partnership Agreement
Given a regional context of increasing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, Japan has
acted to guard its economic position in the region with a strategy of negotiating free trade
agreements (FTAs) with Southeast Asian nations. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated, “FTAs offer a means of strengthening partnerships in areas not covered by the WTO
and achieving liberalization beyond levels attainable under the WTO” (Yu‐Jose 2004). Free
trade agreements like the Japan‐Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
have been criticized in the Philippines for potentially reversing the gains made by agrarian
reform programs (Glipo 2007), as the treaty is designed to facilitate export cropping for
which small farmers do not have the capital to participate. JPEPA’s investment rules

155

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
encourage existing laws in the Philippines to be harmonized with the aims of the treaty,
which critics say could lead to land consolidation for corporate leases and displacement of
agrarian reform beneficiaries and indigenous people. Japanese investment in the
agriculture of the Philippines has been overwhelmingly in the realm of production for
export, particularly bananas, pineapples, other fruits, and cut flowers (Glipo 2007), so there
is concern that JPEPA will erode food sovereignty even further. In fact, sovereignty in
general is at risk, since future restrictions to the treaty are only allowable with the consent
of both countries (Glipo 2007).
5.3.2 WTO Agreement on Agriculture; Quantitative Restrictions
The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s liberalized the
economy of the Philippines a great deal, but the country’s accession to the WTO in 1995
meant a further consolidation of the project of free trade and liberalization. The WTO
Agreement on Agriculture requires countries to move away from non‐tariff barriers and
move to tariffs instead (Glipo 2006). However, the WTO also requires the tariffs to be
phased out over time. In order to comply with these WTO rules, Republic Act 8178 was
passed in March 1996 (Republic of the Philippines 1996).
What does free trade have to do with the rice farmers of the Philippines? First we
have to back up a little and see that conditions of production in other places might not be
the same as in the Philippines, resulting in cheaper products. Rice productivity levels in the
Philippines are slightly lower than the world average, but this is not the main explanation;
consider that yields per hectare are better in the Philippines than in Thailand, which is the
number one exporter in the world (Ignacio 2005). In some places, such as Thailand, better
infrastructure and marketing might keep prices down (Dy et al. 2008), but other
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governments directly subsidize the production of rice, despite WTO policies to ostensibly
discourage subsidies. Rice subsidies in the United States, for example, have been nearly $1
billion per year between 1995 and 2011 (Environmental Working Group 2011), and that is
quite modest compared to the subsidies for corn, which have been approximately $5 billion
per year during that time frame. The WTO claimed it would be requiring countries to
reduce subsidies because they are trade distorting. The developing countries have only
been permitted to have modest production subsidies, yet the developed nations have been
able to maneuver subsidies through a complex system of categorization, which has certain
‘blue box’ and ‘green box’ subsidies (such as direct payments to farmers and food aid)
allowable because they are considered non‐trade distorting. The ‘amber box’ subsidies
such as price supports (which are used by countries like the Philippines) are considered
trade distorting however, and are thus subject to reduction (Glipo 2003). Developing
nations have criticized these rules as a shell game, as it allows the developed nations to
continue business as usual while extracting concessions from the poorer nations. In fact,
after the Agreement on Agriculture was instituted, Northern agricultural subsidies actually
increased, despite the WTO rhetoric that the Agreement on Agriculture would mean a
reduction in subsidies (Glipo 2003).
If the Philippines were to have a completely liberalized rice market, then cheap rice
would flood into the country, and that would depress the farmgate prices that Filipino
farmers would be able to get for the rice they harvest. Many rice farmers would be unable
to compete and rural regions would have an epidemic of unemployment and increased
poverty. In the mean time, the country would slide even further from self‐sufficiency in the
production of its main staple food. This scenario is exactly what went on in Mexico, except
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with corn rather than rice. NAFTA’s (North American Free Trade Agreement) liberalization
of the corn trade has meant a flood of highly subsidized, artificially cheap corn being sent
from the United States to Mexico (Patel 2008). Mexican farmers are not able to compete
and are forced off their land. The problem is not as severe in the Philippines because less
corn is imported, but nonetheless liberalization has already caused a depression of corn
prices in the Philippines as well (Dy et al. 2008). In Bukidnon, I spoke to numerous former
corn farmers who, because of fertilizer debts and low farmgate prices, lost their land or
converted to other crops.
The WTO recognizes desires for protectionist measures, though only to a very
limited extent. In Section B of Annex 5 (known as the special treatment provision) of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, there are allowances for Quantitative Restrictions (or QRs)
and some tariffs as well. A QR gives a country the right to restrict the amount of a certain
import and in the case of the Philippines, the government does currently utilize these
protectionist measures over the importation of rice. The Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture (DA), in coordination with the National Food Authority (NFA), reserves the
right to import rice only during times of need and not during harvest time, when farmers in
the Philippines are selling, because otherwise those farmers would be undercut in price
and not be able to sell their crop. But QRs and tariffs are only allowed by the WTO as
temporary exceptions and are only granted on condition of the eventual removal of all
trade barriers. Indeed, the WTO may eventually have the power to command member
nations to remove all trade barriers, even when those trade barriers serve the purpose of
promoting social stability.
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In 2009, I spoke to one of the Philippine officials on the team that handles WTO
negotiations. She explained that the Philippines has negotiated for QRs on rice since
joining the WTO in 1995, but the terms needed to be renegotiated periodically. The
concession that the Philippines gave in the negotiations was agreeing to a Minimum Access
Volume, which is an agreement that the Philippines must import a certain amount of rice
per year. In the first negotiation, the amount was 119,460 metric tons (MT), followed by
238,940 MT in the second negotiation (Silverio 2012b). In exchange for the extension of
the QR through 2012, Manila agreed to increase the Minimum Access Volume on rice to
350,000 metric tons as a concession and to reduce the tariffs they have on rice (Republic of
the Philippines Tariff Commission 2007; Galvez 2011). This is a curious situation because
if the Philippines were to become self‐sufficient in its production of rice, they would still be
required to import 350,000 metric tons of rice per year. This arguably reveals that the
WTO, rather than being a true free trade organization, is a tool of countries like the US that
want to force agricultural trade. Food sovereignty advocates like Lita Mariano of the NGO
Bantay Bigas (Rice Guard) argue that the US wants to both ensure markets for American
exports and keep Philippine agriculture oriented toward exports so the US will have a
cheap supply of tropical fruits (Silverio 2012b).
Before the QR expired on June 30, 2012, the Philippines applied for an extension on
November 18, 2011 (Silverio 2012b). A number of WTO member countries initially
objected, but during 2012 all of these countries eventually agreed to an extension except
for the United States, which by 2012 had become the world’s fourth leading rice exporter
(Benaning 2012). Besides the QR being a limit on how much American rice could be
exported to the Philippines, the US obstruction was being driven by the American meat
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industry. In January 2012, the US Meat Export Federation, the National Meat Association,
the National Pork Producers’ Council, and the American Meat Institute urged US
Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack to pressure the Philippines to amend their new policies
on imported meat (Michel 2012). The US then threatened to block the Philippine request
for the QR on rice as a “retaliation over the issuance of [Philippine] Department of
Agriculture (DA) [Administrative Order] 22, which provides technical requirements, such
as proper labeling, in the packaging of frozen meat” (Silverio 2012a, 2012b). In other
words, the US may allow the extension of the QR on rice if the Philippines rescinds
Administrative Order 22 and allows looser regulations on the importation and
refrigeration of meat. Besides being a health protection, Administrative Order 22 protects
the backyard hog producers of the Philippines because the entry of highly subsidized
American and Canadian pork into the market would put many of these local producers out
of business. Philippine Secretary of Agriculture Proceso Alcala’s response to the American
demands was, “I will not beg to them. We are talking about the Filipino consumers’ health
and the livelihood of rice farmers in the country” (Benaning 2012). By December 2012, the
QR was still in place, but hanging in limbo as the countries could not reach an agreement at
the WTO Council for Trade in Goods (Despuez 2012).
While the QR negotiations were occurring, the Asian Development Bank advised the
Philippines to abandon its goal for rice self‐sufficiency, arguing that they should instead try
to get rice exporters to make agreements to not impose export restrictions (Hui 2012).
This drew criticism in the Philippines from the National Rice Farmers Council as well as the
Rice Watch and Action Network (an amalgamation of food sovereignty, sustainable
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agriculture, and anti‐poverty NGOs), whose leader said that self‐sufficiency is important
since food “can be used as a weapon” (Panela 2012).
McMichael (2005) argued that the “site” of food security was rescaled from the state
to the world market through the negotiations of the Uruguay Round (1986‐1994) that led
to the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture in 1995.47 WTO requirements on Minimum Access
Volumes and tariff reductions are arguably rules to facilitate the practice of ‘dumping,’
especially by the United States, which is the world’s largest agricultural exporter. Dumping
is the practice of selling unwanted surplus commodities below the cost of production. This
is dangerous to the recipient country since the price of that commodity may drop so low
that domestic producers can no longer sell their crop. Agricultural trade is quite vulnerable
to the practice of dumping, since the products are perishable and countries want to unload
old stocks, since new crops will be harvested. Analyzing import surges, which are defined
as a “20 percent (positive) deviation from a 5‐year moving average for each
commodity/country” (FAO 2003), is a way of determining when dumping may be
occurring. Using FAO data, the Philippines had 72 cases of import surges in the period
from 1984‐2000, including nine occurrences in rice and seven in maize (Khor 2006) and
import surges have been especially pronounced in the years during which the Philippines
has been a member of the WTO (FAO 2003; Glipo 2006).
The US has used food aid as an instrument of foreign and economic policy under the
1954 Public Law 480 (PL‐480). The US has used Titles II and III of PL‐480 to send
agricultural exports as food aid in some situations in anticipation that the recipient would

See “The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture for developing
countries” (FAO 2013) for details on the rules for minimum access.
47
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transition into a trading partner (McMichael 2005). Yet, the way PL‐480 has been used
recently in the Philippines is to use Title I, in which the food is a loan, the value of which
must be repaid within 30 years. In 2006, after many countries temporarily banned the
importation of US rice because of the presence of Bayer’s genetically modified LL62 rice in
export stocks, the US made a Title I PL‐480 agreement with the Philippine government to
ship 69,000 metric tons of LL62 rice to the Philippines, even though GMO rice was yet to be
approved for sale in the Philippines. In this context, Filipino activist organizations and
politicians on the left have accused the US of dumping their unwanted surpluses in the
Philippines (Beleo 2010).
Given these circumstances of dumping, Minimum Access Volumes, and pressure to
reduce tariffs, one might wonder why developing nations decided to join the WTO in the
first place. McMichael (2005) argued, “Southern states signed on in the hopes of improving
their foreign currency income from expanded agro‐exports (under the imperative of
servicing foreign debt). But the effect was to open markets for northern products.” From
this viewpoint, the WTO is a state‐led endeavor that is arguably about preserving the
hegemony of Northern states that are self‐sufficient in their staples (McMichael 2005).
Tariffs are one strategy to prevent the dumping of agricultural goods. Because of
the need to protect small producers, the stance of the Philippine government in WTO
agriculture negotiations has been to favor “calibrated” liberalization rather than
“unbridled” liberalization (IATP 2010). Countries like the Philippines fight to keep their
QRs and their tariffs, but it is an uphill battle in WTO trade negotiations. A metaphor the
Philippine WTO negotiation team uses is ‘the iceberg and the styrofoam cup.’ This is a
contrast between the gigantic agricultural production subsidies of the developed countries
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that, in the context of free trade negotiations, like an iceberg, hide mostly beneath the
surface, and, on the other hand, the protectionist import tariffs employed by developing
nations like the Philippines, that, though they are very light, are completely visible and
above the surface, much like a styrofoam cup floating on water.
5.3.3 The National Food Authority and price supports
State trading enterprises (STEs) are government entities that are intended to
achieve certain policy objectives, such as “maintaining domestic price support…and making
affordable food supplies available to low‐income populations” (Glipo 2006). The National
Food Authority (NFA) is an STE of the Philippine government that has held several
purposes: importing rice (the NFA traditionally was the sole importer of rice in the
country); holding a buffer stock of rice; selling rice at reduced prices to hungry families;
and offering price supports for farmers by buying a certain percentage of harvests of rice
and corn from domestic producers at a price higher than what private traders are paying.
The budget for the Department of Agriculture in 2012 was 2.9% of the national
budget (Avendaño 2011), and the amount spent on procuring rice from Filipino farmers
was 0.3% of the national budget, most of which can be recouped when the rice is sold to
consumers.48 The NFA rice procurement budget varies considerably from year to year
because of the differences in internal production, importation, and the willingness of the
government to intervene in the market by giving price supports to farmers. Sometimes the
NFA does not purchase enough rice from domestic farmers to alter the overall market
price. The NFA’s procurement in 2012 was less than 2% of Philippine internal production,
In 2012, the NFA bought 353,619 metric tons of palay (unhusked rice) from Filipino
farmers at approximately P17/kilo, which means approximately P6 billion ($143 million,
using a 2012 conversion rate of P42/$1) was spent on procurement.
48
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far less than the 5%‐10% that is believed to be necessary to incentivize rice‐growing by
putting upward pressure on the price that private buyers pay farmers.
Supporters of the NFA say that the budgetary burdens of the NFA’s various
functions are outweighed by the social and economic benefits, such as increasing farmer
incomes, increasing levels of self‐sufficiency in the production of staples, ensuring food
security with the grain reserve, and reducing hunger by selling subsidized rice to
consumers.
Still, critics like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) have called for a reduction or even a complete elimination of the NFA’s
importation responsibilities. Also, NFA manipulation of the purchasing price of internally
produced palay (unhusked rice) has been criticized as price distortion by free trade
advocates. The IMF has put pressure on the Secretary of Agriculture to remove the market
operations functions of the NFA (Remo 2008) and a source inside the government
informed me that it is possible that the WTO will pressure the Philippines to eliminate the
market functions of the NFA in future WTO negotiations, since the WTO has often focused
on STEs as prime targets for removal or reform.
The NFA has also come under repeated pressure from the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) to privatize and end the price supports (Ignacio 2005; GMA News 2008; Glipo 2011;
Mayuga 2011). This has been attempted through loan‐condition demands that are akin to
the structural adjustment programs of the IMF. The ADB crafted a development loan
package called the Grains Sector Development Program (GSDP) in 2000. The intent of the
program was to “create a business environment that would attract private sector
investments at all levels of the grain production and marketing chain, and thus contribute
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to food security” (Asian Development Bank 2007). Most of the loan disbursements were
structured to be conditional upon the Philippine government making specific reforms to
the grains sector. The reforms were to focus on:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

liberalized, more cost‐effective grains pricing and import policies;
improved administration of grain buffer stocks;
restructuring of NFA from a grains marketing monopoly into a public
regulatory agency and separate private sector marketing corporations; and
a more targeted and effective food subsidy program for the poor (Asian
Development Bank 2007)

The restructuring of the NFA though would require legislative action. Despite pleas for
urgent passage from the President, House Bill 3898, which sought to transfer the NFA’s
regulatory functions to a different government agency and to privatize the NFA’s grain
trading functions, did not pass through the legislature (Asian Development Bank 2007).
Thus, at that time, the NFA did not get restructured and most of the loan never got
disbursed. In addition to the call for privatization, another condition of ADB loans was that
the Philippine government would give up its Quantitative Restriction on rice imports
(Ignacio 2005; Asian Development Bank 2007; Uy 2008), but the QR remained even under
the usually pro‐liberalization government of President Arroyo because protecting the food
sovereignty of the Philippines was politically important.
Since 2007, the government, in order to reduce its budget, started to hand over
some of the importation of rice to private entities. From 2011 to 2012, the Philippines saw
allowable private sector importation rise from 230,000 metric tons to 660,000 metric tons
in just one year (Lopez 2011). Turning things over to the private sector makes collection of
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tariffs more uncertain and makes the policing of smuggling49 more difficult. Yet, the
government is moving toward complete privatization by pushing for legislation that would
phase out all of the importation responsibilities of the NFA (Flores 2011; Mayuga 2011).
Finally, the World Bank has pushed the Philippine government to remove the NFA’s
functions on hunger reduction (World Bank 2011a; 2011b). Whereas NFA‐subsidized rice
had been selling to consumers at 18.25 pesos/kilo in late 2010, the government raised the
price to 27 pesos/kilo (Maceda 2011) in order to reduce their budget.50 This of course is a
burden to the poor who rely on NFA rice, so the alternative source of aid has been the
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, which gives money directly to the poor. The CCT
is administered through the Department of Social Welfare and Development and in 2012
the program targeted 3 million of the nation’s poorest households to receive P500 ($11.90)
per month per household, plus P300 ($7.14) for each child up to a maximum of three
(Avendaño 2011). The World Bank argued for this move because they said that
approximately 50% of NFA rice was purchased by consumers who did not need the
subsidy, yet one must not overlook the fact that the increase in the price of NFA rice does
squeeze the lower/middle‐income consumers who previously availed of the subsidized
rice, but whose incomes are too high to receive CCTs.
Food sovereignty movements may ultimately want to see very localized self‐
determination of food systems, but protection of the NFA is seen as vitally important;
therefore much of the strategizing for food sovereignty is scaled at this national level. The
In 2003 alone, it was estimated that 300,000 metric tons of rice was smuggled into the
Philippines (Ignacio 2005).
50 In 2011, non‐subsidized rice was selling for approximately P33/kilo (Maceda 2011). By
early 2013, NFA‐subsidized rice was still selling at roughly P27/kilo and non‐subsidized
rice was selling at roughly P34/kilo.
49
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fight continues for the NFA to retain its role in centralized importation, to continue
meaningful price supports, and to preserve the QR on rice imports. These are seen by food
sovereignty advocates as crucial measures to prevent reliance on imports in the future. For
now, the future of the NFA seems uncertain, much like the future of many policies that
influence the type of food security strategies that the Philippines will ultimately follow.

5.4 Conclusion
Neoliberal policies have affected the food system in the Philippines in many ways,
mainly to encourage export cropping and reliance on an international trading system for
food security. In order to be integrated into the international economy, the Philippines has
submitted to trade liberalization to a large extent, but still is involved in struggles to retain
some level of protectionism. Likewise, there are ongoing battles whether deregulation,
privatization, and budgetary austerity measures help or hinder the agricultural economy.
Food sovereignty advocates argue that the logic of free trade should not be foisted on
staple foods because they are vital to human existence. In 2003, Task Force Food
Sovereignty (TFFS) scaled their struggle on the national level by lobbying Congress to
reject legislation that would have removed QRs on rice imports and privatized the rice
trading functions of the National Food Authority (Glipo 2006). From 2008 to 2013,
numerous peasant organizations, food sovereignty advocates, and consumer groups have
urged the government to prioritize rice self‐sufficiency and retain control of trade policies.
Retention of all of the major functions of the NFA (handling importation of rice, offering
price supports for farmers on rice and corn, maintaining a buffer stock of rice, and offering
low cost rice for consumers) is a prime concern of most of these groups. The KMP and
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Bantay Bigas have called for the Philippines to withdraw from the WTO (Silverio 2012a,
2012b; Campos 2012) and KMP, Bantay Bigas, TFFS, Rice Watch and Action Network, and
even many officials I interviewed in the Philippine government have argued that if the
Quantitative Restriction is lifted before self‐sufficiency is reached, it could be disastrous for
the rice farmers of the Philippines (Silverio 2012b, Campos 2012). If the WTO retains its
involvement in agriculture, then Philippine food sovereignty advocates will fight for the
continuation of tools of protectionism such as Quantitative Restrictions and import tariffs.
Part Two has investigated the national and international issues that surround the
food security debates in the Philippines and pointed out the conflicts that have arisen
between the food sovereignty and neoliberal positions on agriculture. Next, in Part Three,
we will see these matters contested on a finer scale as the everyday realities of rural
communities in Bukidnon will be explored.
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Part Three: Political ecology of agriculture
in Bukidnon, Philippines
Described as the food basket of Mindanao, the province of Bukidnon is one of the
agricultural heartlands of the Philippines. Originally known for growing the staple crops
rice and corn, the province is increasingly known for its large plantations of the cash crops
sugarcane, bananas, and pineapples. Chapters Six and Seven will deal with the class and
gender dynamics, respectively, of the agricultural transitions that have taken place in
recent years. These issues will be addressed in various contexts, but especially in terms of
consolidation of land control and the struggles against that trend. Additionally, these
chapters will look at how constructions of class and gender are connected with different
modes of the reproduction of environmental conditions. First, I will provide a sketch of the
areas I studied. In Bukidnon, I selected three different villages on which to focus. Two of
the villages were in one municipality and one village was in another municipality.
(Municipalities are sub‐units of provinces, analogous to how counties are sub‐units of
states in an American context.)
The province of Bukidnon
Bukidnon is on the large southern island of Mindanao, approximately 870
kilometers south‐southeast of Manila. The coordinates are approximately 8˚ North and
125˚ East. Bukidnon is ranked fourth out of the eighty provinces of the Philippines in land
area, though only 21st in population. A number of significant mountain ranges cross the
province, and thus only 38% of its land is classified as alienable and disposable (suitable
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for agricultural, residential, industrial, or commercial use).51 The remaining 62% is
classified as forested land. Bukidnon’s elevation ranges from 2,938 meters, at the peak of
Mount Dulang‐Dulang in the Kitanglad Range in the northwestern quadrant of the
province, down to 80 meters, where the Rio Grande de Mindanao river system leaves the
province in the south. Rainfall is heavy in all parts of the province, though there are
considerable microclimatic variations and temperature depends largely on elevation.
Bukidnon does not have a long history of sedentary agriculture. The province was
inhabited mostly by indigenous groups, such as the Manobo, the main group in the vicinity
of the villages I visited.52 They traditionally practiced hunting, gathering, and kaingin
(swidden agriculture). Large‐scale permanent settlement by Christianized migrants from
the Visayas area (the central islands of the Philippines) did not occur until after World War
II. Visayan53 has become both the most common first language in the province, as well as
the leading lingua franca, though English is used in secondary and tertiary education and
government and Tagalog is used in much of the national media.
Throughout Bukidnon I heard numerous stories of an earlier era when the region’s
soils were productive and the settlers’ corn and rice fields did not need fertilizer, but as
crop waste was burned rather than composted, the soils started to lose their fertility. By
the 1980s the government had encouraged most farmers to use chemical fertilizers to
Of the A&D (alienable and disposable) lands, 92% are used for agriculture.
There are many different indigenous groups in Mindanao. Collectively they are referred
to as Lumad. These groups are traditionally animist. The Muslim presence in western
Mindanao dating from the 15th century did not generally penetrate eastward into the area
that became Bukidnon.
53 Visayan is also colloquially known as Bisaya. Visayan/Bisaya is a confusing term since it
can refer to an umbrella of different languages of the Visayas region, yet it can be used for
dialects of Cebuano, especially those that are spoken outside of Cebu, such as in Bukidnon
and other parts of northern and central Mindanao.
51
52
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boost yields. Yet by the 1990s and 2000s, the chemical fertilizer approach was giving
diminishing returns. As the effectiveness of the fertilizers waned, their prices increased
steadily, sending many farmers into unsustainable borrowing patterns that many times led
to the loss of their land. Changes in land control, improvements in the transportation
infrastructure, and governmental promotion of an export‐oriented economic strategy all
fueled Bukidnon’s transition from corn and rice toward sugarcane, bananas, and
pineapples. Illustrating the decline of the importance of rice, Bukidnon is fourth in land
area, yet it is only the 14th biggest producer of irrigated rice and the 50th biggest producer
of rainfed rice (Republic of the Philippines Department of Agriculture 2009).
The municipalities of Pangantucan and Valencia
Two of my study sites, Agbalo and Butong, are in the municipality of Pangantucan,
which has rolling terrain throughout, while the third site, Cabangkalan, is in a flat river
plain in the municipality of Valencia. Agbalo and Butong, though not contiguous, are both
at an elevation of 720 meters above sea level and both have some agricultural lands at
somewhat higher elevations. Nearby Mount Kalatungan, the sixth highest mountain in the
Philippines at 2,824 meters, dominates the skyline on clear days. High temperatures in the
two villages typically range from 21˚ to 30˚ C, while low temperatures typically range from
16˚ to 21˚ C. Rainfall is heavy throughout most of the year, with a slightly drier period from
February to March. Average annual precipitation is 2,800 mm. Relative humidity is
roughly 80%. The elevation of Cabangkalan is 310 meters, just slightly above the Pulangi
River, which is one of the principal tributaries of the Rio Grande de Mindanao, the longest
river system and largest watershed in Mindanao. High temperatures here typically range
from 25˚ to 34˚ C, while low temperatures typically range from 19˚ to 24˚ C. The rainfall
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here totals 2,300 mm/year, with a notably drier season from February to April. Relative
humidity is roughly 65%. Farmers throughout the province have complained about
increasing climatic unpredictability and general warming. Rain events are getting more
intense and this is creating problems with erosion in the hilly areas.
Pangantucan had a total population of 43,689 in 2007, 84% of which was in the
rural barangays. The average number of persons per household was 4.59. From 1995 to
2007, the municipality was averaging 1.64% growth, slightly lower than the national
average. Only 43% of the municipality was electrified and 2% of the 951 kilometers of
roads were paved. 53% of the land is forested and 37% is classified as agricultural, much
of which is land that is sloped between 18% and 50%.
Valencia had a total population of 181,902 in 2007. The average number of persons
per household was 5.20. From 1995 to 2007, the average growth in the municipality was
2.93%, while the national average over this same period was 2.07%. In the 2000 census,
43.5% of the population was under the age of 15. Valencia is a more urbanized
municipality than Pangantucan, however, infrastructure in the rural barangays is similarly
lacking.
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The village of Agbalo

Figure P3.1: White corn growing in the village of Agbalo (photo by author).
A treacherous dirt path through sugarcane fields, leading into hilly land, reaches the
tiny village of Agbalo. This is the simplest of the villages I visited, unelectrified and for
many years without any local source of water. In 2009, none of the structures in the village
were constructed of concrete blocks (known as hollow blocks in the Philippines or cinder
blocks in the United States). Instead the dwellings were simple wood construction or
traditional nipa huts (thatched palm dwellings using nypa fruticans). There were no
commercial, educational, or religious structures. Agbalo’s residents, who are all organized
into the Agbalo Agricultural Collective (AAC), trace their heritage to migrations from Cebu
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and other islands in the Visayas region in the 1960s. With an original impetus of searching
for land, people came to this area because it had been under‐utilized and not titled to
anyone, yet this did not prevent friction from developing between the newcomers and
those who had been in the general area a longer time. Eventually harassment, intimidation,
and violence were used to drive the new settlers out.
Many of the future members of AAC worked as farm laborers in the area up until the
late 1980s, when organized under an earlier name, they (among three other groups)
petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) for land redistribution. Although the requests were not
granted, 500 families tried to settle the land anyway. Not long afterward wealthier and
more influential people of the area started to use military personnel and security
companies to intimidate and harass the squatting farmers. From the end of the 1980s and
all through the 1990s families were driven out of the area, until at one point only 10
families were left. But in 1999, AAC was created, a new rally for settlement was mobilized,
and by the end of 2000, 126 families were living in Agbalo.
The community faced a series of problems. Access to water was only possible by a
5‐kilometer round‐trip walk, the amount of land per household was not enough to support
the families, and AAC members had trouble supplementing their income by working in the
nearby sugarcane plantations because they were blacklisted for their labor organizing
activities. In 2002, harassment from competing interests started again. At a direct action
staged by AAC to prevent wealthy hacienderos from planting on disputed land, one of the
AAC leaders was shot and wounded and 22 AAC members were arrested and eventually
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convicted for ‘malicious mischief and grave threat.’54 Agbalo’s population dwindled to 34
families, but a 2004 dialogue facilitated by the provincial governor that included AAC, the
wealthy planters, DAR, DENR, and local government units resulted in AAC securing 28
hectares of DENR land with a promise of 72 additional hectares at a later date. AAC has
been waiting for all 100 hectares to be allocated to them before they attempt to officially
gain land title.
In my conversations with residents and officials in the area, I received the
impression that the municipal government still sees the members of AAC as squatters and
as potentially politically radical. There are also familial connections between the municipal
leadership and one of the landowners with which AAC has been in dispute. It is perhaps for
these reasons, among others, that the municipal agriculture office has been reluctant to
legitimize the families’ presence with agricultural training seminars and the like. In turn,
the residents of Agbalo indicated that they have felt somewhat neglected by the
government since they had to lean on an NGO to finally get limited water service (via a pipe
from the nearby mountains) in 2009, and there still did not seem to be any plans for
electrification of the village. There was also some bitterness expressed over the municipal
government’s decision to allow a very large Dole operation on lands that are adjacent to
theirs, which they perceive as a direct health threat. A committee of local governmental
officials was convened to make a decision on Dole’s entry into Pangantucan, but some
residents of Butong and especially Agbalo felt that their input was not included in this
process. By 2009 Dole seemed poised to increase their presence in the area even further.
Even though a local journalist videotaped the shooting of the AAC leader, an unidentified
man who also had a gun took the videotape. The case against the perpetrator was
ultimately dismissed because of lack of evidence.
54
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AAC leaders told me they are not connected to rebel movements, but they know
they are suspected to have these connections by other people in Pangantucan. As a result,
they are cautious about traveling outside of their village. (They were also of the opinion
that I was being monitored by the local police because I was interviewing them.) They
were concerned that the rumors of their connections to rebel groups were purposeful
tactics of the landowners with whom they have had disputes. In other words, if the
landowners can convince people in Pangantucan that AAC has connections to rebels, then
this will discredit their legitimacy in land negotiations.
Agbalo Agricultural Collective leadership advocates sustainable farming practices
for its members, but lack of training hinders some members’ efforts and lack of land makes
profitability difficult. The community shrank to 24 households by 2008. Employment
opportunities on other farms or plantations are fairly limited, so there is some frustration
with the status quo.
A large number of interviewees expressed that they do not want to see their
children continue in agriculture. Getting professional jobs or going abroad is seen as
preferable, yet there was a high level of anxiety that they would not be able to pay for their
children’s education. Gaining access to more land will be a key to making farming viable
for the next generation.
The village of Butong
Butong had a considerably more developed infrastructure than Agbalo. In 2009, its
housing consisted of roughly half concrete block construction and half nipa huts. Most
homes were electrified and roughly half had either Level III water sources (in‐house piped
running water) or Level II (external communal piped water). The village proper had an
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elementary school, a barangay hall, a small health center, and a cockfighting arena. The
community did not have any religious structures or commercial establishments aside from
a handful of sarisari stores (dry goods stores) operated out of caged windows in people’s
homes.
Butong traces its history back to government settlement programs during the 1950s
and 1960s. In 1950, Philippine President Elpidio Quirino established the Land Settlement
Development Corporation (LASEDECO), which encouraged settlement of some of the less
developed areas of Mindanao. By 1954 though, President Ramon Magsaysay abolished
LASEDECO and instituted the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA), which was intended to quell agrarian revolts that were occurring in the Visayas
region and Luzon by resettling combatants in rural Mindanao. This was a government
strategy to give land to the landless, but was also a tactic to decentralize resistance by
dispersing people to new areas. NARRA had a much bigger impact than LASEDECO in
populating certain parts of Bukidnon. Although LASEDECO had brought eight families to
Butong by 1952, NARRA brought many more during the 1950s and 1960s, to the point that
most of the prime farmland surrounding Butong was inhabited by NARRA settlers. NARRA
gave 12‐hectare parcels of land to families who worked hard to turn an untamed landscape
where wild boars ran rampant into a densely settled agricultural community. Interviewees
reported that it was a difficult life in these early years, but these settlers saw Mindanao as
the promised land.
White corn (corn for human consumption) and rice were the principal crops for the
settlers. The community was largely self‐sufficient in feeding itself with locally grown
staples. At first the soil was fertile and farmers felt no need to use fertilizers. Farmers
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were not using chemical fertilizers, but neither were they using sustainable farming
techniques such as composting and erosion control that could have preserved soil fertility,
so yields started to decline. By the 1970s and 1980s, a Green Revolution government
program called Masagana 99, backed by the World Bank, was encouraging farmers to use
chemical fertilizers, arguing that they could increase their yields. Many people tried the
chemical fertilizers and yields often improved in the short term, but the fertilizers proved
to be a budgetary burden for the farmers, and many relied on high interest loans to
purchase them. Another drawback of the chemical fertilizers was that they acidified the
soils. The severity of the debt problems increased because acidification of soils makes the
need for inputs increase over time. As the need for chemical fertilizer increased, so did the
indebtedness of many of the smallholders in the community. A positive feedback loop of
fertilizer use, acidification of soils, and debt was spiraling out of control.
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Figure P3.2: A mix of sugarcane and banana plantations in Butong (photo by author).
In the mean time, land passed to a second, and sometimes third generation, and the
original 12‐hectare parcels were subdivided among heirs, making it more difficult to stay
profitable. Smaller parcels often mean less crop diversification and more susceptibility to
financial problems stemming from crop failure. Members of the community worry about
the dwindling ratio of land to people. At the same time another development was taking
place as well. By the 1990s, competition between BUSCO (The Bukidnon Sugar Milling
Company) and Crystal Sugar Company made transport and processing of harvested
sugarcane cost‐effective for those few who had the capital to grow sugarcane. As a result,
sugarcane expanded through the 1990s and 2000s.
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A sort of perfect storm was taking shape. Land parcel sizes had shrunk, making
profitability difficult; farmers’ debts were mounting from loans for fertilizers (and often
pesticides and seeds as well); and the sugarcane economy became viable for a local elite.
The result: many farmers found that in order to pay their debts they had to offer up their
main resource, their land itself. Large‐scale transfers of land control occurred through
pawning, selling, and renting land. The class dynamics of the area changed dramatically as
this wave of land consolidation by the wealthy took place. The middle class of the
community was hollowed out, forced to work as agricultural wage laborers, often on the
land that used to be theirs. A rural proletariat has grown and this threatens to feed the
Maoist insurgency that sporadically clashes with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The movement from small farmers to wage laborers meant a sharp decrease
through the 1990s and 2000s in the amount of white corn grown in the area. Previously,
people saved corn and other staples for personal consumption. But without control of land,
their food security strategies shifted away from subsistence farming toward a more wage‐
oriented economy and reliance on purchased food. This situation was worsened in 2005
when Dole arrived to rent land for banana plantations, which resulted in further reductions
in the amount of land that small farmers still control. While some see Dole as a job
provider or a welcome tenant, many see the company’s presence as a critical threat to
health, environment, and the integrity of the smallholder class.
Farmworker wage growth has been slow, especially for sugarcane workers, while
inflation has been high, so agricultural wage laborers have suffered through declining real
wages, and as a result a growing number of families rely on the labor of their children for
additional income. Hunger is a persistent concern and there was near unanimous
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agreement that the level of food security for the community was getting worse. One
resident said to me, "Mindanao used to be the land of promise. Now Mindanao is the land
of sadness."
The village of Cabangkalan
Cabangkalan, a rural barangay of the municipality of Valencia, received its first
significant influx of population in the 1960s when people fled the Visayas region, especially
the Ilonggo‐speaking55 areas of Panay and Negros, because of land scarcity. Many current
residents of Cabangkalan started off as maintainers (sharecroppers or tenant farmers) on
land owned by absentee landowners. For some though, President Marcos’s ‘land for the
tiller’ reforms gave them titles called Emancipation Patents in the 1970s and they became
landowners.
From the late 1960s to the 1980s, new settlers turned a great deal of forested land
into basakan (rice paddy) in anticipation that irrigation would eventually come to the area.
In the meantime, rainfed rice and corn were the principal crops grown. Another wave of
migrants came in the prelude to the opening of the government‐provided irrigation works
in 1984. Residents concurred that irrigation had made life easier in Cabangkalan and given
them greater income opportunities. Rainfed rice only produces one harvest per year, while
irrigated cropping can produce at least two.

Ilonggo (alternately spelled Ilongo) is formally called Hiligaynon. The language is in the
Visayan sub‐family, but is distinct from Visayan (Bisaya), which is the most common first
language in Bukidnon. Ilonggo is still the most common first language in Cabangkalan,
though residents also generally speak Bisaya.
55
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Figure P3.3: Rice on the left and land that has been prepared for planting on the right in
Cabangkalan (photo by author).
From 1970 to 2000, the population of Cabangkalan barangay (the village and rural
environs combined) grew from 859 to 6,020, partially through high rates of natural
increase, but more so through migration from the Visayas region and other parts of
Mindanao. In 2007, the average household held 5.0 residents. By 2008, 23.9% of the
barangay had access to Level III water sources (in‐house piped running water), while
21.5% had Level II (external communal piped water). The barangay has 22 kilometers of
roads, but none are paved, so transportation is slow and bumpy to the center of the
municipality 11 kilometers away. In 2009, Cabangkalan had an elementary school, one
carinderia (extremely simple and small cafeteria), a fertilizer store, a general store, and a
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Catholic church. Some of the puroks in the barangay have only recently become electrified.
All of the barangay is classified as alienable and disposable, and over 95% of the barangay’s
agricultural land is now devoted to irrigated rice farming.
Due to the uniformity of agricultural land use in Cabangkalan, the issue of land
consolidation by the wealthy was not quite as severe as in Butong, but it is still a significant
trend that has affected many of the original smallholders in Cabangkalan. The historical
trajectories of the two communities were similar in that Green Revolution techniques were
advocated by the local government, yet these resulted in large‐scale debt for those who
relied on loans for fertilizer and other inputs. Farmers complained of a cycle of
acidification, the need to increase applications of fertilizers, and increased debt.
Consequently many farmers have lost their land and struggled with wage labor and
maintainer jobs. The class structure has bifurcated compared to what it had been and
poverty and unemployment are serious concerns. The health worker in Cabangkalan said
that most malnourished children are the children of wage laborers and maintainers rather
than the children of smallholders and large landowners. The combination of low income
and large family size is the usual profile of a family with malnourished children.
Chemical farming methods are still dominant in Cabangkalan, but the successes of
the women‐led organic rice farming collective Makakabus have been noticed by most
people in the community.56 The organization even received an award from the
municipality for its farming achievements. Among the members of Makakabus there was
widespread enthusiasm for spreading organic farming to the rest of the barangay, because

With only 24 families, the organization makes up a fairly small portion of the total
population of Cabangkalan. Chapter Seven gives the organizational history of Makakabus.
56
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of the ecological benefits, the income‐producing advantages, and the health effects on the
farmers. They would like to see people be “free from the bondage of the traders and
financers.”
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Chapter Six: Class and the reproduction of
environmental conditions
In the villages I visited, class dynamics and the reproduction of environmental
conditions affected each other, not in deterministic ways, but with significant connections
nonetheless. My argument is that where there was less polarization of the class structure,
there were improving human and environmental conditions, and the scale of the
reproduction of these human and environmental conditions was more localized than in
places with more polarization of the class structure. In other words, these improving
conditions were associated with tight‐knit labor arrangements and the use of farming
inputs that were produced on site.
Specifically, the Makakabus membership was enjoying increasing food security, less
class stratification, increasing quality of environmental conditions, and a more locally
oriented reproduction of environmental conditions, while the rest of Cabangkalan and
Butong had declining food security, more class stratification, decreasing quality of
environmental conditions, and a less locally oriented reproduction of environmental
conditions. In other words, these declining conditions were associated with a more
uprooted and transient labor force and farming inputs that were distantly sourced. Agbalo
occupied a middle ground between Makakabus and Butong in all of these respects.
Sections below will deal with food security, issues surrounding landless wage
laboring classes, the challenges facing the smallholder farmer class, how farming choices
and methods affect and are affected by social and environmental conditions, and the
influences of corporations on the agricultural economy of Bukidnon. First though I want to
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provide some income data and note the lack of simple correlation between income and
quality of life. Table 6.1 below shows income brackets for the three villages I studied. The
three income categories might be described as middle income (virtually no one in these
villages could really be described as upper income), poor, and extremely poor.
Table 6.1: Income structure

“Middle income”: households
earning more than P100,000/year
($2,128/year)
“Poor”: households earning more
than P94/day or P34,310/year
($2/day or $730/year) and less
than P100,000/year ($2,128/year)
“Extremely poor”: households
earning less than P94/day or
P34,310/year
($2/day or $730/year)
Ratio of top earning household
income to average of all other
household incomes in village

Agbalo

Butong

12.5%

42.2%

Cabangkalan
(Makakabus
members only)
33.3%

8.3%

42.2%

37.5%

79.2%

15.6%

29.2%

8:1

35:1

5:1

One might assume from the numbers that Butong has the least serious problems
with food security, yet actually the opposite is true. Many of the people in the extremely
poor category for Agbalo and Makakabus are able to grow much of their own food, which
raises their level of food security. In Butong, many people in the (next higher) poor
category are wage laborers who are actually more at risk of food insecurity because they
cannot rely on their own food. This illustrates the importance of class in a Marxian sense.
More than differences in income, it is the lack of access to productive resources that creates
the problem.

186

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
Another matter addressed in Table 6.1 is the ratio of the highest earning household
in a community to the average incomes of all other households in the community. Here,
especially for Makakabus, we see a relatively small disparity (5:1) where the community
has a collective orientation. Butong, on the other hand, has a disparity of 35:1, which is
indicative of more class stratification where many of the original smallholders have lost
their land and a large percentage of local land is controlled by a very small haciendero class.

6.1 Food security
Definitely one of the most striking findings of this research was the disparity
between communities in their perceptions of their own improving or declining levels of
food security. (See Table 6.2 below.) Residents in Agbalo had a high level of agreement
and residents in Butong had nearly unanimous agreement that their communities’
situations were getting worse. For those residents interviewed in Cabangkalan who were
not affiliated with Makakabus, there was also unanimous agreement that their community’s
members were facing declining food security. Also, when I asked the members of
Makakabus what they thought of the food security of the non‐Makakabus members in
Cabangkalan, they agreed that the situation was getting worse for the non‐members. The
contrast to all of this came when I asked Makakabus members what they thought about the
levels of food security for the Makakabus group as a whole. 96% of the interviewees said
that the situation for Makakabus members was improving, while just one respondent said
that things were staying the same. No Makakabus members spoke of problems of
malnutrition within their group, whereas malnutrition was evident in the other groups and
spoken of directly as a community problem (and sometimes even a personal familial
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problem) by interviewees in the other communities. In December 2007 local government
findings indicated that 20.2% of Butong’s children under 12 were below normal weight and
a separate assessment including children under 15 concluded 24.9% were below normal
weight. The barangay that contains Agbalo had 21.1% of its children below normal weight.
The Cabangkalan local government found 20.1% of its children below normal weight in
2008. These numbers would be even higher if the well‐nourished Makakabus families
were excluded from the data.
In comparing the estimates that interviewees made of the percentage of people who
were experiencing malnutrition, there was unanimous agreement among the members of
Makakabus that 0% of the group was malnourished. However, the interviewees of both
Makakabus and non‐Makakabus members estimated that 30% of the rest of the general
population of Cabangkalan were malnourished. The interviewees of Butong estimated that
29% of their community was malnourished, while the interviewees of Agbalo estimated
that 16% of their community was malnourished.
Interviews went into great detail on questions of food and food security. Topics
included what foods people ate, what foods were grown, what foods people saved for their
own consumption, what foods people purchased, how much was spent on purchased food,
and what percentage of foods consumed were grown by themselves.57 Detailed

There was no clear correlation between specific food choices and different food security
outcomes. For the most part, diets were similar from village to village, so quantity of food
was probably more important than type. One exception to this is that higher income
families were eating more diverse sources of protein. In terms of staples, in Agbalo, corn
was the most important staple, though most families ate rice as well. In Butong, rice was
eaten more than corn, which is interesting since Butong had been such a large producer of
corn in its earlier years. In Cabangkalan, rice was always the staple. None of the
interviewees there mentioned eating corn. A wide array of vegetables and tropical fruits
57
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information was collected on household income as well, so comparisons can be made
between community food security and income. The interview protocol can be found in
Appendix A.

Table 6.2: Food security indicators

Median household income (in PhP)
Average household income (in PhP) of
bottom quartile of community
% of food consumed grown by
themselves
% of interviewees who said
community food security improving
% of interviewees who said
community food security declining
Average of internal estimates of % of
community experiencing malnutrition
Average monthly food expenditures
(in PhP) per household
Average yearly food expenditures (in
PhP) per household
% of total income spent on food (avg.
food expenditures/median income)

Agbalo

Butong

17,915

72,200

Cabangkalan
(Makakabus
members
only)
55,660

5,464

25,955

18,096

61.8%

33.8%

69.7%

4%

0%

96%

88%

96%

0%

16%

29%

0%

788

2,090

2,327

9,456

25,080

27,924

53%

35%

50%

Between the three villages, perceptions of improving food security were not closely
correlated with household income. Butong, which had the highest median household
income, actually had zero interviewees who thought that their community’s level of food
security was improving.

was consumed in each village. Fish, especially dried, was the main protein, though meats,
especially those raised in the villages, were part of most people’s diets.
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There are some different explanations that we can consider for this situation. One is
to look at the sharp difference between Butong and the other communities in the
percentage of food consumed grown by themselves (only 33.8% for Butong), which is an
indicator of two different things. One is that many people are wage laborers who have no
crops to save for their personal consumption. The other is that farmers have been growing
fewer staple crops like corn and rice in recent years. Another thing to consider is that there
are more low‐income wage laborers in Butong and these people are not protected from
hunger by a strong social safety net. Aside from government‐subsidized rice sold in nearby
towns, there was little in the way of government safety nets in any of these communities,
and as the previous chapter suggested, these safety nets were being shredded. The
members of Makakabus, however, felt a very strong social safety net within their own
organization. This increased communitarianism combined with the fact that 69.7% of their
food was grown by themselves meant that food security was quite high for the members of
Makakabus.
Another thing to consider when analyzing the statistics is that household income
may be higher in Butong than for Makakabus, but so is the number of people in each
household (5.0 for Butong and 4.1 for Makakabus). If we look at median household income
divided by number of people per household, then both of these communities would be
roughly P14,000 per year per person. Thus the food expenditures per person for
Makakabus are definitely higher than for Butong, but this could be explained by Makakabus
members being closer to a city with supermarkets and higher priced goods.58 One might

Supermarkets sell refrigerated items and more distantly sourced products, so this could
drive up the level of expenditures. People in Agbalo and Butong did utilize dry goods
58
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argue that higher per capita food expenditures were a deciding factor in the higher levels of
food security achieved by Makakabus, however, I believe the more important factor is that
their food self‐sufficiency level was notably higher than the residents of Butong. In Butong,
I observed more hunger among agricultural wage laborers than smallholders, even though
agricultural wage laborers had food expenditures that were roughly average for the
community, while most smallholders had below average food expenditures.
If, instead of median income, we analyze the relationships between average income
for Butong interviewees and Makakabus members, we can still see a similar situation. The
average income for all Makakabus households was P104,813/year ($2,230/year). One
might imagine that the average income for Makakabus, where 96% of the members said
their group’s food security was improving, would be noticeably higher than in Butong,
where 96% of interviewees said their group’s food security was declining. Yet, even when
removing the income of the main haciendero in Butong from the income total, the average
income among the remaining Butong interviewees (P105,552/year or $2,246/year) was
actually slightly higher than the income for Makakabus members.59 Thus we can see that
income was not the only determinant in food security.

markets in a nearby town, but these stores have modest product selections. All three
communities made steady use of outdoor vegetable, fish, and meat markets in nearby
towns, as well as sarisari stores that are very informal neighborhood caged stores where
one can ask the proprietor for basic items.
59 If the income of the main haciendero in Butong were kept in the equation, then we would
see an average income from the interviewees of P186,318/year ($3,964/year). If the entire
community were interviewed, then we would probably see a number that is closer to, but
slightly above the P105,552 level. This is far less of a subsistence economy than for
Makakabus, so we would expect to see higher incomes in Butong, yet at the same time
there is strong evidence of lower achievements in human development in Butong.
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Another way of analyzing food security and income is to look at the average income
in the bottom quartile of each community (see Table 6.2 above), since these are the people
most likely to be dealing with hunger. Butong’s bottom‐quartile average income was 43%
higher than Makakabus and nearly five times higher than Agbalo. Since Butong actually
had the most serious problems with food insecurity, again, it is apparent that income was
not the only factor.
People in Agbalo had a slightly better perception of food security than Butong,
although the situation there was still fairly grave. For one thing, the social safety net was
not strong, as AAC was not as organizationally robust as Makakabus, but perhaps more
important though in explaining the food insecurity in Agbalo is simply its extreme poverty
(median income of P17,915 or $381 per year). Even though residents grew for themselves
a relatively high 61.8% of the food they ate, there was just not enough money to buy
sufficient amounts of other foods, as can be seen by the very low amount spent on food
(P9,456 or $201 per year per household).
In conversations, residents of Butong gave a variety of explanations for what they
thought influenced their food insecurity. Numerous people said that the community had
become too reliant on wage labor and regretted how so many of them did not grow most of
their own food anymore. Many of them said specifically that the lack of staple production
was affecting their food security negatively. Furthermore, they said people losing control
of their land (through sales and pawning) has negatively affected the community’s level of
food security. Farmers complained about low yields due to climatic unpredictability,
erosion, and acidification. Some farmers were not saving any of their harvested corn
because they felt too many of their neighbors would borrow this food and never repay. For
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wage laborers, declining real wages and lack of employment opportunities were an obvious
factor in the food insecurity of the wage laborers.
The chemical farmers that I interviewed in Cabangkalan all said that the wealthier
people in town do not have a problem with food security, but that those farmers who have
small landholdings and those who work as wage laborers were experiencing decreasing
food security.60 The non‐Makakabus members in Cabangkalan all spoke of the problem of
malnutrition in certain segments of the community, with some respondents even
mentioning that their own children are malnourished and below normal weight. This
reveals that the success of Makakabus vis‐à‐vis Butong is not simply due to their more
advantageous location in a rice farming area in an irrigated flat plain.
The members of Makakabus gave a number of reasons for their increasing food
security: increases in soil fertility; the spirit of cooperation, or bayanihan, where members
help each other out and provide a group‐wide social safety net; the practice of reciprocal
labor, where members trade work on each other’s farms; the practice of saving food for
personal consumption rather than selling the entire harvest61; and the health benefits of
eating organic foods. It was not just the farm owners in the organization who reported
improvement, but the laborers as well. Whereas a lack of work was the common complaint
throughout other groups, Makakabus workers said they had plenty of work.

Though the sample size was small (eight households), it was interesting that non‐
Makakabus members in Cabangkalan (who were all involved in chemical rice production)
produced only 25% of the food they ate, which was even lower than in Butong.
61 Harvests are in February/March and then again in September/October, so planning is
necessary to ensure that enough food is on hand in the final weeks before the new harvest.
It is rare for people in Agbalo and Butong to get paid for a job with food, but for the
members of Makakabus, getting paid in rice is routine.
60
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6.2 Landlessness and the development of a rural proletariat
The people I interviewed overwhelmingly concurred that the raw number and
percentage of the agricultural work force that was landless in Bukidnon had increased from
the 1980s through the 2000s. This is due partially to natural increase of the rural
population bolstering the ranks of wage laborers, but also reflects former smallholders
losing control of their land and moving into wage labor. The surplus of wage laborers that
has been created by this situation has kept wages low, and of course these landless laborers
cannot rely on their own food production to protect their food security. Thus they are
more reliant on purchased food and more susceptible to price shocks.
Although subsistence farming is the main activity in Agbalo, for those who are
smallholders (the majority of the households), 19% of their income came from agricultural
‘sidelining’ jobs (casual wage labor), mostly in nearby sugarcane fields operated by local
hacienderos. The wages at these jobs averaged P14.33 ($0.30) per hour, which is typical for
the area and which provides only a modest income for one person, let alone a family. Most
of the employment is only seasonal (work as a tapasero (sugarcane cutter) only runs from
November to May), so there are times of the year when things get extremely difficult, all the
more so for landless households.
Wages for non‐Makakabus laborers in Cabangkalan were generally quite low, P100
– P150/day, with women’s wages usually at the lower end of the scale. Some jobs paid
better, such as working in a threshing gang (~ P166/day) or planting rice (~ P250/day),
but these tasks are extra strenuous and are only available sporadically five months out of
the year, so there are long periods of unemployment for many of those workers who do not
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have a regular boss.62 Most wage work is only set up 1‐3 days in advance, so long‐term
wage security is precarious. Many people said that it is those laborers without a boss that
suffer the most, since they have trouble finding steady work and also have no one from
whom to borrow money in an emergency. This situation is increasingly typical in the
Philippines and more broadly. The World Bank (2007) noted that most developing
countries have an increasing percentage of the agricultural workforce employed as casual
laborers rather than people with a steady job.
Wage laborers, especially in Agbalo and Butong, repeatedly told me that the cost of
living had been increasing much faster than wages in recent years. This situation is
reflected in national and regional data on farmworker wages and the consumer price index.
Using the data from the tables below, between 2000 and 2010, nominal wages for all
Filipino agricultural laborers were going up at a rate of 4.4% per year while the consumer
price index was going up 5.2% per year, which means that real wages fell 7.8% over that
ten year time period. The situation for sugarcane workers was even more dire since their
wages were going up an average of only 2.4% per year, meaning that their real wages fell
23.5% over that ten year time period.

Having a ‘regular boss’ usually means that one is employed as the maintainer of a certain
number of hectares of land. If there is local work available, this may be supplemented by
outside planting, harvesting, and threshing jobs. If one’s ‘regular boss’ owns/operates a
large amount of land, then the routine may be to rotate through that boss’s planting,
harvesting, and threshing needs.
62
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Table 6.3: Nominal farmworker wage rates in Philippine pesos ($1 = PhP 47 in 2009) for
2000, 2005, and 2010 (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011). Data is shown for both
genders and then men and women separately. The Philippine Bureau of Agricultural
Statistics chose to use the biological terms ‘sex’, ‘male’, and ‘female’.

Table 6.4: Consumer Price Index in constant 2000‐level baseline of 100 Philippine pesos
(Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011).

Table 6.5: Real farmworker wage rates in constant 2000‐level pesos per day (Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics 2011).

The data for the Northern Mindanao Region, which contains Bukidnon, indicate
similar drops in real wages. The raw wage data for sugarcane workers in Northern
Mindanao was roughly P30/day lower than the national average though, which suggests a
high level of surplus labor and a lack of political organization among the workers.
Many families in the villages I visited asked their children to skip secondary school
in order to do wage work in the fields to bring more income to the family. Residents in
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Butong reported a sharp increase in child labor in the years since the ascendancy of
sugarcane in the local economy. They said it had recently become the norm in households
where parents are wage laborers for their 10‐12 year old girls and boys to work in wage
labor as sugarcane weeders and their 13‐15 year olds (mostly boys) to work in wage labor
as tapaseros (sugarcane cutters). Child labor has also been on the rise among non‐
Makakabus members in Cabangkalan, with many people mentioning that 12 year olds
worked regularly in the rice fields as wage laborers.

Table 6.6: Commuting distance

Average distance traveled to work
site

Agbalo

Butong

3.37 km

4.79 km

Cabangkalan
(Makakabus
members only)
1.98 km

There were notable differences in the distances traveled for work in the three
villages. Makakabus members in Cabangkalan generally lived adjacent to or very close to
the fields where they worked. Even when other jobs were included, their average commute
was merely 1.98 km. The residents of Agbalo did slightly more ‘sidelining’ where they
worked for outside bosses. Their average commute was 3.37 km. As the economy
surrounding Butong had undergone the biggest transition, the interviewees there had the
longest commutes, averaging 4.79 km.63 Indeed, laborers from Butong often had to leave
the community to reach their work sites and described how their commutes had increased
in recent years as their work had transitioned from farming their own plots to working in
Long distances were also traveled by those Cabangkalan residents who were not
members of Makakabus, some of whom told of traveling as much as four hours away to find
simple seasonal harvesting work.
63
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the sugarcane and banana plantations that were characteristic of the more liberalized
economy. The necessity of these longer commutes illustrates Cindi Katz’s (2004) concept
of time‐space expansion, wherein rural residents adjusting to the spatiality of a new
economic reality experience the “exploded geography of everyday life.” This was reflected
in the maps that Butong residents drew for me of what was important to their work. In 34
of the 42 maps drawn by Butong residents, fields and plantations more than 3 kilometers
away from home were depicted and there was a strong emphasis on roads and places
outside of the village. Land controlled by Dole was also a prominent feature in the Butong
maps. See Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 below for examples of maps drawn by interviewees in
Butong. (In all of the maps, any identifying information, such as personal names of
interviewees, neighbors, or employers has been removed. Also local village names have
been changed or removed.)
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Figure 6.1: Map drawn by Butong resident and Dole employee showing Butong on the right
and Dole plantation and palletizing (packing) operation approximately 7 kilometers away
where this resident works.
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Figure 6.2: Map drawn by Butong agricultural wage laborer showing various sugarcane
plantations and Dole (marked as “Dol”) plantations in the area. The ‘waiting shed’ is a spot
where wage laborers might be picked up by a supervisor in a truck when work locations
are especially distant.
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Figure 6.3: Map drawn by Butong smallholder who sold and pawned their land parcels to a
local sugarcane haciendero.
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In comparison, the maps drawn by residents of Agbalo were quite different, nearly devoid
of roads and generally focused on the interviewee’s own field and home lot. Not one map
showed land beyond Agbalo. The maps from Agbalo also gave great detail in terms of
which crops they were growing, which I think reflected the higher degree of attention to
cropping choices as food self‐sufficiency strategies in Agbalo than Butong. See Figures 6.4
and 6.5 for maps drawn by Agbalo residents.

Figure 6.4: Map drawn by an Agbalo smallholder showing diversity of crops such as corn,
cassava, rice, gabi (root vegetable), and native bananas.
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Figure 6.5: Map drawn by another Agbalo smallholder showing a diversity of crops,
including ¼ hectare of corn, ¼ hectare of rice, cassava, coffee, native bananas, and
coconuts, as well as the carabao used for plowing.
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The maps of the members of Makakabus were more expansive than those from Agbalo, but
still focused largely on the community itself, its rice fields, and its irrigation infrastructure.
Also, what was notable was the inclusion of things like schools, the Makakabus warehouse,
the church, the barangay hall, and other indicators of community, features much less
apparent in the maps produced by residents of Agbalo and Butong. See Figures 6.6 and 6.7
for examples of maps drawn by members of Makakabus.

Figure 6.6: Map drawn by Makakabus smallholder family showing their house, rice fields,
duck raising area, the local church, and the Makakabus warehouse.
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Figure 6.7: Map drawn by Makakabus field worker showing the field for which she was
responsible, the Makakabus warehouse, and the local church at which she had a paying
maintenance job.
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When I asked wage laborers about labor organization in Butong, I felt the issue was
usually sidestepped. Because of the ‘red scare’ climate in Bukidnon, it seemed that
moderate reformers were reluctant to be open about their ideas on labor topics lest they be
branded as sympathizers to the communist New People’s Army (NPA). Thus, I was unable
to engage in any open discussions about labor organizing or see any sort of movement on
the ground, despite the fact that there was wide agreement among wage laborers and small
farmers that low wages were a key problem in the economy. Using striking as a tactic
would probably be difficult; since there is so much unemployment, strikebreaking would
presumably be accomplished easily. Several different employers I interviewed
acknowledged that one of the main problems in the economy was low wages, yet they
themselves paid their workers P100‐P120/day, which is near the bottom of the range,
revealing the disconnect between what they say is good for the economy and what they are
willing to do themselves.64
In an environment characterized by surplus labor, low wages, low job security, and
seasonal work, there is a real danger of political instability. The NPA is a Maoist rural
insurgency that for several decades has drawn power from the disaffection of
underemployed rural wage laborers and farmers who have lost their land. NPA activity in
Bukidnon was especially strong from the mid‐1970s to the mid‐1980s, and people
responded variously. Many residents of both Butong and Cabangkalan, for instance, used

To give an idea of the low wages and underemployment that some families encounter,
one family I interviewed had five members—a wife, a husband, and three working teenage
sons (15, 17, and 19)—who all worked in agricultural wage labor. Their combined net
annual income was only P60,800 ($1,294) and their combined employment only averaged
104 hours per week. Broken down into an hourly wage, that was only P11.2 ($0.24) per
hour.
64
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to live further away from their village centers, but fled their isolated homes during
eruptions of NPA activity in 1982 and 1983 because they feared NPA intimidation. Some
reported that the NPA extorted ‘revolutionary taxes’ from the farmers. There were,
however, a fair number of NPA sympathizers in the area, as the popularity of the Marcos
dictatorship had plummeted by that point and people were considering alternatives. The
Marcos regime had some success in fighting the NPA militarily, but the insurgency was
dampened more by the removal of Marcos in 1986 and the beginning of the Corazon
Aquino government. Through the late 1980s and 1990s, the drive toward land reform
tended to minimize support for the NPA among farmers in the area. However, by the
2000s, the limitations of CARP (the 1988 agrarian reform program) were clear and the
administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was antagonistic to land reform advocates, so
NPA activity and support were on the rise again.
In most of Bukidnon, the middle class is losing ground (literally and figuratively) as
a vast underclass grows. The stability of the smallholder middle class will be very
important to the future of a municipality like Pangantucan. If the transition from family
farms to sugarcane and banana plantations continues, then the municipality is likely to be
further divided into a tiny elite and a large poverty‐stricken working class. If population
and underemployment continue to increase and real wages continue to fall, sympathy may
eventually build for rebel movements like the NPA. Bukidnon and especially Pangantucan
still have a reputation for peace and order, and are thus attractive to investors. But if that
reputation is lost, then it will be more difficult to attract outside investment. There is a
paradox here—the best way to attract investment in the area is not to cater all policies and
planning to the elites and the big corporations, but instead to maintain the social fabric of
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the small farming communities. Without that, in the long run, a disgruntled rural
proletariat may bring instability to the agricultural economy. Promoting stability in land
tenure for small farmers will be one of the most important challenges for the municipality.

6.3 Smallholders and the battle with debt
Both Butong and Cabangkalan have been the sites of considerable land
consolidation by the wealthy. Pawning (prenda), selling, and renting are all methods by
which original landowners have lost control over their land. By now, only a fraction of the
land in Butong is still in the hands of the original settlers or their descendants. One long‐
time resident of Butong estimated that for the community as a whole, in the late 1980s,
70% of local residents’ income was derived from their own land and 30% from working for
others. By the late 1990s this had changed to 50%/50%. By the late 2000s, in his estimate,
income was only 30% derived from their own land and 70% from working for others.
I spoke to one of the main corn and cassava traders in a town near Agbalo and
Butong. He claimed that he actually barely breaks even with those endeavors. The way he
makes money is through being a sugarcane haciendero, controlling 80 hectares of land. He
was reluctant to describe how much he owned, how much was pawned land, and how
much was rented, likely because he used dummy landowners for part of the owned land
and/or because he did not want to reveal how much land had been pawned to him.
Even though I did not solicit for opinions on population issues, many interviewees
throughout Bukidnon contended that problems for smallholders and wage laborers were
linked to rising population. Many spoke of the need for smaller family sizes because of the
shrinking land to population ratio, and in Butong about 30% of the people I interviewed
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blamed large family sizes for the lack of jobs. Regardless of gender, age, class, educational
level, or occupation, roughly half of all groups I spoke to in Bukidnon volunteered the
opinion that their area needed more family planning measures such as access to
contraception. This was unexpected considering the area is strongly Catholic, and the
Church’s position has been adamantly against artificial birth control. In fact, in 2010 the
Church made a veiled threat to excommunicate President Benigno Aquino III because of his
advocacy for family planning (Tubeza 2010).65
People also talked about the poor choices that are available to struggling
smallholders. Sometimes when small farmers lose their land, they try to relocate to
marginal lands in mountainous areas, but these locations usually have severe problems
with erosion, as well as potential social friction with indigenous peoples when the lands are
actually their territories. It is more common though for farmers who lose their land to stay
put and work as laborers on the land that used to be in their control. Others become more
transient laborers who follow seasonal demands at harvest and planting times.
The story of one of the long time residents of Butong was representative of the
community’s history. Her parents were settlers who settled the land in 1955 when she was
around 8 years old. Her parents grew primarily corn, with some cassava as well. In 1983
the land was subdivided into six different two‐hectare plots for her and each of her siblings.
She continued to intercrop corn and cassava. 1994 was the first time she had to pawn land:

In December 2012, after years of debate, controversy, and strong opposition from the
Catholic Church, the Philippine legislature passed the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act (Republic Act 10354), which increases Filipinos’ access to
contraception, fertility control, family planning information, and maternal care, and
mandates reproductive health and sexuality education from grade five through high school
(Roopanarine 2012).
65
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1 hectare for 3 years for P13,000. Then in 2005 she started selling off home lots, either for
money or for a cow (twice). The prices she got for the home lots were only around P15,000
each time. Altogether she sold off 5 home lots, so at the time we spoke their remaining plot
was only 0.5 hectares, half of which was pawned to a neighbor. She was not very hopeful
about being able to pay off the pawning debt when the term was over. The reason she sold
a lot in 2005 was to send her son to Manila to find work. She also simply needed food at
the time as well.
6.3.1 Prenda
Pawning land is a common occurrence in Butong. People pawn land for a variety of
reasons including paying their debts from input loans, medical emergencies, illnesses, price
spikes for essential goods, and to pay for burials. Prenda is an agreement between a
landowner (who is in immediate need of money) and a lender of money. The landowner
agrees to pay back the amount of the loan (usually with no interest) at the end of the term,
and in the mean time, relinquishes the usufruct rights to a parcel of land. If the end of the
term is reached and the landowner cannot repay the loan, the lender is entitled to continue
using the land until the debt is repaid. Even if the loan is repaid on time, the agreement
works to the favor of the lender since they have been able to use the land while forfeiting
capital only temporarily. The key incentive for the landowner to enter into prenda is that
the amount of the loan will be higher than the potential rent that they would receive for the
land parcel.66 Moreover, they receive the cash quickly. The key for the lender is that the
amount of the loan is far less than the value of the land. Therefore, if the loan is never
The highest rental rate among locals I recorded in Butong was P10,000/hectare/year,
but much more typical were rates in the range of P5,000. The rental rate to Dole was
typically P12,000.
66
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repaid, as often happens, they have received the land at a bargain price. Compared to
purchasing land, prenda may also be preferable for a lender who already owns land, since
in Butong the law does not permit official ownership of more than 12 hectares of land.67
Obviously prenda is preferable to renting the land from the landowner because rent is
simply money lost, while with prenda, the lender will get the money back and have use of
the land. In my interviews, a number of landowners told me there were times when they
needed money and they wanted to rent their land to someone, but the local haciendero only
wanted to enter into a prenda agreement, and would even wait for the landowner to
become increasingly desperate until they were virtually forced to opt for prenda.
One farmer I interviewed had been in Butong since he was four years old. At the age
of 20, in 1986, he bought 8 hectares of land. His farm was profitable in the early years
because the land did not need fertilizer. Around 2000, things started getting more difficult
because the land started needing fertilizer, and he needed to take out loans to pay for it. At
one point, he borrowed P20,000, but the debt grew to P90,000 because of the interest rate
of 10%/month. He and his wife tried renting some of their land to the biggest local
haciendero in 2008, but the haciendero preferred to get pawned land rather than pay a
rental fee, so by the time of our conversation they were in a four‐year P40,000 prenda
arrangement for 2 hectares of land. If land might normally rent for 5,000/hectare/year,
then P40,000 is exactly what they should be getting in rent, yet with the prenda
arrangement, they will receive nothing. They were only 42 years old at the time I
interviewed them, but they said that they were just waiting for their children to get jobs

In a NARRA resettlement area like Butong, the limit on land ownership is 12 hectares,
but in most other parts of the country, 5 hectares of agricultural land is the limit.
67
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and send money home. They said, “Farming can be like gambling—you win, you lose. You
need faith and hope. Try not to get discouraged and try not to lose hope.”
In some prenda agreements, the landowner finds that at the end of the term, not
only do they not have enough money to repay the loan, but they actually need to be loaned
even more money. Numerous times I saw situations where the lender agreed to increase
the prenda amount. In some instances, this may be done out of a sense of decency
(especially when parties are related) that they should not occupy another’s land rent‐free
indefinitely. Since lenders know that many landowners will never be able to repay the
debt, then this could be seen as a form of rent. However, in some cases, another motive for
the lender to agree to escalate the prenda amount is to purposely drive the amount of the
debt higher so that it becomes impossible for someone with limited means to ever pay it
off, enabling them to acquire more land without official title.
A study done in the provinces of Laguna and Nueva Ecija (both on the island of
Luzon) showed that agrarian reform beneficiaries were more likely to sell or pawn their
lands than non‐agrarian reform beneficiaries (Dy et al. 2008). This situation reflects poorly
on the level of support services offered by DAR and the DA to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
6.3.2 Lending
The typical rate for input loans in Bukidnon is between 5% and 10%/month, though
for some loans, people were paying as high as 20%/month. Especially in emergencies,
people are forced to take out ‘5/6’ loans, where for every P500 they borrow, they will owe
P600 at the end of the month. When I interviewed a long‐time resident of Butong who was
one of the main informal lenders in the community, he volunteered, with a certain amount
of reluctance, information about his lending activities, but he also went into long
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philosophical digressions about his moral place in the universe. I wondered if these
digressions were subconscious rationalizations that revealed an unease he felt about his
class position in the community. One chemical farmer I interviewed said that he loses 12%
of his income every year just from the amount of interest that he pays on his input loans.
The perceived need for fertilizer has been the biggest impetus for borrowing in many
communities, and this was the case in Butong and for the chemical farmers in Cabangkalan.
Large commercial banks generally do not lend to small farmers, but prefer doing
business with large agribusinesses. The Land Bank of the Philippines, which is the
government’s official agricultural development bank, also offers less support to small
farmers than to agribusinesses. Lending records for 2001‐2005 showed average annual
increases of loan amounts for rice and corn at 6.6% and 4.2% respectively (similar to the
inflation rate), while the increase for HVCC (High Value Commercial Crops) was 10.2% (Dy
et al. 2008: 141). Small rice and corn farmers may secure loans from rural banks,
cooperatives, and NGO micro‐finance institutions when they are available, but often these
farmers have no choice but to turn to informal lenders, who generally have usurious rates.
As a result, wealth is increasingly transferred from the poor to the wealthy in the form of
loan interest or as transfers of land in those cases when the farmer defaults on the loan and
must sell or relinquish the land. Some studies have shown more than 50% of Philippine
small farmers rely on informal loans (Dy et al. 2008). Some community leaders in
Bukidnon said formal lending, which usually offers lower interest rates than other lenders
in the area, was declining because few of the potential borrowers were considered good
loan risks. This may also be a sad indicator that there is not much land left anymore in the
hands of small farmers that can serve as collateral for the loans.
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Community oriented micro‐financing was being practiced on a small scale by
Makakabus. By offering micro‐financing, money stayed within the organization and
accountability was on a more personal basis. If there was a transfer of wealth from farmers
in the form of loan interest, then at least that wealth remained an asset for the members of
the cooperative. Offering a fair interest rate to those in desperation can be vital in letting
them hold onto their land rather than pawning or selling.

6.4 Farming choices and methods
There was considerable variation between the three villages in the agricultural
techniques and approaches they were using. If broad categorizations are made, Agbalo is a
center of rudimentary subsistence staple farming; Butong has a mix of plantation
agriculture and smallholder farming, both generally in the chemical paradigm; and the
members of Makakabus in Cabangkalan are purely organic rice farmers. This section
shows some of the connections between specific farming practices and varied modes of the
reproduction of environmental conditions.
The effects of government agriculture extension varied over the different
communities. Provincial and municipal programs from the Department of Agriculture had
a significantly higher impact on Butong than in the politically isolated community of
Agbalo. Livelihood programs from the provincial government that involved getting
animals, such as pigs, goats, cows, and carabaos (water buffalos), were generally regarded
as positive in Butong, but there were complaints that the programs were not targeting the
poorer households and many of the recipients were those who were least in need of
assistance. Other programs involved loans, which many people perceived as unhelpful
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since they did not want the burden of a government loan. Both Butong and Cabangkalan
were influenced over the years by government programs that featured chemical fertilizer
subsidies. The ecological and economic effects of the fertilizers and pesticides that were
being used in the area caused some groups like Makakabus to break with the chemical
paradigm and try farming organically. By 2009, Butong had yet to see a similar large‐scale
movement, but a number of farmers there had expressed a desire for more seminars in
organic farming techniques. For a village where almost no one was doing organic farming,
there was a high degree of interest in converting to organic agriculture.
Table 6.7: Farming practices

Percent of corn or rice farmers saving
seeds
Percent of farmers who expressed any
interest in using GMO seeds
Percent of farmers using crop rotation or
variety rotation

Agbalo

Butong

100%

71%

Cabangkalan
(Makakabus
members
only)
100%

6%

45%

0%

55%

54%

100%

100% of the farmers from Makakabus and Agbalo saved seeds from one cropping to
the next. This was a decision that was borne of a sustainable staple crop farming
philosophy among Makakabus and some of the Agbalo farmers, but for many farmers in
Agbalo, it was simply a result of their poverty and their need to save money. Of the corn
farmers in Butong, 71% saved seeds. These were generally the farmers who were growing
Señorita white corn for consumption, while those who were not saving seeds were growing
mostly hybrid feed corn. Hybrid corn seeds in Bukidnon in 2009 were priced in the range
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of P1,850 ($39)/hectare for GSI 40 (produced in Bukidnon) to P4,200 ($89)/hectare for
Pioneer 30B80 (produced in the US).
I asked interviewees their opinions about GMOs, and Butong was the only place
where a significant number (45%) of those with an opinion on GMOs expressed an interest
in using them. Only four interviewees were actively using GMO seeds, and these farmers
were all in Butong. These were mostly larger landowners with more capital to invest,
interested in the potential for higher income, especially with Monsanto’s genetically
engineered RR (Roundup Ready) corn68, since using the herbicide trademarked Roundup
could be cheaper than paying laborers to weed the field.
A majority of farmers in Butong and nearly all farmers in Agbalo were not interested
in using GMOs and their reasons varied considerably. Some were concerned about issues
of genetic contamination, while most were critical of the high expense of seeds such as RR
corn (P6,900 or $147/hectare). This issue was compounded by the need to match the
seeds with expensive fertilizers and the herbicide Roundup (P575 or $12/liter). Some
mentioned that Roundup was not good for the soil, but their most common criticism was
that these varieties of corn were not edible for humans, so they had no interest in planting
them, since they could not directly improve their food security.
In April 2005, Agbalo Agricultural Collective conducted a campaign against local use
of GMOs. Advertisements promoting Monsanto’s Bt corn had appeared in Pangantucan, but
AAC’s efforts may have proven effective, since I could find no evidence of Bt corn being
grown in the Pangantucan/Agbalo/Butong area. The organization was considering
RR corn is engineered to resist the herbicide glyphosate (which goes by the trademark
Roundup). So when a farmer sprays Roundup on the crops, the intended effect is to kill the
weeds in the field, but the RR crop will remain intact.
68
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pressing the local government to consider an ordinance against the planting of GMOs in
Pangantucan.
The members of Makakabus are dedicated to organic farming and thus had no
interest in GMOs. The issue of genetically engineered crops was virtually a non‐issue in
Cabangkalan since commercialized GMO rice seeds were not yet sold in the Philippines.
Crop rotation was practiced by a little over half of farmers in Agbalo (55%) and
Butong (54%). 24% of Agbalo farmers and 6% of Butong farmers were rotating in
leguminous crops like peanuts, soybeans, or long beans in order to replenish nitrogen in
the soil, but also corn was rotated with cassava, sugarcane, or upland rice in order to
reduce erosion. Makakabus farmers did not rotate crops, but did rotate what varieties of
rice they grew in order to deter pests. Instead of maintaining soil fertility through crop
rotation, Makakabus farmers composted crop wastes and used the compost as fertilizer.
6.4.1 Crop choices
The national rates of return for white corn were dismally low during the 2000s.
While in the best year a 17% profit was earned per hectare, the worst year actually saw an
average 11% loss (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011). This situation can be tied to the
low farmgate prices for white corn that have resulted from the liberalization of the
international corn trade.69 Table 6.8 shows white corn hectarage in Bukidnon shrinking
drastically since 1995, even though it remains the staple crop of choice for many poor

Liberalization has kept farmgate prices low in the Philippines for both rice and white
corn. While the farmgate price for rice in 2010 was 3.00 times the price in 1990 and the
farmgate price for white corn in 2010 was 2.59 times the 1990 price, the consumer price
index in 2010 was 3.70 times as high as it was in 1990 (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
2011). In effect, the prices that staple crop farmers have been getting for their crops have
not kept up with inflation.
69
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farmers. In Agbalo and to a lesser extent Butong, many people still rely on it for their
personal food security. With two harvests per year, there is less time between harvests
compared to other crops, so families appreciate the increased food security this provides.
There is also a cultural connection to corn for many of the people in the area who are
Cebuanos. But yet another reason for continuing to grow corn is that farmers are able to
save seeds and thus have seed corn on hand from the previous crop when they do not have
the funds to buy seeds. In my interviews many farmers in Butong said that the government
needs to provide better price supports, since the price of corn has remained low for a very
long time. The average farmgate price that corn farmers received in Agbalo and Butong
was only P9.6 ($0.20)/kilo.

Table 6.8: Five‐year snapshots of the number of hectares planted to various crops in
Bukidnon (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011).
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Besides white corn, cassava (known locally as balanghoy), rainfed upland rice, and
various backyard fruits and vegetables70 are grown in Agbalo and Butong as well. Peanuts
and to a lesser extent cowpeas (black eyed peas) and mung beans are also intercropped in
order to provide protein as well as replenish nitrogen in the soil.
In Butong , from the 1950s to the 1970s the staple crops of white corn71 and rice
(mostly upland/rainfed rice, but some basakan/paddy rice as well) were dominant. Corn
was even used like a currency in barter arrangements. However, sugarcane cultivation
accelerated in Butong through the 1990s and the 2000s (see Table 6.8 above), and it
became the dominant crop in the area by the turn of the century. Most of the land planted
to sugarcane was formerly in corn and rice production.
Some small farmers who cannot afford to take out loans for fertilizers plant cassava,
since that will grow without fertilizer and is better for erosion control than corn. Yet
cassava is not a very profitable crop (only fetching around P6 ($0.13) per kilo) and is not
one of the staples of the local diet, as it is comparably lacking in nutrition. Furthermore,
Fruits included saging (various native bananas such as lacatan (Musa acuminata) and
saba (Musa acuminata hybridized with Musa balbisiana), coconuts, guava (Psidium
guajava), durian, rambutan (Nephelium lappaceum), lanzones (Lansium domesticum),
marang (Artocarpus odoratissumus), nangka (jackfruit or Artocarpus Heterophyllus), and
mango. Vegetables included gabi (taro), sayote (chayote or Sechium edule), lutya
(Xanthosoma sagittifolium), malunggay (Moringa oleifera), camote (sweet potato),
ampalaya (bitter melon or Momordica charantia), alugbati (Basella alba), pechay (bok choy
or Brassica rapa subspecies chinensis), okra, tangkong (water spinach or Ipomoea
aquatica), batong (long beans or Vigna unguiculata subspecies sesquipedalis), kalabasa
(kabocha squash or Cucurbita maxima), talong (eggplant), and sili (peppers). All three of
the villages had this same assortment, though Cabangkalan, because of its higher
population density and less expansive home lots, tended to produce fewer tree fruits.
71 Tinigib white corn was planted in the 1970s, while Señorita white corn became dominant
in the 1980s. At the time of my research Señorita was still the main white corn grown for
subsistence by many small farmers, although some hybrids, introduced since the 1990s,
were grown for human consumption. The hybrids require fertilizer, whereas Señorita can
grow without it.
70
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cassava does not benefit soil fertility, so if farmers rely on it for very long, it could
jeopardize their prospects in the future. Cassava’s low input costs explain why farmers
choose it, but the movement from corn to cassava is also driven by corporations that
purchase cassava for the production of animal feed and alcohol.
According to the 2008 agricultural census, in the barangay of Butong, 235 hectares
are planted in sugarcane, 130 hectares in white corn, 101 hectares in bananas, 51 hectares
in cassava, and 31 hectares in rice. Rubber and coffee were other notable crops.
Neighboring barangays are slanted even more toward sugarcane and away from white
corn, so this affects the overall orientation and employment opportunities of Butong.
Cabangkalan does not see the same variety in cropping choices since residents
nearly unanimously take advantage of the irrigation system to grow rice. Choice of rice
variety was very important to Makakabus members though for a number of reasons.
Rotating varieties is firstly a method to deter pests because a pest that attacks one variety
may not fare as well with the succeeding variety. There are also considerations of how
varieties perform in terms of general pest resistance (ilon‐ilon, M1, RB8, and CC20 are good
for pest resistance for example), pest recovery (M9 will recover well after an insect
infestation), disease recovery (CC20 recovers easily), yield (M9 is high yielding for
example, but it takes longer to mature), eating quality (B21 has a ‘smooth’ quality and
pulang humot is a red fragrant rice), nutrition (M9 has been bred to be flavorful even
without getting polished in the milling process, so it retains more nutrients), and speed of
maturity (3.5 months for M9 compared to 3 months for CC20, RB8, and 128 for example).
The timing of crops needs to be coordinated with both weather patterns and regional
irrigation schedules (a farmer may choose B1 for a certain season for example because its
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maturity process synchronizes with the weather and the irrigation schedule). Using faster
maturing varieties will allow more fallow time before the next planting, which can result in
better fertility. Makakabus operates a seed bank for its members and the quality control
manager communicates information on the pros and cons of different varieties to the
members. The average farmgate price received by members of Makakabus for their rice
was P15.0 ($0.32) per kilo. The average price received in Cabangkalan for chemically
grown rice was P14.2 ($0.30) per kilo. This difference was an incentive for farmers to grow
organic rice, but farmers were more motivated by the lower input costs and reduced health
risks in organic farming.
6.4.2 Soil erosion
Table 6.9: Erosion

Percent of farmers experiencing
significant erosion

Agbalo

Butong

86%

85%

Cabangkalan
(Makakabus
members
only)
0%

Soil erosion was one of the top concerns for farmers in Agbalo and Butong. A strong
majority of the farmers there mentioned it as a significant problem, while in the flat lands
of Cabangkalan, erosion was not an issue. Soil erosion was one of the main disadvantages
of farming in hilly areas, especially where rains are heavy and frequent and topsoil loss
makes yields decline. In addition, Butong residents noted that the 1990s saw a spate of
illegal logging that caused additional problems of erosion and flooding that still continue
today.
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Canalization (diverting uphill rain runoff into ditches that avoid the main crop area)
and erecting stone borders around fields was used to prevent some of the erosion in these
areas. Contour planting was done as well, but during the time I was there, there was no
evidence of terracing by any of the farmers. The planting and harvesting processes disrupt
the soil and lead to erosion in hilly areas, so some farmers tried to control the problem by
planting sugarcane or cassava, which only need to be planted every 1‐4 years compared to
corn, which is planted twice a year. Coffee plants are perennials, so planting them is
another strategy to reduce the amount of tillage. Planting gmelina arborea (a tree grown
for lumber) or fruit trees at the borders of fields can also secure the soil and act as a
windbreak.
6.4.3 Fertilizers
Fertilization strategies are one of the key areas where there is differentiation
between communities in the scales of their reproduction of environmental conditions. The
method of crop fertilization for all Makakabus members was scaled simply at the level of
the farm. Rice straw that is post‐harvest crop waste is gathered into a pile and composted
with the help of worms to create vermicast fertilizer and spread over fields when ready six
to twelve months later. The richness of the compost is noteworthy and sufficient to
provide yields that often exceed the chemically grown rice in the area.
The chemical farmers in Cabangkalan typically use urea (45‐0‐0), complete (14‐14‐
14), ammonium phosphate (16‐20‐0), and ammonium sulfate (21‐0‐0), which they must
purchase in the urbanized part of the municipality 11 kilometers away. A number of
chemical farmers complained that their yields are actually declining because the chemical
fertilizers are acidifying their soils, while Makakabus members spoke of consistently
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improving yields. This is in keeping with the findings of Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright
(2009), where organic yields were improving and chemical yields declining.
Fertilizer use in Agbalo is inconsistent. A few farmers used manure or other organic
fertilizers and a few used chemical fertilizers, but there were a number of farmers who
were what is facetiously called ‘organic by default.’ They do not have the money to buy the
chemical fertilizers, so they just make do without. Unfortunately many of these farmers
have not been trained in composting and other organic fertilizer production techniques, so
their yields are comparatively low and in some cases yields are falling.
There were quite a few farmers in Butong who lost their land because of fertilizer
debts. Agronomists from nearby Central Mindanao University and Xavier University
explained that chemical fertilizers can kill earthworms and some of the microorganisms in
soil that can give it its fertility. Farmers and extension agents described how the area’s
black, moist, thick soils with abundant organic matter had turned into red, dry, crumbly,
acidified soils that eroded easily. Thus, if they continued in the chemical paradigm, farmers
routinely complained that they needed to use more and more chemical fertilizers over time
just to achieve the same yields, even as the price of inputs went up.
In Butong, for those who were planting sugarcane and corn, the use of urea (45‐0‐0),
complete (14‐14‐14), and ammonium phosphate (16‐20‐0) was most common. However,
there was also significant use of potash (0‐0‐60), ammonium sulfate (21‐0‐0), and other
chemical fertilizers. The prices72 of these fertilizers were definitely causing many farmers

In mid‐2009, prices had come down from their 2008 peaks, but were still out of the reach
of many small farmers. Some of the local prices (for 50 kilo sacks) I recorded at dealers
were: P980 ($21) for urea, P1,230 ($26) for complete, P1,020 ($22) for ammonium
72
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to reduce their applications of them and increase their interest in organic fertilizers.73 One
farmer in Butong asserted that hard work is more important than fertilizer. He quipped,
"The footprint of the farmer is the best fertilizer."
Some farmers in Butong spoke of the extra labor needed to produce organic
fertilizer, however, the responses given for where chemical fertilizers were purchased
showed that time spent and costs for transportation of chemical fertilizers were high. Corn
farmers in Butong frequently spent between 39% and 54% of their gross income on the
costs of chemical fertilizers. For sugarcane, spending between 17% and 22% of gross
income on fertilizers was common. One farmer who was renting land and using chemical
fertilizers frankly admitted that the time would come when the land he was renting would
be acidified at which point he will have to leave and rent somewhere else. This situation
reveals how the chemical paradigm was not simply a farming strategy, but an approach
that represents a fundamentally different outlook on the reproduction of environmental
conditions than that associated with the organic fertilization techniques of agroecological
farming.
6.4.4 Pests and pesticides
For Makakabus, pest control was based on traditional approaches. The pests that
the rice farmers were concerned about in Cabangkalan were tayangaw (rice bugs or

phosphate, and P1,880 ($40) for potash. The majority of these fertilizers were imported,
with Japan and China being the most common sources.
73 The use of organic fertilizers in Butong was less prevalent than in the other settlements.
Of those who were using organic fertilizers, roughly half were farming purely organically
and half were mixing organic and chemical fertilizers. Durabloom was a common
commercial organic fertilizer, while many people were using things like goat, pig, chicken,
cow, or carabao manure, or vermicast fertilizers that were produced on their own farm or
at least locally produced.
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Leptocorisa acuta), rice yellow stem borers (Scirpophaga incertulas), black bugs
(Scotinophara coarctata), and rats. To combat tayangaw, the Makakabus farmers hung
dead snails at the periphery of the field to attract the bugs away from the rice. Stem borers
were controlled through the use of water management, raising and lowering the level of
water in the basakan (rice paddy) at strategic times to deter the stem borers. Weeding at
strategic times was also important in deterring pests, such as rats.
The chemical farmers in the area sometimes used water management against stem
borers, but otherwise used a wide variety of chemical pesticides for the various insects that
attack the crops. Most of these pesticides were sprayed by hand using canisters that are
strapped to the back. Some of the chemical farmers said that pests and weeds were
becoming resistant to the pesticides and herbicides they were using and consequently their
yields were declining.
Health problems associated with pesticides were a major reason why many of the
members of Makakabus decided to switch to organic farming. Some of the problems and
ailments reported by chemical farmers included reduced immune resistance74, headaches,
weight loss, stomach aches, coughing, shortness of breath, fainting, dizziness, itchiness,
fever, eye irritation, blurred vision, and visual hallucinations. One person in the village
who was working on a chemical rice farm died after direct exposure to pesticides that had
leaked out of the tank he was carrying on his back. Another person told of leakage that
caused his back to become so hot that he immediately jumped into the nearby river. One
person with tuberculosis said the only times he vomits blood is after spraying pesticides. A

Susceptibility to tuberculosis and other respiratory ailments was one of the main
problems in the area. Exacerbation of asthma was another problem.
74
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study by Pingali, Marquez, and Palis (1994) showed that for Filipino farmers who used
pesticides, yield benefits from the pesticide use were exceeded by the amount of increased
money spent on healthcare costs.
The pests that were a problem in the fields of Agbalo and Butong were rats, spotted
stem borers (Chilo partellus), pink stem borers (Sesamia inferens), Asian corn borers
(Ostrinia furnacalis), bunlod (various soil‐dwelling white grubs that are the larvae of scarab
beetles in the family Scarabaeidae), and ulod (various army worms of the genus
Spodoptera). In Agbalo, chemical approaches were generally avoided, but this was as often
as not because of lack of funds. Indigenous and natural pest deterrents were not employed
as much here as among the members of Makakabus. Butong farmers were more likely to
use chemical methods than anything else. Herbicides included Monsanto’s Roundup and
POWER, as well as 2,4‐D (a principal ingredient of Agent Orange). Syngenta’s Cymbus 5
and Racumin were used to kill rats. Karate (P950 or $20/liter from Syngenta), Parapest,
and malathion were the main insecticides used. Furadan is a granulated pesticide used to
kill bunlod (Scarabaeidae). Health problems reported by interviewees that they associated
with pesticide and fertilizer exposure in sugarcane and corn farming were significant,
including itchiness and skin and eye irritations. However, the bulk of the complaints from
Agbalo and Butong concerned the practices at the Dole banana plantations in the area. (See
section 6.5 below for more details.)
6.4.5 Landcare and MASIPAG
Landcare and MASIPAG are both Philippine NGOs that facilitate farmer
empowerment by emphasizing low‐input diversified farming and providing environmental
benefits for local ecosystems. Both organizations have the goal of preserving the economic
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viability of the class of smallholder farmers. Furthermore, both organizations encourage
ground‐up, non‐hierarchical, communitarian approaches that value the farmers as
potential educators and small‐scale experimenters for their peers in their communities.
Instead of donor‐dependence, farmer independence is stressed.
MASIPAG is especially adept at helping rice farmers gain independence from the
chemical paradigm by teaching them how to do their own breeding of varieties, how to
compost to create their own fertilizer, and how to create natural pesticides. (See Chapter
Four, Section 4.2 for more details on MASIPAG.) They are strict in their adherence to
organic farming practices. MASIPAG farmers enjoy higher profitability because they have
reduced their input costs and do not need input loans. MASIPAG instruction was the
original basis for the farmers’ organization that eventually led to Makakabus. The national
leaders of MASIPAG told me that organic corn farming is more challenging than organic rice
farming, especially when corn is planted in highly sloped areas. Also, the nature of the corn
plant makes it difficult for farmers to do their own breeding, whereas new varieties of rice
can be bred relatively easily. Thus they focus largely on rice in their work in Bukidnon.
Landcare, which is affiliated with ICRAF (World Agroforestry Centre), advocates
specific approaches to erosion control and diversified farming that offer hope for upland
farmers, as more than half of the land in the Philippines is sloped greater than 18%.
Although contouring, Natural Vegetative Strips (NVS)75, and terracing are the usual
strategies suggested for preventing erosion, the Landcare approach is flexible and
emphasizes group problem solving to address the specific challenges and needs of a given
NVS are strips of unplowed grass (often forage grasses) that can act as a border at the
edge of a terrace. The perennial grasses hold the soil, prevent erosion, and may serve as
forage for farm animals. Leguminous hedgerows are used as borders in some locations.
75
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community. Also Landcare’s emphasis on diversified agro‐forestry means that farmers can
still protect personal food security by growing corn or rice, but they can also have steady
sources of income from fruit trees, timber trees, and vegetables. Although organic modes
of production are usually a goal, Landcare’s emphasis is more on a mix of sustainability and
profitability rather than strict adherence to organic standards. Technologies are only used
if they fit the local social, economic, and physical conditions (Metcalfe 2004).
Landcare was not active in Pangantucan when I was there, so I initiated a field trip
for eight farmers from Agbalo and Butong and an agricultural technician from the
Municipal Agriculture Office to visit the Landcare headquarters in Misamis Oriental
province to visit a number of their working farms that demonstrate Landcare techniques in
practice. I was curious to see if the Pangantucan farmers would be interested in alternative
approaches for farming. Of the things seen and discussed there was a shared enthusiasm
for using Landcare’s techniques to combat erosion, which plagues the majority of farmers
in Pangantucan. New Landcare farmers are often skeptical at first because the NVS takes
up important production space, but when they try terracing, they find that there are long‐
term increases in yields (Metcalfe 2004). I met with Pangantucan’s mayor and the
leadership of the Municipal Agriculture Office about the potential benefits of these
approaches. If the Pangantucan farmers wanted to launch a Landcare group, I wanted the
local government to be exposed to the Landcare philosophy and to be able to offer support
to those who were interested in pursuing its strategies.
Scaling up the Landcare project (Cresencio‐Catacutan 2007) can be facilitated by
more coordination with other NGOs and governmental agencies, especially the Department
of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, at municipal,
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provincial, regional, and national levels. Currently though Landcare’s successes in
integrating with governments are mostly at the municipal levels. Although government
involvement is important, Landcare emphasizes that the programs are best when
instigated by farmers groups, since they are founded on the idea that local solutions are
appropriate for local problems. “Landcare is about community mobilisation that builds the
two important issues of social and resource capital” (Metcalfe 2004).

6.5 Agribusinesses’ influences on class and environment
A number of foreign agribusiness corporations operate in and exert influence on the
class structures of the villages I visited in Bukidnon. One corporation, BUSCO (Bukidnon
Sugar Milling Company), which sounds like a home‐grown operation, was actually started
by the Marubeni Corporation of Japan in 1976. The plant can process 18,000 metric tons of
sugarcane per day, making it the mill with the largest capacity in the country.76 The
sugarcane economy relies on accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) in the case of
land control, and it simultaneously creates and relies on the dispossessed class for low
wage labor. The American corporations Monsanto and Pioneer are among the most
dominant seed companies in Bukidnon. They deal exclusively in hybrid and GMO seeds
that are not effective if saved for subsequent croppings. These companies cater to those
farmers who have the capital required to purchase their seeds and other corresponding
inputs. This has contributed to increased class stratification as these products are most

Negros, the island that is the historic center of the sugarcane crop in the Philippines, has
a mill that has a higher net yearly production. In 2011, 55% of sugar production in the
Philippines was on Negros, while 17% was in Bukidnon (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
2013).
76
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viable in large‐scale production scenarios. The company currently causing the biggest
changes in the rural economy of Pangantucan, however, is the American fruit corporation,
Dole.
6.5.1 Dole’s increasing presence in the hilly agricultural lands
Dole started operating banana plantations and packing facilities in the vicinity of
Agbalo and Butong in 2005. By the time of the 2008 local agricultural census, Dole was
operating on 407 hectares in the municipality, 148 of which were very close to Agbalo, and
101 of which were in the vicinity of Butong. Residents of the area, including Dole
employees themselves, expressed their concerns to me that Dole will continue to expand,
crowding out small farmers who grow white corn and rice, further eroding the area’s self‐
sufficiency in staples. Furthermore, residents expressed grave concerns about the effects
Dole was having on human and environmental health.
Residents of Agbalo and Butong have complained about Dole’s pesticides in the air
and water since 2005. Adults and especially children reported getting stomach aches,
nausea, faintness, diarrhea, colds, coughs, fevers, shortness of breath, rashes, and other
skin irritations when spraying occurs. Some people mentioned that in order to keep from
getting sick they had to boil their water after Dole sprayed. Roughly a dozen interviewees
claimed that the pesticides have sickened their livestock and killed numerous chickens in
the vicinity.
In 2001, out of concern for the health of residents and workers, the Bukidnon
provincial government banned aerial spraying because of the dangers of pesticide drift.
This ban could be overturned though because of a legal battle that has erupted in Davao,
another banana‐growing region in Mindanao. A 2007 Philippine Department of Health
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study documented the adverse health effects of aerial spraying. This led to a Davao City
Council ban on aerial spraying. The Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters Association
challenged that legislation, resulting in the Philippine Court of Appeals declaring the ban
unconstitutional. That ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court has so far
failed to rule on the matter. Aerial spraying is again being practiced in Davao and activists
continue to press the Supreme Court, the President, the Department of Agriculture, and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for a nationwide ban on aerial spraying
(Tejano 2012; Lacorte 2012).77 If the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
decision that the Davao City Council ban is unconstitutional, then Bukidnon’s ban would
presumably be overturned as well. Regardless of whether the Bukidnon aerial spraying
ban remains in effect, many Pangantucan residents are not happy with Dole’s presence
since using trucks and spraying by boom (a metal rod) is still resulting in significant drift.
Bananas are subject to many pests and diseases. Residents expressed concern
about alcoheris, a disease that attacks bananas, spreading from Dole’s Cavendish banana
plantations to the native bananas (saging) that are a staple grown by residents in Agbalo
and Butong. Dole workers regularly dealt with scarring bugs, bunlod, bats that scratch the
bananas, bunchy top virus, and moko virus. Bananas with bunchy top virus were burned
and quarantined. A variety of biocides are used in the Dole plantations.78 Preferred
fertilizers were potash (0‐0‐60), urea (45‐0‐0), complete (14‐14‐14), and solophos (0‐60‐
Fuertes et al. (2012) documented higher rates of allergies, tuberculosis, and autoimmune
diseases in Davao‐area communities where aerial spraying was occurring.
78 According to employees I interviewed, Monsanto’s POWER was the leading herbicide
used. In addition, Syngenta’s Daconil (chemical name Chlorothalonil) and Bayer’s Antracol
(chemical name Propineb) and Baycor fungicides were used in the plantations. In addition
to the contact biocides, systemic pesticides from European‐based multinationals Bayer and
Syngenta were used in the soil.
77
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0). One resident of Butong I interviewed had worked for three months as a fertilizer
applier for Dole, and reported that he developed rashes on his arms from contact with the
fertilizer. He was not provided with a mask or goggles and he complained about nausea
caused by foul odors from the chemical sprays that were being used in the area. The liquid
sprays on the leaves would make his pants wet and then irritate his skin. His worst skin
irritations were in his arm and leg joints and neck. Bumps referred to as 'butoybutoy'
(little mountains) formed on his skin, causing itchiness. He said his wife experienced
itchiness just from washing his clothes.
Another resident of Butong I interviewed said that in 2007, while working as a
sprayer for Dole, he collapsed from exposure to pesticides. Residents said that several
other pesticide workers in a neighboring village collapsed as well. Dole employees from
Butong and their coworkers complained about respiratory problems, blurred vision,
fainting, sleepiness, weight loss, loss of appetite, inflammation of the liver, rashes, bumps,
itchiness, and other skin irritations. A number of them said that they or their coworkers
had been hospitalized because of reactions to the pesticides. Those whose job required
them to carry a canister of pesticides on their back, reported they had problems with
pesticides leaking onto their necks.
According to Dole, workers did spraying for 6 months before they got rotated to
another task for one year. Dole management in another part of Mindanao originally
refused to check their pesticide sprayer employees for blood toxicity (Teruel 2005), but
because of pressure from labor organizers, now the company’s policy throughout
Mindanao is to administer a cholinesterase test after six months of work as a sprayer to
check the level of toxicity in the employee’s blood. All of the sprayers that I was able to
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speak to worked at Dole for less than six months because they were temporary workers
(with a contract of six months or less) or they had left their positions because of health
concerns they felt were associated with their exposure to Dole’s pesticides. Other Dole
employees I spoke to confirmed that sprayers were often the new employees who are on
their initial 3‐month probationary period or they are temporary employees. I was thus
unable to get firsthand confirmation of whether or not cholinesterase tests were
administered or what the course of action would be if toxicity levels were elevated.
Dole stipulates that workers wear long pants, long sleeves, and boots. When
workers are doing weed spraying, they are supposed to wear protective gear: gloves,
masks, goggles, and head coverings. Everybody is issued a mask, but some do not wear it.
One Dole employee said the masks that are provided to sprayers prevent proper breathing,
so some employees don't use their protective gear because of the heat and discomfort. He
estimated that about 10% of the workers do not follow the guidelines. Another Dole
employee said after only one week of working as a sprayer for Dole, he had coughing fits
and needed to see a doctor, even though he wore his protective gear religiously. A third
employee, who was a temporary worker, said that he was not issued the full range of safety
equipment that was offered to permanent employees. A fourth employee said some of the
more stubborn employees do not follow the dress code and end up having problems with
the sprays, such as difficulty breathing or skin problems. If the supervisor is watching, they
will wear their protective gear, but then when the supervisor is not looking, they will take it
off since they complain that they are too hot to wear all of the gear. If supervisors enforce
the rules, three infractions lead to a one‐day suspension. If the employee has another
infraction, he or she is terminated. One supervisor I talked to said that in the 3.5 years he
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had worked there, nobody had been terminated by him, but he did say that others had been
fired for safety violations. When I interviewed personnel at the main facility near Agbalo,
one of the managers said that in their four years of existence, five temporary employees
had been terminated for violations of safety regulations, but that no full‐time permanent
employees had yet been terminated.
Some pesticides are injected or sprayed manually, but when spraying is done by
boom, it is supposed to be done only late at night so that worker exposure is minimized.
However, the Bukidnon Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) has
cited Dole for a number of instances where they sprayed during daytime hours, even in
some cases where the fields were adjacent to residential areas or elementary schools.
Roughly a dozen interviewees, both residents of the area and people who were
current or former employees of Dole, said people they knew working for Dole in Bukidnon
had died through their work activities. One interviewee reported that two Dole workers in
a neighboring municipality to the southwest had died in 2006 as a result of pesticide
exposure. In a separate incident from a municipality to the north, one resident of Agbalo
said his cousin, who was working as a sprayman for Dole, had died from lung and intestinal
disorders that doctors said were tied to the fertilizers being used on the plantation. A
resident of Butong told me of a Dole worker in a municipality to the east who had died of
work related causes. Records at the provincial office of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources confirmed this death as a result of pesticide exposure.
Many residents in Agbalo and Butong complained about the lack of public inclusion
in the decision process that allowed Dole to establish plantations there. Dole’s rented
parcels were scattered in many places throughout the municipality, but there is a large
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plantation and processing facility adjacent to the community of Agbalo. Opened in May
2005, the Dole facility employed 245 men and 92 women during the time of my stay,
including office employees as well as field workers. All but 43 of these employees were
regular permanent workers. People in Pangantucan complained of nepotism and cronyism
in Dole’s hiring decisions, with many of the jobs going to people outside of the community.
Many of those workers faced lengthy commutes. Temporary employees were hired
through an employment agency called Asia Pro.79 The numbers of temporary workers
would climb during certain times of the year, such as harvest time.
From 2005 to 2010, Dole’s wages in the area were increasing by approximately
2.6% per year, while the consumer price index for the Philippines increased by 5.2% per
year for the period from 2000 to 2010 (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2011). While the
gross pay for an employee in 2008 of P233/day sounds impressive compared to the
P100/day that might be typical for a sugarcane weeder, the P100‐125/day for a tapasero,
or the P200/day for someone plowing a corn field, the take home pay (after deductions) of
the Dole employee would be approximately P180 ($3.83)/day, which needs to be evaluated
in the light of the increased health risks that are posed to many Dole employees. Increased
transportation costs and extra money spent on meals away from home also diminished the
wage advantages for Dole employees. As of 2009, Dole was not offering higher wages to
those who had seniority in Bukidnon. All non‐supervisory workers received the same pay

Asia Pro is a Manila‐based company that employs 26,000 workers, primarily in
temporary agricultural wage labor. The two Bukidnon offices have a combined total of
approximately 2,000 workers on their rosters. Dole and Del Monte are the two top
contractors with which they work, with about 83% of the workers in Dole bananas and
17% in Del Monte pineapples. Asia Pro’s gender balance is more equal than Dole’s
Bukidnon operations, but still weighted toward males at 60%.
79
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rate regardless of how long they had worked with the company. The Asia Pro temporary
workers who were employed by Dole received take home pay of approximately
P150/day.80
Although I was able to interview a number of employees (both permanent and
temporary) and former employees of Dole, I was ultimately unable to reach higher levels of
management, even though I submitted several requests with all of the expected protocols.
The security division delayed action on my interview requests and over a period of weeks
seemed to be conducting an investigation of me. Dole security personnel interrogated the
police of the town in which I lived. They interrogated my landlady. Then they sent two
men to my house for an unannounced visit to see my living space and ask questions about
my project. I was exceedingly cordial in all interactions, upfront about what I wanted to
ask in my interview(s) of Dole management in the Philippines, and I even released my
interview questions to them, upon their request. Still, they refused the interview request.
Official word eventually came from the Vice President of Corporate Social Responsibility in
Paris, France that they did not have time to fulfill my request. It was interesting that this
was their response to a request for a one hour interview, since they had obviously spent
many person‐hours conducting their investigation and preparing their response.
Dole is obviously a powerful player in the municipality and more broadly. The
corporation pays property taxes and employs a large number of people, but the sorts of

At Dole plantations, bananas get harvested once a year and the life span of each tree is
five years, at which point replanting takes place. One employee I interviewed described
that where he works, there are ten 'regular' (full time permanent) workers in 20 hectares,
plus three three‐month contract workers, with five additional contract workers during
harvest times. Those who are on three‐month contracts sometimes get transferred to
regular status depending on their performance.
80
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long term health and environmental impacts of Dole’s presence that I documented pose an
enormous cost that should be factored into the equation. Municipalities, for instance, might
consider piggybacking on the DENR fines on plantations that violate their Environmental
Compliance Certificates (ECCs). It is the local area that suffers when there are
environmental problems, and heavier and more targeted fines to the offending firm may be
more of a deterrent in preventing poor environmental practices. This suggestion
notwithstanding, I did not see any instances where violation of an ECC resulted in
nullification of a lease, which would give much more clout to the provincial and municipal
governments’ concerns around environmental and health violations.

6.6 Conclusion
At the outset of this chapter, I argued there were connections between land tenure
continuity, class equity, food security, and a more localized reproduction of environmental
conditions characterized by tight‐knit labor arrangements and on‐site production of
farming inputs. Loss of land control by selling or pawning was an epidemic that was
largely tied to the debts associated with the chemical farming paradigm. Makakabus was
successfully fighting the trend of land consolidation, but there were deep changes
observable among the chemical farmers of both Cabangkalan and Butong. Makakabus
members and other sustainable farmers in Agbalo and Butong were reaping health benefits
from organic farming as well as getting better per hectare incomes than the chemical
farmers in the area. Makakabus’s successes were promoting stability for the smallholder
class. This, combined with strong group cohesion and self‐sufficiency in staple food
production, resulted in the elimination of hunger for all of the members of Makakabus. In

237

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
the meantime in Butong, many from the agricultural wage laboring class, as well as some
smallholders who were in debt because of input loans, were struggling with hunger as their
incomes were often insufficient to purchase enough food and many were not in a position
where they were producing the staple foods they consumed. Even though incomes for the
lowest quartile of Makakabus were lower than incomes for the lowest quartile of Butong,
this did not mean that Makakabus had the same difficulties with hunger because they were
aided by the group’s informal but effective social safety net, as well as by the fact that they
themselves produced most of the food they consumed.
The presence of multinationals like Dole in Bukidnon was seen by residents in
mixed terms economically. While some people were enthused by the slightly higher wages
available in the Dole plantations as compared to the sugarcane plantations, the interviews
showed that many Dole employees still struggled financially. As for Dole’s greater impact
on the area, most people agreed that the corporation was not economically benefiting the
community as a whole and they worried about Dole’s effects in decreasing the amount of
food produced that would be consumed locally. Dole’s presence was accelerating the
transition away from smallholder agriculture toward wage labor and Dole’s dependence on
foreign markets and distantly sourced agricultural inputs made the community more
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the world economy. Furthermore, Dole’s impact on human
and environmental health was widely condemned by the local population.
Class relations were changing in Bukidnon, but the construction of gender was
changing as well. The next chapter analyzes how this too was related to the control of land
and shifts in the scaling of the reproduction of environmental conditions.
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Chapter Seven: Gender and the
reproduction of environmental conditions
This chapter explores the ways that gender and the scales of the reproduction of
environmental conditions81 are articulated vis‐à‐vis labor, land tenure, ecological change,
and development strategies. One of the principal arguments in Chapter Six was that food
insecurity in rural Bukidnon has more to do with class stratification, land tenure instability,
environmental degradation, lack of communitarianism, and lack of staple cropping than it
has to do with income, even among the bottom quartile of the communities. This chapter
re‐examines the causes of food insecurity and looks at how the construction of gender is
tied in with active, tentative, and potential solutions to food insecurity that are allied with
central tenets of the food sovereignty paradigm. In much the same way that class equity is
an important corrective for problems of food insecurity, gender equity is important for
establishing new relations of production, social reproduction, and environmental
reproduction that will result in greater food security and food sovereignty.
Although female labor on family farms has long been the norm in Bukidnon,
women’s large‐scale entry into agricultural wage labor has been only in recent decades. In
the hilly region around Agbalo and Butong, this shift was associated with the growth of the

As described in Chapter Two, some agriculturalists, largely responding to the marketing
pressure of international agribusinesses, scale their environmental reproduction globally
as they source inputs from multinational seed companies, purchase chemical fertilizers
formed from imported petroleum, and use pesticides developed and produced in other
countries. Thus their major inputs all come from outside national borders. In contrast,
many organic farmers scale their processes locally as they use traditional open‐pollinated
seeds, save selected seeds for future planting, compost crop residues, create their own
fertilizer using vermicast techniques, and use only traditional local pest control.
81
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sugarcane plantation economy, which hired women for certain key jobs such as weeding.
At the time of my study approximately 80% of the sugarcane weeders and nearly all of the
stalk gleaners were women. Inflation of food prices caused more women to seek out wage
work, as there was a greater need for cash among the expanding landless class. Women
working in the fields and plantations generally earned less than men. In 2009 I found that
women sugarcane workers generally made P80 ($1.70) – P100 ($2.13)/day, while the
typical wage for men was P100 ($2.13) – P120 ($2.55)/day.
Another factor driving the need to take on wage labor however was the fact that the
conversion from corn and rice to sugarcane limited the amount of staple foods that were
produced in the area, which necessitated the purchase of foods produced elsewhere. In
other words, sugarcane cultivation directly caused a decline in the subsistence farming
economy. Loss of land among smallholders had already curtailed women’s agricultural
output from former family farms, but the increase in female wage labor also meant less
time for women to work their backyard plots, further eroding the food self‐sufficiency of
many families.
Changes in the gendered division of labor were subtler among the chemical farmers
in Cabangkalan compared to Butong. This is because in Cabangkalan there have been no
major changes in the cropping patterns. Rice has been dominant for many years and
women’s and men’s roles and tasks in working in the basakan (rice paddy) have not
changed dramatically. However, there are similarities in the communities in the sense that
land consolidation has caused more class stratification and more reliance on wage labor
among both men and women who worked in the chemical rice farming areas. Increases in
women’s wage labor participation have been driven by increases in the cost of living that
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have outpaced wage growth. One income was no longer sufficient to sustain households
relying primarily on wage labor.
Among the members of Makakabus there was a different pattern of changes
characterized by greater (though far from complete) convergence of tasks between
genders, leading to marked reductions in the gendered division of farm labor. A more
dramatic change, however, is that decision‐making in the Makakabus farms changed a great
deal in terms of the expanded authority of women. From many households in the
organization (and not just for the official leaders of the organization), there was a narrative
of the emergence of leadership or equal partnership in agricultural decision‐making for
women who had formerly been relegated to a lesser role. As for the tasks of social
reproduction, men were contributing more than in the past; however, there was less
convergence in social reproduction than there was in farm labor. Thus, women were still
doing the bulk of the work of social reproduction, and with the added responsibilities of
farm labor, women had increased overall burdens. This has been referred to as the ‘double
burden’ (Razavi 2002; Agarwal 2003) or ‘double shift’ (Zhang and Lovrod 2012).
Valencia, promoted by its government as “The City of Golden Harvest,” is largely a
rice producing area. Cabangkalan is in one of Mindanao’s prime, flat, rice‐growing plains,
an area that has been irrigated since 1984. By the time I visited Cabangkalan in 2009, the
community had marked dissimilarities between the practices of the majority chemical
farmers, usually male, and the practices of Makakabus, a women‐led collective of
sustainable rice farmers. These differences have resulted in different levels of profitability,
food security, and the retention of land control. I will now trace the how these changes
occurred.
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As an increasing number of farmers became dissatisfied with the chemical farming
paradigm during the 1990s, some banded together in 1995 as the Bukidnon Masipag
Farmers Multi‐Purpose Cooperative (BMF‐MPC), which drew funding support from the
Philippine Development Assistance Programme (PDAP), an NGO working in the area. The
women of BMF‐MPC eventually expressed their desire to start their own livelihood
diversification project, but the leadership of the organization, which was completely male,
ignored the idea. A “mini‐gender war” (PDAP 2009) transpired and the women, with the
encouragement of PDAP, started their own organization, naming it Makakabus82
(‘Malahutayong Kahiusahan sa mga Kababayenan sa Bukidnon’ or Sustainable Unity of the
Women of Bukidnon). The Makakabus vision statement includes language on equity, social
justice, food security, and sustainable agriculture (Makakabus organizational materials
2009). The new organization expanded quickly to 176 members, though when the
leadership opted to enforce very strict regulations on exclusively organic farming practices,
the membership dwindled quickly to only 8. Membership had rebounded back to a level of
48 (24 families) by 2009 as a number of residents of the area observed the economic
successes of the core members of the organization and wanted to take advantage of the
increased income opportunities and the lower overhead costs of organic farming. Although
Makakabus’s quest for outside funding was hindered by the previous association with
BMF‐MPC, which had defaulted on a loan that they had received through PDAP (Philippine
Development Assistance Programme), eventually Makakabus became one of ten sites in

An excellent summary of the beginnings of the organization of Makakabus can be found
in the article by Angeles and Hill (2009) on the gender dimensions of livelihood
diversification. In the time since their 2001 fieldwork, Makakabus has focused more on
organic rice production with less emphasis on livelihood diversification.
82
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Mindanao for PDAP’s Promoting Participation in Sustainable Enterprise (PPSE) program,
which supported their endeavors at organic rice production and other diversified
livelihood sources.
In the meantime the chemical farming economy continued to see economic changes.
Small farmers increasingly were not able to stay out of debt and they would frequently
have to pawn their land to cover their debts. To reverse the trend of small farmers losing
their land in prenda arrangements, Makakabus began paying off people’s prenda debts so
that the original owner/farmer was indebted to them instead. Makakabus would then get
the owner personally involved in planting organic rice, bringing back the condition of the
soil, and avoiding the expensive inputs of seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Rather
than the 15% share of the net harvest that was the local standard for maintainers,
Makakabus let the owner/maintainer retain 20% of the net harvest.83 Thus within a few
years the owner could pay off the debt to Makakabus and retake control of their land.
These farmers would usually continue to farm organically since the organization not only
had helped them regain their land but also supported them through the conversion from
chemical to organic farming. After years of heavy chemical use, the first year or two of

Net harvest refers to the rice that is left after the harvesters and threshers are paid with
rice. For example, if the gross harvest on one hectare of land is 120 sacks, one‐twelfth or
10 sacks will go to the harvesters, one‐twelfth or 10 sacks to the threshers (and the owner
of the threshing equipment), leaving a net harvest of 100 sacks. Of this net harvest, 20
sacks will go to the maintainer of the land (whether that is the owner acting as maintainer
in a prenda arrangement or a maintainer hired by the organization). 80 sacks will be the
share for the organization in cases where the land has been pawned to the organization or
80 sacks to the member‐owner in cases where the land is not pawned. All of these people
have the option to retain their rice for their personal consumption or to sell the rice to the
organization and let the organization handle the marketing.
83
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organic cropping does not bring great yields, but after that organic fields will often produce
as well if not better than the field did when it was farmed chemically. Since the input costs
are negligible, organic farming then becomes more profitable for the farmer. Although
labor hours increase in the organic paradigm, the farmers said their health improved and
their personal productivity increased when they were no longer exposed to chemical
pesticides. Their involvement with Makakabus gave these farmers a built‐in marketing
solution for the organic rice, as Makakabus was a local market consolidator.
Makakabus actually become the dominant organic collective in the area, while its
parent organization BMF‐MPC shrank to six farms. This was the result of BMF‐MPC lacking
in both the strength of its marketing plan and in its sense of gender inclusiveness.
Makakabus received a second round of funding through another PDAP loan in 2008, to
facilitate its prenda land rehabilitation program, which was seen as a resounding success.
This second round of funding was through a newer phase of PDAP programs called
Promoting Rural Industries and Market Enhancement (PRIME). In 2009, repayments on
the loan were proceeding at the prescribed pace and the organization was expected to
remain financially viable, even if there were no new loans or grants in the future.
The scaling of the operations of Makakabus has been in flux. Makakabus was
centered on the Cabangkalan barangay, but included a few farms that extend into other
barangays that were easily accessible. The key for leaders of the organization was for all of
the farms involved to be close enough for easy inspection by the leadership to ensure that
their rigorous farming standards were being met. Only if they were able to expand their
administrative/technical staff would they be interested in moving into other municipalities
in Bukidnon beyond Valencia. But even if it was financially and logistically plausible, I
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sensed that there would be some reluctance. The leadership saw the strength of
Makakabus as resting on the interpersonal relationships that allowed for a high degree of
accountability and transparency in their activities. Scaling up the organization would risk
the integrity of these relationships.
In the earlier days of the organization, effort was made to educate and motivate
farmers in the area concerning organic rice farming. The success of the organization both
in financial matters and restoring soil fertility in farmlands has meant that they no longer
feel the need to ‘advertise.’ The organization was well known within the barangay and
when farmers were interested in trying organic farming, they would come to Makakabus.

7.1 Scales of (re)production and the construction of gender identities
For decades, corporate influence bent governmental extension programs toward the
chemical farming approach, yet increasingly this approach is only profitable in large‐scale
farms where low‐wage labor replaces the family farmer/owner‐operator. In the
communities I visited, the application of chemical pesticides was seen as men’s work
because of the need to carry heavy containers of pesticides and because women were
concerned about transferring this exposure to a fetus or a nursing child. As noted in the
previous chapter, the majority of the farmers I interviewed who had engaged in spraying
pesticides complained about health problems and many of them had been hospitalized.
Thus, the use of pesticides may keep women out of certain aspects of the rice‐growing
labor process and influence the gendered division of labor involved in that style of
agriculture. In addition to avoiding chemical exposure for the sake of their children or
future children, women were probably less likely to participate in cultivation that required
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chemical inputs because acquiring these inputs required a higher level of mobility than
many women had, considering their child care and other domestic responsibilities. Organic
agriculture does not need these off‐farm inputs, so travel, which can be especially difficult
with children, is not as frequently necessary.
Makakabus emphasized gender inclusiveness in its programs and practices, because
many of the other farmers attempting the organic paradigm were not necessarily engaged
with these issues. The male members of BMF‐MPC, for example, saw the women in their
organization as housewives and helpers rather than farmers and entrepreneurs (Angeles
and Hill 2009). The creation of Makakabus was the direct result of dissatisfaction with
gendered exclusion in their previous organization, so when Makakabus began its
independent existence, the stress was on transparency of operations and inclusion of all of
the opinions of the members. BMF‐MPC has stagnated since then, while Makakabus
thrived. The male‐dominated structure of BMF‐MPC did not allow for the creation of a
spirit of bayanihan (group cooperation on tasks) since they were excluding the decision‐
making potential of half of the community.
Makakabus is offering an alternative form and an alternative scale of the
reproduction of environmental conditions. It also emphasizes alternative constructions of
gender identities that blur the usual distinctions in the division of labor and break
stereotypes about leadership. My research suggested that Makakabus was succeeding in
the (re)production of their environmental spaces partially because they have created a
spirit of bayanihan. Their attempt to transition to a more cooperative style of production
that crosses family boundaries and utilizes reciprocal labor rather than wage labor was an
example of how many organic producers attempt to (re)build the horizontal social
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exchange arrangements that used to be more prevalent in Philippine rural life (Shields et
al. 1996). In the case of Cabangkalan, which did not have significant settlement before the
1984 irrigation works, Makakabus was trying to establish these horizontal exchanges for
the first time. There were still gendered divisions of labor in the organic farms, but the
distinctions were definitely less clear‐cut than in the chemical farms.
In my study I attended monthly meetings of Makakabus where all members were
present and there were no apparent distinctions between men and women in regard to
who participated in discussions. Group dynamics that I observed were inclusive in terms of
allowing all voices to be heard and to accept ideas and criticism from all members
regardless of position or gender. This may be evidence of a conscious performance of new
more egalitarian gender identities to contrast the former experiences in the parent
organization. From a variety of interactions and interviews, I can characterize the
members of Makakabus as very future‐oriented, hardworking, cooperative, food‐secure,
healthy, and noticeably happier about their prospects as farmers than other agriculturalists
living in the area. The personal health effects of eating the organic rice they were growing
were widely talked about by even the poorest members, and no one in the organization
was selling their organic rice in order to purchase a larger amount of chemically grown
rice.
I asked the leadership about how the organization maintained its focus and its
culture of hard work, cooperation, and planning for the future. They indicated that regular
meetings helped sustain group unity, members felt free to speak up about their concerns,
and when something was agreed upon in a meeting, strict implementation of that policy
was a way of showing the integrity and resolve of the organization. Financial transparency
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kept the level of trust high. Members indicated that cooperation develops ‘organically’
from following the organic standards in farming. Many of the members spoke about how if
they needed a hand on their farm, the other people in the group would pitch in. The shared
sense was that the whole group would solve problems encountered by the farmers, so
people never felt alone. Even personal problems were addressed by the other members of
the organization. A spirit of camaraderie kept people focused on the future. Besides
informal caregiving, Makakabus as an organization was also working toward a future
where the health of its members would be protected through formal means via payments
to a national health plan.
The near unanimous view that food security was improving for the members of
Makakabus stood in stark contrast to the other communities I visited. Additionally the
interviewees spoke of environmental health, especially in the context of soil fertility, but
also in species biodiversity and climate change concerns. I did not get the impression that
these concerns were driven by media exposure or other outside influence. Instead, I had
the impression that people were thinking more actively about their environment because
their type of farming was in a more active and creative dialogue with the farm ecology than
was the case with the chemical paradigm, which was often reactive and prescribed.
The success of Makakabus in being a local market consolidator of rice and in altering
the direction of movements in local land tenure through their land rehabilitation program
led to changes in both the gendered division of labor and in the construction of gender
identities among members. Femininity for Makakabus members consciously encompassed
production, social reproduction, and the reproduction of environmental conditions rather
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than the more traditional focus on social reproduction that was characteristic among many
women who were wives of chemical farmers in the area.

7.2 Ecological revolutions and gender
Jason Moore (2010) argued that we may be seeing an ecological revolution where
neoliberalism is in crisis and the increasing price of food may play a pivotal role in
curtailing the accumulation of capital, which could result in an overthrow of the neoliberal
project. Arguably, there was an ecological revolution (Merchant 1989) occurring in the
agriculture systems associated with Makakabus. A transition was occurring wherein the
potential for profitability and stability was greater with the shift from chemical to organic
cultivation practices. The land itself seemed to influence local constructions of gender,
wherein more collective and gender‐equitable approaches to labor and social organization
were turning out to be advantageous. In this sense, this research supports Bakker’s (2010)
ideas about the agency of socionature.
However, collective and equitable approaches being more conducive to group food
security does not necessarily mean that the government will use food security and
community stability as the most important criteria through which to evaluate rural
development. Although it might be more progressive for the state to use these criteria, it
remains that crude economic criteria often hold sway. Yet, even in a scenario where
budgetary concerns prevail, the organic paradigm may be considered preferable because it
does not need constant capital inputs, whereas the chemical paradigm is prone to state
intervention because of its reliance on outside inputs that have a high degree of volatility in
price. Furthermore, in a self‐sufficiency/food sovereignty paradigm, there is less
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vulnerability to outside economic influences, which means planning can be more stable.
Slanting rural development toward corporate export cropping, on the other hand is riskier
since it relies on the whims of distant markets. To sum up these changes, the ecological
revolution may also be intertwined with significant changes in the agricultural economy.
The Philippines is a place where political and professional success for women is
relatively common and many people view women as the ones who hold the country
together, whether through professional success, remittances from overseas jobs, or
maintaining family stability domestically. Yet a patriarchal belief system was still
entrenched within the culture. Rural men typically feel they should be the productive force
of the family unit. However, the changes that have occurred in the general agricultural
economy in recent years, such as those in Bukidnon, have deprived most men of the
opportunity to be in control of their destinies. The challenges to family farmers in the
Green Revolution model of agriculture have meant that men end up selling, pawning, or
renting their land, and frequently have to rely on wage labor to pull in an income. This
situation decreases their income potential, which can diminish self‐esteem, and the
experience of farming as paid employees doing repetitive specialized tasks may take away
their senses of themselves as problem‐solvers. If farmers are still farming their own land,
but using the prescribed methods of reductionistic chemical farming (Plumwood 2002), in
which the decisions are dictated by the instructions on the seed bag, fertilizer bag, or
pesticide container, then they may lose a sense of themselves as independent problem‐
solvers.
Before I started talking to people in Cabangkalan, I was expecting to encounter two
groups: those who believe in and are practicing organic farming, like the members of
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Makakabus, and another camp of people who are staunch advocates of the chemical
approach. To the contrary, every one of the small farmers using chemical methods with
whom I spoke in Cabangkalan expressed that they would like to compost their rice straw
rather than burn it, that they would like to restore the soil’s natural fertility, that they want
to avoid taking loans for increasingly expensive fertilizers and pesticides, and that organic
farming has greater income potential.84 They saw the Green Revolution as essentially a
failure and expressed an interest in trying organic farming. Yet short‐term financial
concerns often prevented them. Worries about the drop in productivity during the first
year or two of the organic conversion process, combined with their currently indebted
state meant that weathering the transition period was out of the question for most of the
farmers in the village. Thus the chemical approach continued to be used, with soils
requiring ever‐greater amounts of fertilizers and pesticides just to attain the same yields as
previous years. The larger chemical‐farming operators could usually stay profitable by
taking advantage of economies of scale in regards to some input and labor costs. But in the
process, excessive fertilizer was turning the soil acidic and jeopardizing the long‐term
production viability of the land. Small‐time chemical farmers were almost all struggling
with debt. The Makakabus prenda land rehabilitation program addressed these issues in
the community by offering a way for small farmers to eventually reassert control over their
land and bring back its soil fertility.
Chemical farming operations lack a long term approach to soil fertility, since the 2.5
croppings per year average does not allow enough of a fallow period to restore natural

Broad and Cavanagh (2012) also found that organic farmers were earning better
incomes than chemical farmers in their study near Davao in southern Mindanao.
84
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nutrients. Input manufacturers want to perpetuate the continuous style of cropping so
they can sell more products, but ecological damage caused by the technologies of the Green
Revolution may be reaching a tipping point, creating a need for a paradigm shift.
The IAASTD report (2008) suggests that sustainable agriculture is the path that
needs to be taken by developing countries, in order to both preserve soil fertility and keep
the control of agricultural lands out of the hands of elites and foreigners. I asked chemical
rice farmers in Cabangkalan if they would be interested in a hypothetical program
(governmental or otherwise) that would give them financial assistance during a conversion
to organic farming. The unanimous answer was yes. Farmers stated that they cannot
straddle the two paradigms. For example, one chemical rice grower I interviewed said to
me that he would like to see the enforcement of the laws against burning rice straw. Yet he
routinely burned his rice straw. When I asked him why, he said that as a chemical farmer,
he would be economically disadvantaged in the short term if he did not burn his rice straw.
His response suggests that he needs to be spurred on to do what he considers the right
thing, and both governmental regulation and financial assistance can help him get to that
place.
Since organic rice farming only produces two croppings per year, while chemical
rice farming produces 2.5 croppings, some may argue that the food security of the
Philippines would be improved by chemical farming since more rice is produced. When I
asked one of the leaders of Makakabus how she felt about this, she said:
Those people are just seeing their life in the present, rather than seeing the future
outcomes of what they are doing today. The more they hasten their production, the
more they are destroying their land. And they are destroying their health. They are
not thinking of the next generation to come. What will be their future?
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When the environment reaches a point where group‐oriented organic farming is
more productive than single‐family chemical farming, it may mean that the construction of
gender may shift in subtle ways as well. In Cabangkalan, a contrast developed between
soils that required ever‐increasing and financially draining inputs of chemical fertilizers
versus soils that thrived with simple composting and overturning of internal organic
materials. As the dominant model of the patriarchal family unit engaged in chemical
farming was shown to be a less effective economic strategy in Cabangkalan, residents of the
community (beyond just Makakabus members) were gradually becoming more open to the
construction of more egalitarian gender identities. In this sense, the environment was an
active force in the process of gender construction.
Makakabus members specifically spoke about how their lives were modeled after
and inspired by the agricultural cycles they observed around them. The cyclical flows of
energy and nutrients in the farming ecology informed and (re)inscribed the Makakabus
members’ senses of the reproduction of human labor in the system. Cooperative efforts in
the production of the rice and the provision of childcare and eldercare were part of the
responsibilities of those involved in the labor. This contrasted with many of the other
farms in the area where people were more separated into either rice laborers or those
taking care of social reproduction. We can also consider the differences between
paradigms in terms of nutritional allocation. Nazarea‐Sandoval (1995) put the differences
in nutritional allocation by gender in the context of energy flows: “Energy is channeled
toward the dominant and the ‘indispensable’ and away from the subordinate and the
‘marginal.’” If the chemical paradigm devalues the labor of women, then males may get
nutritional preference.
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Figure 7.1: Rice seedlings being pulled and bundled for replanting in another field in
Cabangkalan (photo by author).
The gendered division of labor in Cabangkalan differed according to which farming
paradigm was being practiced. For example, pulling (known as gabot, which is the removal
of seedlings from an immersed paddy) and transplanting (which is the replanting of those
seedlings further apart from each other in another field) were largely considered women’s
work in the area. It was this labor‐intensive practice, which was used in all organic farms,
that brought better yields than the simple broadcasting method (spreading seeds at
random) that was commonly used in the chemical paradigm. Broadcasting is wasteful of
seeds compared to transplanting. But also, the practice of broadcasting excludes women
from potential income activities and in places where it becomes the norm, there is a risk
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that the environmental knowledge that women have about the farming ecology can be lost.
The acts of gabot and transplanting were much more interactive with the rice paddy
ecology than the act of broadcasting seed. When planting, there needs to be careful
consideration of how much distance there is between separate plants, so sunlight will not
be blocked by neighboring plants and there will be room for the panicles to develop.
Some activities in the basakan (rice paddy) system, such as turtling (land
preparation) and carrying sacks of grain were done by males regardless of which farming
paradigm was practiced, but I was able to witness more convergence in the gendered
division of labor in the organic farms in tasks such as water management, weeding,
harvesting, threshing, and practicing papalid/pahangin (using the wind to winnow the
grain from the chaff). In the non‐organic farms, pesticide application was always done by
men, while indigenous pest deterrence strategies used in the organic farms were done by
either gender. Some of the activities practiced on the non‐organic farms, such as spraying
pesticides, applying chemical fertilizers, and burning rice straw have taken some of the
creative problem‐solving out of farming. There is much less about these strategies that
would link farmers’ experiences to specific ecological conditions.

7.3 Land control, class, and gender
Land control has been lost by many of the original settlers and agrarian reform
beneficiaries in places like Butong and Cabangkalan. Although many people in the area
indicated that the problem of land tenure instability was in an uncontrollable downward
spiral, Makakabus challenged the trend with a variety of actions that made land control a
principal part of their sustainability strategies.
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One criticism of governments and NGOs that focused on practical (e.g. income, jobs,
credit) rather than strategic (e.g. education, literacy) gender needs is that this resulted in
the prioritization of activities that were market‐oriented and reinforced male economic
power (Harris 2009). Angeles and Hill (2009), for example, criticized how, in the
Philippines, specifically for Makakabus, PDAP stressed women’s practical rather than
strategic gender needs. While this may be true, the question is whether this was really the
wrong strategy. While increasing educational opportunities for everyone is advisable,
stressing practical gender needs can in some cases be more beneficial. Land tenure is an
increasingly important issue and security of resource control may prove to be more
important than monetary security. If households lose control over their land, then they will
be at a greater disadvantage than if they have control of their land but are disadvantaged
educationally. The importance of control over land will continue to escalate, as global food
prices will presumably increase. I heard many farmers and wage laborers in Agbalo and
Butong say they wanted their children to get out of farming, but I did not hear this
sentiment expressed among members of Makakabus. In Agbalo and Butong, there was a
desire for the strategic gender need of education to solve the poverty problem, but with
more land tenure problems, they were generally in a more disadvantaged position to
facilitate this outcome.
Makakabus’s organizational materials (2009) include the goals: “To develop and
promote sustainable farming systems in order to improve the production base of farmer
owned and managed enterprises. To develop strategies around securing and sustaining
asset reform in agrarian relations.” From this we see that land control and land tenure
were early and basic considerations of the organization. Land reform from the government
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had not been succeeding, so the members of Makakabus decided to create their own land
reform program. As local farmers see that the means toward preserving land control is the
adoption of a more collective approach, this stands in contrast to and challenges the
previous view of the (usually patriarchal) family‐centered orientation. Makakabus’s effort
to keep land owned and operated by small farmers will not only help reorient the local
farming economy toward smallholder owner‐operation, but will change the ways that
gender is constructed in Cabangkalan.

7.4 Neoliberal economic reforms, development, and gender
In a climate of neoliberal economic reforms, rural development programs tend to
emphasize monetary security and market orientation rather than rewarding agricultural
practices with positive ecosystem services and a local focus. These emphases can drive
changes in the construction of gender as well.
The Philippine Local Government Code of 1991, which was partially guided by IMF
structural adjustment (Perez 2010; Lim and Montes 2010), was a devolution of central
government power to local government units (LGUs). While devolution could have
hypothetically led to a democratization of development decision‐making (Harris 2009),
local political and economic elites have tended to capture the process. Furthermore, the
emphasis of development tends to be more on the generation of tax revenues for the LGU
rather than social equity in the community (Harris 2009). LGUs may be reluctant to
implement programs that promote internal consumption, since only monetized commerce
can bring in tax revenues. Thus, there may be an incentive to administer development
programs that promote chemical farms that use purchased inputs rather than inputs
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developed on the farm. During the 2000s, government‐sponsored agricultural
development focused mainly on increasing yields, with very little emphasis on maintaining
ecosystem services or integrating gender concerns. NGOs tried to fill the void and led the
movement to protect soil fertility, water resources, and air quality.
International changes in how development programs are conceived affect priorities
in the Philippines. During the 2000s, the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), which was the principal funding source for PDAP (Philippine Development
Assistance Programme), underwent an evolution in its emphases. PDAP’s PPSE (Promoting
Participation in Sustainable Enterprise) program was focused on the goal of sustainability
along with economic interests, but its successor was PRIME (Promoting Rural Industries
and Market Enhancement), which even in name reveals a shift in focus to market‐
orientation without any reference to sustainability. “People empowerment [and] equitable
land distribution…gave way to…private sector development, market linkages, and asset
generation activities” (PDAP 2009). The words of CIDA Second Secretary/CIDA Philippine
Mission head Joe Goodings were: “There is such a thing as healthy profit. That’s how the
world works” (PDAP 2009).
This is not to say that, with the replacement of PPSE with PRIME, there has been any
change in the farming approach of Makakabus, but it does reveal that the emphasis of
PDAP’s evaluation of its member communities shifted from social equity and ecosystem
services toward profitability, which in turn, may exert an influence on local constructions
of women’s identities, away from ‘protectors of the resource base’ and instead toward
‘responsible entrepreneurs.’
With the emphasis on privatization associated with neoliberalism, the functions of
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rural development that were handled by Philippine government agencies were increasingly
handed over to private investors or NGOs because of the lack of government funds
available. In the case of Makakabus, the members sought the assistance of an NGO because
they knew there would not be the same level of support from the LGU.
Harris (2009) pointed out that individuated rights for resources like water or land
may fit into a philosophy of neoliberalism where rather than relying on their community or
state, individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for their own welfare. Yet, in the
context of land tenure in the rural Philippines, economic situations are often so precarious
that relatively small shocks may push a landowner into selling or pawning their land. Thus
some land tenure activists I spoke to in Bukidnon and other parts of the Philippines
promote the idea of redistributing land to communities or cooperatives rather than
individuals and theorize that the policy of individual titling was a purposeful strategy
designed to allow elites to accrue large landholdings again.
Nightingale (2006) stressed the need to evaluate how international policies can
affect gender relations on very local scales. In the case of Makakabus, the organization was
paradoxically practicing a very locally oriented style of agriculture in regard to its inputs,
but relying on marketing a portion of its products outside of the community to capitalize on
the small premium that some consumers in urban areas were willing to pay for organic
rice. International development personnel may look at this situation and think they need
to strategize on opening export markets for organic producers like Makakabus. But I
would argue that what is really necessary is to work on addressing the factors that are
creating the price disparities. The rice subsidies that the United States uses for its domestic
production bring down the price of chemically grown rice worldwide.
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Rather than facilitate an expansion of the geographic scales of trade for
organizations like Makakabus, development planners might focus on helping to develop
viable local markets for their products. But because of the small discrepancy in price
between chemical and organic rice85, there was not enough demand within the neighboring
city of Valencia to warrant a retail outlet there, so the bulk of the rice that was not
consumed by members86 was sent three hours away to the larger, more cosmopolitan city
of Cagayan de Oro to be marketed to a more health‐conscious clientele.87 The Makakabus
leadership was actively trying to change this situation, since in principle they, like
MASIPAG‐influenced farmers organizations in general, would prefer to feed local people
first, but there were no viable retail locations in Valencia City for them to tap into at the
time of my study. As awareness of organic products grows in the area, this will likely
become a possibility, but as of 2009 the explosion in organics awareness that occurred in
the 2000s in the United States had not happened in the Philippines.
Small farmers tend to focus on production, often giving little thought or effort to
marketing. Lack of marketing knowledge or LGU support meant that many individual
In terms of a premium for organic rice as compared to conventional, the selling price of
milled organic rice was usually 1600/sack compared to 1500/sack for conventional rice,
though Makakabus was strict about filling sacks to 50 kilos, while much of the conventional
rice weighed only 48 kilos per sack, so the actual difference can be as little as 0.75 pesos
per kilo (P32/kilo compared to P31.25/kilo).
86 Of the rice that was produced, members of the organization consumed a significant
portion. For those acting as maintainers, an average of half of the rice they earned was
consumed and the rest sold, but for land owners, the amount consumed was approximately
10% since they retain a larger share of the net. Aside from a small amount saved for seed,
the rest is sold.
87 Of the rice that was sold outside of the organization, there was some walk‐in business
from local families, but 80% of the rice sold by Makakabus went through their marketing
arm, BOPC (Bukidnon Organic Products Corporation). Cagayan de Oro was the main city in
which this rice was marketed, but Manila and Cebu, the two largest cities in the country,
also occasionally received shipments.
85
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farmers in Bukidnon who tried to produce organically got discouraged because they had no
structure in place for marketing their products. The success of Makakabus is largely
attributable to their advantageous marketing arrangements. Collective marketing efforts
by organic producers were a scaling strategy of sorts because economies of scale may be
achieved in situations that would be too difficult for individual producers who are not
linked to a collective or cooperative.
The only farmer in Cabangkalan I met who had switched from organic to chemical
methods (this was before Makakabus was a significant force in the community) blamed his
lack of a good marketing strategy as the reason for his failure as an organic farmer. When I
spoke to him, he said he felt trapped in the chemical paradigm, dependent on short‐term
income, and not able to consider a transition back to organic because of his short‐term
financial needs.
This farmer had loans that were building interest at the rate of 7%/month. As he
put it, "loans are a way of life." His debts to a financer, the short term financial needs of his
family, and his children’s education required him to rely on the third cropping of his
chemical rice fields for steady income (in the alternating years when there is no irrigation
shut off). He said that organic farming was good because your inputs are reduced and if
you continue for more than three croppings, you can get good yields. I asked him if debt
and lack of liquidity were not problems for two farmers operating over the course of 20
years, one using chemical methods and the other using organic, which would be more
profitable? He said the organic farmer would definitely be more profitable. I also asked
him if there were a government program to finance farmers' conversions from chemical to
organic farming, would he take part? And he said yes to that as well. He said
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environmental and health benefits come from organic farming. He would like to see
greater health and fewer worries about the price of fertilizers. He said the whole financial
situation would improve; climate change would be lessened with organic farming, since
there would be no burning of rice straw; and the restoration of soil fertility would be
another effect.
Shields et al. (1996) detailed the ways that transitions in some Philippine
communities from subsistence to a market economy have increased competition for scarce
resources and meant that horizontal social exchange arrangements have been abandoned
in favor of hierarchical relations, with the result that the sustainable reproduction of
environmental conditions falls by the wayside. In the case of Makakabus, the transition ran
in the reverse direction because horizontal social exchange and sustainable environmental
practices were increasing. However, the need to engage in markets was still present. To
promote consumption of organic foods on the local scale, governments and development
agencies will have to help create local markets and institute programs that both reward the
positive ecosystem services of organic farms and penalize the destructive externalities of
the chemical farming paradigm.
Why did Makakabus thrive, while the original organization, Bukidnon Masipag
Farmers Multi‐Purpose Cooperative (BMF‐MPC), shrank to a size considerably smaller than
Makakabus? It did not seem to be about different agricultural methods. While BMF‐MPC
had a period in which its members were straying from organic growing methods (a
development that partially prompted Makakabus to splinter off), by the time of my study
both BMF‐MPC and Makakabus were strict organic practitioners with a high degree of
similarity in their agricultural styles. But BMF‐MPC still remained stagnant compared to
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Makakabus. One explanation concerns the orientations of the two organizations, with
BMF‐MPC being more focused on education and Makakabus being more oriented towards
business. The heart of BMF‐MPC was the leader’s test farm, in which he experimented with
a range of rice varieties and other crops. Aggressive marketing of the organization’s output
did not seem to be a priority, but this might also have been because the organization no
longer had a critical mass to produce enough of an output to entice any distributors or
retailers. Furthermore, the fact that the organization defaulted on their original loan from
PDAP could not have helped their prospects. Makakabus, on the other hand, did have the
critical mass to make a marketing arrangement with Bukidnon Organic Products
Corporation (BOPC). The leadership of Makakabus felt they had outgrown their
educational phase and were intent on making sure they remained financially viable.
One might assume that the decision to fund a women‐led organization was to
promote a kinder, gentler type of development. In the case of PDAP’s decision to fund
Makakabus though, I argue instead that PDAP was impressed by the rigor of the
organization, suggested by its willingness to remove members for not following organic
practices, and impressed by the organization’s orientation toward business success rather
than educational outreach. Many people both inside and outside of Makakabus commented
on the strictness and discipline of its leader. The ‘toughness’ discourse was evident from a
story told among the group’s members of how the leader once chased one of the workers
up a tree when he was not following proper procedures. The story may be apocryphal or
the worker’s decision to climb a tree may have been at least partially an exercise in jocular
theatrics, but the story still underscores an intragroup discourse of some fear of
retribution. This discourse was known by PDAP and its affiliates. While concurrently there
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was also a strong discourse of the leader as being nurturing and generous, one must
wonder whether the ‘toughness’ discourse was a key reason for the organization to be
recognized by funders, and if so, what this says about the dynamics of development
decisions. Does it take aggressiveness (that is often considered to be in the domain of the
masculine) to be noticed by those in power? If so, are these victories for feminism or might
they be seen partially as defeats? Unlike many feminist political ecology studies,
Makakabus was a story of success. But we have to analyze how and why it has been a
success so far.
Women in Philippine rural society have had the responsibility of maintaining the
functional continuity of the family unit, while for men, activities like drinking and gambling
have to a certain extent become gendered in themselves as male practices. Thus in an
agricultural economy under stress, women may be seen as the more reliable leaders or
entrepreneurs. But the limitation for the implementation of investment in women’s
enterprises is that men are not sufficiently involved in the provision of childcare since their
gender identities do not emphasize this activity. If men do not help with the tasks of social
reproduction, child care, and eldercare, then the PDAP/PRIME type of development
projects add burdens of increased ‘productive work’ for women in the community (Angeles
and Hill 2009) on top of their tasks of social reproduction. To reduce the cumulative
burdens that women face, the projects need to find ways to spread the responsibilities and
rescale societal practices of social reproduction. One is to encourage men to be more
involved in the social reproduction of their families and communities. Another is for the
government to do more to provide daycare and healthcare. Yet the neoliberal project is at
odds with this idea since part of that project is to shrink the role of the state. Given the
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fiscal effects of neoliberalism and structural adjustment there was little public funding
available to restore, let alone add social services.88
Local development personnel saw women as better credit risks than men because
their priorities were families, food, education, and housing, while men were seen as less
responsible and susceptible to vices (PDAP 2009). PDAP’s former executive director said,
“Women are better entrepreneurs than men. They know how to save money, they know
how to budget, they know how to engage the market.” Though presumably beneficial in
most respects for women, these perceptions, when they steer policies and programs,
(re)create the gender identity of woman as entrepreneur, while there is no concurrent
encouragement for men to participate in the processes of social reproduction. One local
development officer spoke of maximizing the women’s traits. “We capitalize on the
women’s survival skills” (PDAP 2009). This discourse reveals that while local lending
organizations were working to improve the livelihoods of women, they were also engaged
in the construction of subjects who will be good credit risks and thus bring them profit.
As Sultana (2009) put it, “Subjects are always embedded in multiple relations of
power.” Perhaps the potential of Makakabus was recognized more by those with ties to
international development than by the men in their own community. The title of the article
on Makakabus in PDAP’s (2009) organizational publication is “Because Women Can Lead
and Lead Well.” One might see this statement in terms of a drive to create new possibilities
and overturn an outmoded conventional view of men as the ‘natural’ leaders, but at the

Trade liberalization since the 1990s meant that import duties and taxes dropped from
over 5% of national GDP in the early 1990s to less than 3% of GDP by the late 2000s.
Likewise, total national government spending dropped from 24% of GDP in 1990 to 18.3%
by 2010 (IBON Foundation 2009).
88
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same time it solidifies the concept of gender itself, which might pose challenges for equity
in the future.
The Philippine state promotes family cohesion. Billboards throughout Bukidnon
state, “Ang pamilya nga ligaon may kaugmaon” (A family that is strong has a future).
Other billboards proclaim, “A family that stays together has a future.” It is difficult to assess
what prompted these billboards. Was it to discourage fathers from abandoning their
families? Was it to encourage couples to work through their problems? What is
interesting, though, is that these billboards express the state’s concerns, yet, at the same
time, the government expends a great deal of energy in facilitating the voyages of Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) (Parreñas 2001b), many of whom are women of child‐rearing
age. Early in her presidency, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo told Time magazine (2003), “I am
not only the president of 80 million Filipinos. I am also like the CEO of a global corporation
of the 8 million Filipinos who live and work in 140 countries all over the world.” The
Philippine transition into a neoliberal “labor brokerage state” (Rodriguez 2010) has
ramifications for the sex ratio of some communities in Bukidnon.89 The remittances of
OFWs provide a significant portion of the Philippines’ Gross Domestic Product, though
families are often torn apart through the long distance separations that are the result of
these arrangements (Parreñas 2001a; Pratt 2009, 2012; Battistella and Conacao 1996).

The barangay‐wide ratio for Butong was 100 females: 115 males. The differences
between sexes were even more pronounced in the 25‐49 year old age range, which may be
an indicator that more women were leaving the communities for work in other countries or
other parts of the country. Small farming villages are not the primary sources of OFWs, but
the phenomenon definitely occurs even in small communities and it is not limited to the
unmarried and the childless.
89
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In the Philippines in general, in the era of neoliberalism, people were decreasingly
producing for their kinship and neighbor groups and increasingly producing for
international markets. The OFWs were an extreme example of this. Not just the products
produced from their labor, but their bodies themselves crossed international boundaries.
The Philippine government valorizes the OFWs as national heroines/heroes, suggesting the
ways that the government favors financial stability over family and community stability.
The food sovereignty framework stands in opposition to this strategy by stressing
community cohesion and more local self‐reliance.

7.5 Conclusion
Development programs and projects must address both labor issues (equitably
producing income) and environmental issues (protecting the sustainability of resources)
(Nightingale 2006). Gender‐sensitive development has been shown to make an impact in
the promotion of local‐scale economic‐ecological endeavors that are also financially viable,
promote local food security, and ensure long‐term ecological sustainability. The success of
Makakabus suggests how these concerns can be combined with and advanced through
organic agriculture.
Angeles and Hill (2009) note that development aid and NGOs have essentialized
women in Cabangkalan as “alternative income providers and domestic reproducers.” Yet,
the success of Makakabus’s program for retaking land that had been pawned to local elites
shows this tendency to be in the process of being overcome. My purpose is not to say that
Angeles and Hill were wrong in their conclusions from their 2001 fieldwork. It is to
question what may have changed in the interceding years. By the end of the 2000s,
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Makakabus was involved in production as well as reproduction. Whereas in the early years
of the organization, the emphasis may have been on alternative income, that has changed to
a focus on competitive organic rice production. In answering the question what may have
changed in the interceding years, it is interesting to consider that Makakabus may, on the
one hand, have been influenced by neoliberal pressures for engagement with markets, yet
on the other hand have been influenced by food sovereignty discourses regarding
sustainable agriculture, community development, and land reform. Makakabus has been
involved in a project that is empowering women and men, especially of the poorer classes,
through their prenda land rehabilitation program, and thus land control emerged as an
urgent issue equally as important as education in these rural contexts.
The conditions that allow Makakabus to be successful are fairly narrow, such that
their profitability and viability could be precarious if there are negative outside influences.
Governmental and non‐governmental organizations in developing rural landscapes can
ensure that farmers organizations and cooperatives are institutionally and economically
encouraged to provide beneficial products and ecosystem services to their localities rather
than leaving them subject to the whims of international economic forces. This entails
promoting food security strategies that make local, sustainable staple production a central
part of the plan. The example of Makakabus shows us how more egalitarian gender
identities, a less gendered division of labor, and a focus on fighting class inequities can be
part of this process.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
8.1 Contributions to the field
Food sovereignty is a burgeoning movement that has reacted against the neoliberal
corporate food regime (McMichael 2005). While much has been written about the subject
on the macro‐level, this study includes detailed micro‐level analysis of three Philippine
villages. Analyzing the food security strategies in these communities in Bukidnon offers
some workable recommendations concerning future paths in agricultural development,
and contributes to the literature of development geography and political ecology. This
project supplements the growing body of work that addresses globalization as more than
simply an economic phenomenon, but rather as a set of spatio‐temporal and political‐
ecological practices as well.
My project works across disciplines, scales, and groups. Analyzing agricultural and
food security strategies using a political ecology approach bridges geography,
anthropology, political economy, ecology, rural sociology, and agrarian studies. The
findings may be useful for those interested in agricultural development and the tension
between commodified agriculture and subsistence cultivation. My ethnographic research
examined the various scalar forces that affect the people of a rural area and how they work
within or against these scales. Through interviewing, working with, and reporting back to
NGOs, academics, and governmental units and agencies spanning the local, provincial,
national, and global scales, my project suggests some possibilities for cross‐scale
partnerships, providing the potential for re‐envisioning relations of production,
consumption, social reproduction, and the reproduction of environmental conditions.
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As a Visiting Research Fellow for the Department of Geography at the University of
the Philippines – Diliman, I reported my findings to them at the end of my stay in the
Philippines. I also presented my findings and recommendations to the University of the
Philippines – Los Baños School of Environmental Science and Management and the national
secretariat of the NGO MASIPAG (Farmer‐Scientist Partnership for Development) at Los
Baños, as well as the leadership of the NGO Amihan (National Federation of Peasant
Women – Philippines) in the Manila area. I reported back to the mayors of the
municipalities and the barangay captains of the communities in which I did interviews. I
also plan to report back to the governor of Bukidnon, with whom I met at the beginning of
the study, as well as regional, provincial, and municipal leaders and national personnel of
the Department of Agriculture, Department of Agrarian Reform, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. Finally, I will contact the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization in the hopes of presenting my findings to them. I hope to have
future trips to the Philippines and continue to have lasting relationships with the local
farmers, wage laborers, and NGOs and continue to engage with them around their evolving
concerns.

8.2 Summary of findings regarding research questions
1) How does the production of scale intersect with power relations in
particular ecological contexts?
At first glance, this project might seem like a typical David vs. Goliath story about
small farmers trying to achieve their independence in the face of corporate influence. One
might be tempted to reduce the analysis to a simple contrast between sustainable farmers
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who operate on a micro‐scale and plantations that operate on a macro‐scale. Instead, I
argue that the success stories within the sustainable paradigm are primarily where there
has been cooperation on a scale of many families, whereas the failures (whether of
sustainable farmers or conventional farmers) have largely been when operators are too
isolated and do not have a successful support group. Regarding agribusiness strategies
(such as those of input manufacturers), there is of course a top‐down approach that we can
accurately associate with large‐scale marketing, but we also need to remember that the
target customer base has often been the isolated individual farmers who attempt (and
some would say get trapped into) the chemical paradigm. With wave after wave of small
farmers losing control of their land, the success of this strategy is questionable. Thus, a
finding of this study is that it is extremely challenging to be a completely independent small
farmer in the Philippines today, regardless of the paradigm of agriculture that is being
practiced. Scaling processes are largely about deciding with whom someone is going to
cooperate and against whom someone is going to compete. In this sense, the difficulties
faced by the lone producers show the problems with scaling too small.
While there may be similarities between the successful players in the agricultural
economy in the scaling of their operations at meso‐scales, we see a sharp difference
between a group like Makakabus versus the large chemical rice farms or the sugarcane
haciendas in their reproduction of environmental conditions. Makakabus emphasizes a
very low‐external input type of farming, while the other players source inputs from afar
and therefore take part in a much more complex web of geo‐economic influences. It would
be an overstatement to say that Makakabus avoids the realm of capitalism because they
still rely on marketing their products outside of the community, but one might say that
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through their land rehabilitation program, they take over some of the dead tissue of a type
of globalized hydrocarbon capitalism that is based on long distance transport of materials.
1.1) How are the neoliberal and corporate agribusiness projects being scaled?
Most of my attempts to speak with the management of large agribusiness
corporations were thwarted. In Chapter Six, I detailed the rather elaborate process that
Dole used to avoid being interviewed. I did not succeed in meeting with any management
representatives of Chiquita or Monsanto either, even though there were initial—perhaps
disingenuous?—signs that they would cooperate with my interview requests. Pioneer (a
DuPont company) was the only one of the mega‐corporations operating in the area that
agreed to speak with me, perhaps because they had the least to hide. Pioneer, present in
the Philippines since 1976, has had fewer controversies about business and labor practices
compared to the other American companies operating in the Philippines. Its Philippines
Country Manager, whom I interviewed, praised the Philippine government for its
regulations on biotechnology. He did not think the regulations were overly strict, and he
praised the government’s strong protection of intellectual property rights, referring to the
Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002 (RA 9168), which was drafted with the assistance of
USAID. This law was important to Pioneer and Monsanto since they sell GMO seeds in the
Philippines, and it illustrates the government’s cooperation with the interests of
agribusiness corporations.90 The Philippine government’s strong role in the ‘banana war’
with Australia (Fagan 2005) showed how Manila was also willing to go to work for the
interests of Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte.
It was interesting though that the Country Manager was frank about the possibility that
in the long run GMO seeds may not prove to be as effective as hybrids, mentioning that
GMOs could potentially be phased out by the company.
90
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How were agribusinesses interacting with the people of Bukidnon? Corporate
outreach into communities was minimal. Pioneer, for example, donated a few corn dryers
to some Philippine communities, but no projects were undertaken for Bukidnon
specifically. Marketing and advertising from companies like Monsanto and Pioneer was
fairly minimal. Generally, promotional materials were available at input dealers, and
marketing techniques did not rely on narrative, symbolic, or emotional appeals. Instead,
product claims focused on the technical aspects of their products, which was indicative of a
general attitude that emphasized the improvement of yields without substantive
engagement with community issues. As Pioneer’s Country Manager said, “The only way to
self‐sufficiency is to produce more.”
To many people in Bukidnon, the operations of Pioneer and Monsanto, which
markets its RR corn under the name DeKalb, are under the radar. However, the impact of
Dole is more evident, and something on which people generally had an opinion. The
prevailing sentiment was that Dole offers a fair wage, but the company does not benefit the
community as a whole. People had serious concerns about the effects of Dole’s pesticides
on workers and residents in the vicinity of their plantations. In addition, Dole rescaled the
agricultural geography of municipalities like Pangantucan by renting small and medium
sized parcels of land, especially ones that were contiguous, and then stitching them
together to make larger banana plantations. While the local landowners enjoyed a brief
burst of income in these arrangements since the first five years of rent were paid in a lump
sum, local activists pointed out that in the latter years of these 25‐year contracts, what once
looked like a fair rent will seem paltry due to inflation. Moreover they argue that given
Dole’s banana cultivation practices, erosion, acidification, and pesticide residues in soils
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will mean the lands will be seriously degraded by the end of the rental term. At that point,
another rescaling effort might be necessary wherein the government will have to deal with
lands that are in need of environmental remediation, as was the case in some former Dole
lands near Davao in southern Mindanao.
Many of the neoliberal reforms demanded of the Philippines by the IMF, World
Bank, Asian Development Bank, and WTO are examples of the ‘hollowing out’ of the state
(Jessop 1994; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). The activities of the National Food Authority,
the National Irrigation Authority, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Agrarian Reform, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources have all been
subjected to rescaling efforts by outside forces, wherein part or all of their responsibilities
have been privatized, deregulated, and/or pushed off to other scales of governance. The
motivations for these acts have generally been to push the Philippines toward budgetary
austerity or to encourage an export oriented economy, both ostensibly to spur the
Philippines into a better fiscal situation wherein it can pay back its debts. However, it was
apparent in 2008‐2009 that these policies were negatively affecting many small farmers in
Bukidnon as they were left with insufficient price supports and reduced levels of
agricultural extension services.
1.2) How are small and medium sized farmers scaling their operations?
There was a clear contrast between individualistic/nuclear family‐oriented Butong
and group‐oriented Makakabus in their labor arrangements and marketing strategies.
Agbalo was more similar to Butong in its labor arrangements, though there was some
reciprocal labor there as well.
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Makakabus embodied a group‐scale orientation in its labor arrangements,
centralized rice purchasing, a high level of food self‐sufficiency, localized activity spaces,
and farming techniques that promoted localized reproduction of environmental conditions.
One might assume that the rice would be marketed locally as well. However, this was not
the case. Although a fair amount of the organization’s rice was consumed by its members
and some other local residents, the majority of the rice sold was marketed in the capital of
the Northern Mindanao Region.
The group‐scale orientation, however, enabled the members of Makakabus to assert
more control over their lives than when they were involved with chemical agriculture.
Their responses in this regard revealed the direct connections between food sovereignty as
a community strategy and the experiences of sovereignty on a personal level. The
members felt that they could control their own destinies, whereas those who were not in
Makakabus frequently expressed their doubts.
One of the most troubling things I encountered was the way in which transient wage
labor seemed to be making people lose the drive to plan for their own communities. A
detailed study of identity formation was ruled out by time constraints, but one thing I
found was a difference between the spatial scales of the maps interviewees drew for me of
what was important to their work. Wage laborers, who were much more likely to have
longer commutes, tended to emphasize roads and de‐emphasize community landmarks or
landscape detail in their maps when compared to the farmers who were staple producers
and more locally based. Participating in different food security strategies alters people’s
connections and commitments to local and regional spaces, and thus their understandings
of themselves as socio‐spatial actors.
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I was also aware of differences in the way that people were scaling their actions in a
temporal way. There were similarities in short‐term economic decision‐making between
the agribusiness plantations, the local elite’s plantations, and the smallholders employing
chemical methods. Conversely, the organic farmers, such as the members of Makakabus,
did not try to maximize profit in the short‐term. These more durable commitments were
evident in the practice of growing only two crops of rice per year, opting for long‐term soil
fertility over short‐term financial gain.
Before visiting the study area, I was aware of resistance to agricultural
biotechnology among farmers in Mindanao. I assessed accurately ahead of time that some
of my interview subjects in Bukidnon would be critical of the potential environmental
impacts of GMOs such as changing soil chemistry, the possible unintended side effects of
developing ‘superpests’ and ‘superweeds’, and the potential for genetic contamination of
native varieties. Furthermore, some residents were critical of the marketed ‘expertise’
(Mitchell 2002) of biotech companies that serves as a veil for intellectual property (IP)‐
based accumulation strategies. Yet, two other issues were more visceral for most of the
farmers I spoke to: GMO seeds are too expensive and the resultant crops are not edible for
humans.91 They framed their objections in direct food security terms. They wanted to be
able to scale their food sovereignty at the level of their farm.
Two Philippine NGOs, MASIPAG and Landcare, have a great deal to offer
communities in the Philippines in terms of how they scale their projects. MASIPAG
indirectly inspired the formation of Makakabus, which initially broke off from a MASIPAG

In the area, RR corn, and to a lesser extent Bt corn, were the main GMO seeds for sale,
and both of these produce feed corn.
91
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group, but not because of any objections to MASIPAG philosophy. Developing a bayanihan
communitarian approach, using reciprocal labor, and acting as a local market consolidator
are all ways in which Makakabus embodies MASIPAG’s approach to scaling agricultural
development in rural communities. Landcare, which is especially geared toward
diversified farming and agroforestry in upland environments, also encourages organizing
groups of families to scale their projects on a meso‐scale, so problem solving and marketing
can both be done collectively.
1.3) How are changes in land use decisions affecting the construction of scale
in Bukidnon?
According to Nightingale (2006), “The political ecology literature has emphasised
that access to, control over and the distribution of resources are at the core of most
environmental issues, both in terms of social inequities and in terms of ecological decline.”
In the context of the agricultural economy of Bukidnon, land was the most important
resource, and both social inequities and ecological decline were in dynamic tension with
the way that the distribution of land occurs in Bukidnon. The cash cropping plantation
paradigm relied on volume for its profits and typically its practitioners were more
concerned with short‐term profits than long‐term sustainability. For the sugarcane
hacienderos, the large rice planters, and the banana plantations, much or all of the land
under cultivation was not owned and there was less of an incentive to preserve its
ecological integrity since it was seen as an expendable resource. For smallholders, on the
other hand, there was often a greater incentive to preserve soil fertility and prevent
erosion since the condition of the land is integral to their long‐term security strategy.
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However, local land ownership itself does not guarantee non‐exploitative labor
relationships, since local large landowning elites can still hold sharecroppers or wage
laborers in poverty. Menser (2008) argued that land ownership itself needs to be
democratized, which in the Philippines would require the revision of its land reform
policies in a more truly redistributive direction. Market‐based land reform in places where
there are severe inequalities is often a way of formalizing and institutionalizing the unequal
relations of different groups, since the wealthier parties are the ones who can participate in
these kinds of titling endeavors (Borras and Franco 2010). As discussed here, these
practices were prevalent in the area of Bukidnon. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program from 1988, however, could be used in its present form to democratize land reform
since compulsory acquisition was one of the avenues of that land reform program.
However, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have been reluctant to fund this
type of land transfer on the basis that it creates conflict. My research and the work of
Franco and Borras (2007) and Borras et al. (2009) suggest that there will potentially be
more conflict if land reform programs are not truly redistributive, but it is unlikely that the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank would support a return to compulsory
acquisition given their market and private property orientation. While left wing groups
like KMP advocate a new program called the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill that would use
compulsory acquisition without compensation for present landowners and give free land to
landless peasants, it seems to me that the government would be more likely to consider a
middle ground where landowners would be compensated for part of the value of their land
and agrarian reform beneficiaries would have to pay for a portion of the value of the land.

278

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
Attempts could be made to involve outside donors, such as philanthropic foundations or
international financial institutions, to help fund the program.
Community titling is another way in which land reform can be democratized and the
government can scale agrarian reform more broadly than through individual titling.
Community titling is possible under CARP, although it has been under‐utilized historically.
Community titling would help immensely with the problems around pawning
arrangements and sales (legal or otherwise) that lead to a large percentage of redistributed
land falling into the hands of local elite landowners.
Government policy on biofuels also exerts an effect on land use decisions and the
ways in which certain producers scale their operations. The Philippine Biofuels Act
stimulated sugarcane production in Bukidnon, which exacerbated problems with land
consolidation by local sugarcane hacienderos, further diminishing the amount of land
devoted to staple cropping.
2) What are the results of different food security strategies in terms of gender
relations, class relations, agricultural productivity, and the health of the farms’ biotic
communities?
The organic rice collective Makakabus fit well into the paradigm of low‐input
sustainable staple cropping. In contrast, Butong’s agriculture was more geared toward
cash cropping (sugarcane and bananas) and chemical production methods. Agbalo
occupied a middle ground between the two, growing primarily white corn, a staple crop,
but not fully practicing sustainable production methods.
2.1) Gender relations in the farming economy of Bukidnon
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Mosse (2005) wrote that women often do not receive recognition for their
agricultural knowledge and their agency is denied in market interactions or planning with
development organizations. The story of what occurred at first in Cabangkalan with the
Bukidnon Masipag Farmers Multi‐Purpose Cooperative (BMF‐MPC) certainly fit that
description, but what happened with the creation of Makakabus out of BMF‐MPC turned
these notions on their head. Though the gendered division of labor was only partly
modified, the gendered division of decision‐making was radically altered. The leadership
positions in Makakabus were, by charter, all occupied by women, while the group decision‐
making process was completely gender‐neutral. Both of these features were in stark
contrast to the processes and organization of the male‐dominated BMF‐MPC.
Because the change in gender relations among Makakabus members was overlain
with a new emphasis on communal and reciprocal labor, the way gender was constructed
vis‐à‐vis family life was also different from the rest of the community at large. In other
words, while Makakabus members were moving toward a group identity that de‐
emphasized traditional gender roles, the families practicing chemical agriculture in
Cabangkalan were still in a pattern where men were in charge of production decisions and
women were more in charge of the responsibilities of social reproduction. Still, the
convergence of gender identities in Makakabus should not be exaggerated since
participating men were taking on some new responsibilities of social reproduction, but less
than the degree to which the women were taking on new responsibilities of production.
Therefore the problematic aspect of these changes was that women were often facing
increased burdens of work.
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Shifts toward plantation economies in places like Butong have moved the area away
from subsistence and toward a more wage‐oriented economy. While there was a raw
increase in the amount of wages earned by women, which may have afforded some
independence in certain situations, the fact that women’s wages were not as high as men’s
translated to disadvantages in their economic power. Women were usually limited to
lower wage positions such as weeder or stalk gleaner. Furthermore, women transitioning
into wage labor may be acquiring new skills, but the changes were not of the same order as
what the women of Makakabus experienced, because Butong women’s wage labor jobs did
not alter their agricultural decision‐making responsibilities.
For corporate workplaces such as Pangantucan’s Dole banana‐processing center,
only 27% of the workforce was female, so the overall effect of Dole’s presence is to increase
the gendered economic disparities in the area. Asia Pro, which is a major contractor with
Dole and Del Monte for temporary labor, also employs only 40% women.
A majority of recent Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the 15‐34 age group have
been women (Basa, Villamil, and de Guzman 2009). Although the Philippines in general
relies on remittances from OFWs for approximately 11% of its GDP (The Economist 2010),
it was clear that none of the three villages I visited had quite this much reliance on outside
support. Roughly equal amounts of money were coming from OFWs and from relatives in
other provinces. Looking at these international and inter‐province remittances combined,
Makakabus members received supplemental income from outside of the community equal
to 2.5% of their regular income, while Butong received 5.6%, and Agbalo 7.5%. A number
of people in Butong mentioned that they would like to rely on their children for more
support in the future, so the exodus of working age people, especially young women, may
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increase in the future. Makakabus members on the other hand, did not talk about the need
to send members of the community to outside places as a security strategy. So it is possible
that female empowerment in the agricultural economy was reducing the temptation to
venture outward. It is possible as well that the construction of gender for Makakabus
members was such that agriculture was seen as a collective family endeavor where
everyone has a contribution.
2.2) Class relations in the farming economy of Bukidnon
In my study, in a place like Butong, I found correlations between declining food
security, increasing class stratification, decreasing quality of environmental conditions, and
a less locally oriented reproduction of environmental conditions. Conversely, for a group
like Makakabus, there were correlations between increasing food security, less class
stratification, increasing quality of environmental conditions, and a more locally oriented
reproduction of environmental conditions. There was a lack of a simple correlation
between income and quality of life. The findings of my study are similar to those of
Bachmann, Cruzada, and Wright (2009): health, food security, and the local environment
are all improved by sustainable farming; and it is important that this all happens within a
farmer‐empowerment approach.
The Masagana 99 program and other efforts of the Philippine government to
introduce fertilizers into rural economies created disastrous results for many farming
families. Typically, a cycle of debt from high‐interest loans to pay for the fertilizers would
be deepened by the fact that the need for chemical fertilizers grows over time as organic
soil organisms are killed and the soil is acidified and hardened. Especially in places like
Butong, this problem was compounded by the division of farmland into smaller parcels as
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multiple heirs inherited split estates. Then, as the processing of sugarcane became locally
cost‐effective, a small elite developed who would take pawned or sold land from former
smallholders and amass large sugarcane plantations, driving an increasing amount of the
population into wage labor and further dividing the class structure of the community. Land
consolidation by sugarcane hacienderos meant wealth was being concentrated in the hands
of a few, but we can also see that if a community’s land is divided among too many, then
parcel size becomes too small and farmers have difficulty staying profitable.
Some smallholders in Butong, starting in the mid‐2000s, opted to rent their land to
Dole, which was quickly establishing large banana plantations in the area. Again, this
development removed more people from their status as independent owner‐operators and
many of them turned to wage labor. Both the sugarcane and banana plantations have
pushed communities like Butong further away from staple production and thus away from
food self‐sufficiency. The problems of relying on wage labor have been compounded by
inflation of food prices and drops in real wages, especially among sugarcane workers,
which has resulted in an increase in the incidence of child labor.
In places like Pangantucan, if we continue to see the transition from small farmers
farming corn to hacienderos planting sugarcane, the municipality will bifurcate into a tiny
elite and a large poverty‐stricken working class. The middle class will be replaced by a
rural proletariat. If this occurs concurrently with continued population growth, then wages
will remain flat and unemployment will grow. There is already an insurgency that could be
fueled by these potential frustrations. The NPA (New People’s Army) operated in most
provinces, including Bukidnon. Though the NPA was not very strong at the time of my
study, it is not far‐fetched that increased class stratification could swell their ranks and

283

Ehrhart: Scaling Food Security
lead to more unrest, especially in rural barangays. If local government units are serious
about promoting a positive climate for investment, they need to promote the stability of
middle class farmers, so these farmers do not lose their land and potentially turn to the
NPA in their discontent. Protecting smallholder farming in rural areas is likely to maintain
physical security and preserve political stability, which can attract outside investment.
In regard to the cash‐cropping paradigm, it is important to not fetishize money and
instead to engage in a more general assessment of the well‐being of communities. Cash
cropping may have benefited the elite sugarcane hacienderos and management‐level
employees of Dole, but the cash cropping paradigm was not benefiting the area in general.
Butong, which was oriented mostly toward cash cropping, may have looked on paper like
the most prosperous village because of its higher incomes, but it actually had the deepest
problems with hunger, malnutrition, and a declining quality of life for most of its residents.
Makakabus was working to reverse the trend of land consolidation by the wealthy in
Cabangkalan. Ironically, their strategy is to use the same tactic as the large landowners—
prenda. The organization either takes over existing prenda arrangements between large
landowners and smallholders, or they work with smallholder chemical farmers who are
first experiencing problems with debt. Their intent, however, was not to retain the land,
but instead to rehabilitate it, get the original landowner involved in organic production,
and return the land to them with enhanced soil fertility.92
An important question to ask is whether this strategy of using prenda for positive
social change should be replicated in other places. I consulted with a number of people in

Makakabus also works with both old and new members who are not involved in prenda
arrangements.
92
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Philippine NGOs and academic institutions about this, and the consensus was that it could
be a positive tool of rural redevelopment. However, they were hesitant to promote it on a
large scale since there is potential for abuse. One thing that is clear is that it would only
work in a situation where the parent organization operates with a high degree of
transparency. It was inspiring to see what Makakabus’s efforts were doing for class
dynamics in Cabangkalan, particularly in contrast to the deteriorating situation in Butong.
One of the main reasons people opt for prenda in the first place is that they are
dealing with debt problems from high‐interest loans. The transfer of wealth from poor
farmers to wealthier members of communities through loan interest is considerable.
Ideally, micro‐lending with low interest rates could be done by farmers organizations so
that interest earned by the lender would be put back into the community. Makakabus was
succeeding in this endeavor, but many farmers organizations do not have the capital to
start a program like this. Foreign NGOs may be able to fill the gap here temporarily, but as
Cahill (2008) argued, microfinance from external sources may discourage the agency of
Filipino residents in the solving of their own problems. Milgram (2005), also looking at the
Philippines, questioned the ability of microfinance to address the “social causes of poverty”
rather than just the symptoms. Furthermore, microfinance has had mixed results in other
places in providing gender equity (Goetz and Gupta 1996), health, and educational benefits
(Korth et al. 2012).
Governments can prevent class stratification in rural areas by providing better
transportation infrastructure so more small farmers can transport their products to market
themselves. Currently many farmers sell very low to rice traders who take care of the
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transportation. Better transportation infrastructure would help ensure that the state’s
price support programs benefit the people that are the intended beneficiaries.
Seed choices are another factor that affects the construction of class in rural
communities. Control of seeds by small farmers means control of the means of production.
MASIPAG (which influenced Makakabus) emphasizes the importance of strengthening the
smallholder class by using open‐pollinated seeds that do not need external inputs (such as
chemical fertilizers and pesticides) and thus keeping farmers out of debt. The
transnational‐corporate/biotech strategy threatens that control through patents and
because of the possibility of genetic contamination of native and traditional varieties of
seeds. Although a national attempt to prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified crops
would probably be challenged in a WTO action, provinces can consider such bans
individually. So far, several Philippine provinces have succeeded in banning GMO crops.
The degree to which vertical integration occurred in the area depended largely on
what crop was being grown. The Dole banana plantations were the most vertically
integrated operations in the sense that they rented land, hired field workers, processors,
and transportation workers, and then exported the produce through the port in Davao in
southern Mindanao. Chiquita, on the other hand, outsourced banana production to
independent growers. They required standardization of practices for the growers, but did
not have official control over the production processes. A seed purveyor like Monsanto
was only vertically integrated into corn production, for example, through the pairing of
seed and herbicide combinations.
In a sense, Makakabus was vertically integrating to a limited extent since land
procurement, labor, inputs, harvesting, threshing, and acting as a local market consolidator
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were all largely coordinated by the organization. So it is interesting to see how vertical
integration can lead to increased class stratification in the corporate examples, but also
decreased class stratification in the case of Makakabus. Thus it is less the case that vertical
integration itself is the enemy of social equity and more simply the economic terms that
different parties negotiate.
2.3) Productivity and profitability
Even among those farmers in the villages who were not practicing sustainable
agriculture, there was more respect than I imagined for indigenous and traditional
practices of organic agriculture. What was interesting was that this came not so much from
environmental concern or holistic philosophy, but from the simple recognition that organic
practices could be more profitable. Agroecological techniques have been demonstrated to
help end rural poverty, as producers are not tethered to expensive chemical inputs and do
not lose capital to the interest on input loans (DeSchutter 2010).
Unfortunately, time constraints did not allow me to interview enough of the
chemical rice farmers in Cabangkalan to be able to make head to head comparisons in the
incomes of chemical farmers versus organic farmers. But it was noteworthy that there was
agreement among both chemical and organic farmers that organic farming results in higher
incomes over long terms (such as five to ten years or more).
Comparing the incomes of different crops is problematic as well, considering
differing geographies, but one of the leading families in Makakabus was earning P91,321
($1,943)/hectare from rice, while the largest sugarcane haciendero in Butong was earning
P51,720 ($1,100)/hectare. Sugarcane farmers, and to an even greater extent, corn farmers
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(at least those who were using fertilizers) were spending large percentages of their gross
incomes on chemical fertilizers.
Yet, one of the major insights to gain from this study is that higher income is not
necessarily the foundation of community well‐being. Even though Makakabus lagged
behind Butong in income measures, the attitudes of the residents of the two places were
starkly different. Makakabus members could be characterized as happier, healthier, more
food secure, more group‐oriented, and more optimistic about the future.
It was evident that farmer profitability and corporate profitability could sometimes
be at cross‐purposes; when I asked the Country Manager of Pioneer whether his company
would consider marketing an open‐pollinated variety seed, he frankly confessed that there
would be no economic incentive for a seed company to produce a seed that could be saved.
2.4) Health of the local farming community
There was a large disparity between the different communities in terms of their
perceptions of their increasing or decreasing food security. Although income was
obviously an important factor for food security, there was a clearer correlation between
food security and self‐sufficiency in staple food production. Even though Makakabus had
lower incomes (both median income and average income of the lowest quartile) than
Butong, it was Butong that had higher levels of hunger. Makakabus had the highest degree
of food self‐sufficiency and the highest ratings for improving food security. There was also
unanimous agreement within the group that there were no examples of malnourished
individuals in the group. Official barangay data was not disaggregated in a way that could
confirm this, but I was able to confirm with the Cabangkalan barangay health worker that
Makakabus members did not have malnutrition problems and that the malnourished
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children in the area were typically the children of wage laborers in the chemical farms,
especially day laborers who did not have a steady boss. It was clear as well from
interviews that the absence of hunger within Makakabus was partially due to the group’s
strong social safety net compared to Agbalo and especially Butong.
The effects of pesticides and other agro‐chemicals on human health were quite
serious in all of the communities. Many of the members of Makakabus mentioned avoiding
pesticide exposure as a leading reason they converted to organic methods. While the
effects of smallholder use of pesticides was an issue in all three of the barangays, the effects
of Dole’s spraying of pesticides in its banana plantations near Agbalo and Butong was a
major issue for both residents and workers who complained of a variety of ailments. The
complaints were already substantial even though Dole had only been operating in these
communities for less than four years.
2.5) Health of the nonhuman biotic communities in the area
The University of the Philippines – Los Baños, which is the leading agricultural
school in the country, has emerged as a solid backer of the organic paradigm. Likewise,
Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro (the capital of Region 10/Northern Mindanao)
promotes organic agriculture through its Center for Sustainable Agriculture.93 This has had
a direct effect on the direction of agricultural development in Valencia, as the city
Central Mindanao University, a large agriculture school between Valencia and
Pangantucan, seemed to be undergoing a changing of the guard. From the agriculture
professors I spoke to there, there were a wider range of opinions on the chemical
paradigm. Although everyone agreed that excessive chemical fertilizer use had destroyed
the productivity of some farmlands, some of the older professors advocated a ‘balanced
fertilization’ approach (where both organic and chemical fertilizers are used), while others
more fully embraced organic fertilization practices such as vermi‐composting and
sustainable agriculture practices such as crop diversification and low‐external input
farming.
93
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agriculture office has drafted plans to be the organic rice capital of the Philippines. When I
talked to the Valencia Agriculture Officer in 2009, the Sustainable Agriculture and Organic
Rice Development (SAORD) Master Plan was nearing completion and Valencia had become
the first local government unit in the Philippines to be registered with the International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). The DA leadership in Pangantucan
was less proactive. Funding for the department was low and there was a lack of an
ambitious development plan.
Do those who own land have obligations to prevent land degradation? When I
interviewed one soil science professor at Central Mindanao University, he explained his
view that all land in the Philippines is Philippine land and that the government needs to
promote food security for the entire nation. Therefore he advocated a regulatory
framework where if the government detected that the soil fertility of a particular parcel
was not being protected, then that landowner risked losing title to that land and ownership
would revert to the state. This of course would be difficult from both the standpoint that
the Philippines does not have the resources to inspect all of its farmlands and from the
standpoint that resistance to this type of government intrusion would be strong
considering the potential for abuse inherent in such a program. However, the professor’s
viewpoint does illuminate the tension between food sovereignty planning and the potential
ecological abuses that are possible when short‐term profit‐motivated farming is being
practiced.
The Dole banana plantations were one of the most serious threats to the ecological
integrity of farmlands in Bukidnon, since they are causing problems with erosion, soil
acidification, and pesticide residues in soils. Soil quality will likely be seriously
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compromised when owners re‐occupy the land at the end of rental contracts, and erosion is
a particularly important problem since it also affects downstream waterways. Siltation is
believed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to be causing problems
with floods, which are an increasing menace in the Philippines. The effects of Dole’s
pesticides are not confined to human health, since numerous farmers have complained that
their livestock have been sickened or killed from sprays drifting from Dole plantations.
I looked for evidence whether multicropping farmers were more attuned to
microenvironments or other environmental factors than farmers who were monocropping.
I did not find this to be the case, since many of the farmers of Makakabus, who were
monocropping rice (although they were diligently rotating varieties from season to season)
spoke at length about their farming ecology and expressed a creative engagement with
farming processes to a degree that I did not see elsewhere, except in a few cases in Butong
and Agbalo where farmers were also practicing sustainable and organic methods of
fertilization and cultivation.
The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act stipulates that crop waste is not to be
burned. Thus, a national law can be enforced to eliminate burning. Composting is possible
not just for rice straw, but corn stalks and sugarcane leaves as well. If pressure is put on
local governments to enforce the law, then the end result might be more conversions to
organic methods. The logistics and issues of this transition will be discussed in the next
section.
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8.3 Philippine concerns
Control of staple food production is one of the most fundamental aspects of food
security. When this project was originally conceived in 2006 and 2007, it was evident that
the Philippines could soon be reaching a pivotal moment of policy decision‐making
regarding whether to pursue export‐orientation or local self‐sufficiency. The 2008 food
price crisis did in fact push the government in the direction of promoting self‐sufficiency94,
but has this has been a mere change in the political discourse that is not matched by
changes in the material realities of agricultural production in the Philippines? The answer
to this question is complex. Since 2010, the Department of Agriculture under President
Benigno Aquino III has taken some important steps toward sustainability, which should
benefit long‐term self‐sufficiency. Furthermore, the Food Staples Sufficiency Program
(FSSP) rightly focuses on farm to market roads, post‐harvest facilities, and irrigation works,
which are important measures to improve infrastructure. However, the government has
not made strides on addressing the growing problems of consolidation of land by the
wealthy, increased control of land by agribusinesses, or land tenure instability among
smallholders. In order to reach and maintain staple self‐sufficiency, policies still need to
address the problems of stalled land reform and the use of land for export cropping.
International economic policies have had deleterious effects on the food security of
the Philippines, and in certain cases these policies have filtered into Philippine governance
itself and contradicted national efforts for food self‐sufficiency. The different scales of
‘The Blueprint for Food Security’ was an ambitious plan made as a response to the food
price crisis in 2008 by the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration to increase rice output
with an original target for full self‐sufficiency in 2010. By 2009, the target was pushed back
to 2013.
94
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government within the Philippines are presently hamstrung. The various tenets of
neoliberalism work against Philippine independence. Deregulation has eviscerated the
oversight capabilities and the inter‐scalar coherence of government agencies; privatization
curtails government influence over an economy that is increasingly difficult to control; and
trade liberalization threatens the viability of internal rice and corn production. As one
senior official from the Department of Agrarian Reform told me:
We should not have total trade liberalization. The economic playing field is not the
same. You have rich guys and poor guys and we are poor guys and Japan and the US
are rich guys. If you put them on equal footing on the economic playing field, the
poor guy will lose out. You have to have certain restrictions.
Better government planning can keep staples from getting crowded out by high
value commercial crops, but accomplishing this requires better coordination between the
different levels of government: national, regional, provincial, municipal, and barangay. Part
of the solution is a reintegration of the different functions of agencies accomplishing
agricultural development (DA), land reform (DAR), and environmental protection (DENR).
This will require inter‐agency coordination to ensure that some communities do not fall
between the cracks, while at the same time making sure that funds are not wasted on
overlapping programs.
The devolution of the Department of Agriculture (from the Local Government Code
of 1991) has created many problems in terms of the implementation of programs. For
accountability to be restored and for good programs to take full effect, devolution needs to
be reversed. The AFMA (Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act) of 1997 was an
effort to encourage local government units to do crop zoning through SAFDZs (Strategic
Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones). The effort was a failure in most
municipalities across the country because of the lack of accountability that local
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government units had to the federal government. However, if the devolution of the DA can
be reversed, then SAFDZs can be required again and can serve as a method by which staple
cropping zones are protected and agribusinesses are prevented from taking control over
too much land. Local governments have the liberty to put a cap on how much land
agribusinesses can rent in each barangay. Strengthening the laws against conversion of
agricultural land into other uses is another method the government can use to protect food
security (Feranil and Teves 2011). Mapping, vermicast fertilizer programs, and organic
growing technique training seminars are other aspects of a potentially revitalized AFMA.
Furthermore, SAFDZs can act as aids for developing municipal food sovereignty programs.
If provinces and regions are part of this process, the national government will be able to
hold provinces accountable for specific production goals. The difficulties provinces have
had in achieving these goals will be alleviated if the strategy is also based on progressive
revisions of land policies instead of solely focused on production gains.
Also, it would be helpful if government agencies reconsidered their policies of
facilitating foreign development projects. There is a temptation to unload parts of their
responsibilities to private groups, but few of these private investor projects aid the
Philippines in achieving self‐sufficiency in food production. Although Task Force Food
Sovereignty called for an end to the DA’s sub‐agency PADCC (Philippine Agricultural
Development and Commercial Corporation), I would argue that PADCC needs to be strongly
reoriented toward protecting lands and peoples involved in projects from exploitation.
PADCC should exercise caution to make sure they are not facilitating projects associated
with land degradation or disruption of the ancestral domains of indigenous groups, and
ensure that projects do not have a net‐negative effect on staple food production.
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Organizing farmers organizations is necessary to attack problems of specific
communities, and strong, principled, and transparent leadership of these groups is
necessary to develop trust among members. All of the levels of governance in the
Philippines can support these developments, and this can be facilitated by cooperation with
civil society organizations. Furthermore, when the judicial system deals more effectively
with violence perpetrated against community organizers, whistleblowers, activists, and
journalists, smallholders will be more empowered to unify and solve their own problems.
There is an analogy to be made between the different strategies pursued for food
security and the different strategies pursued for family financial security. If one food
security strategy is to focus on the localized production of staple foods, the analogous
strategy for family security is to stay together geographically. The alternate strategies for
both food and family have fetishized monetary solutions to the problems. The Philippine
government has prioritized an export‐oriented economy and this holds true whether we
are talking about agricultural commodities like bananas and pineapples or talking about
the labor of human beings. Exporting creates dependence on forces that are beyond the
control of Filipinos, as the international demands for bananas and labor are both
unpredictable. In the food security context, increases in energy prices may have multiple
effects: increases in the prices of fertilizers; increases in the prices of staple foods (if they
need to be imported); and higher prices and reduced demand for export crops (bananas,
pineapples, etc.). In the context of families being reliant on remittances from abroad, the
possibility of layoffs, reductions in real wages, and tighter immigration restrictions in
developed countries are all potential exogenous shocks to this strategy.
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If we think (slightly figuratively) in terms of an ecosystem that has different cycles
of energies and nutrients, we might see contrasts in different ecosystems in the amounts of
external inputs and outputs. There is never such a thing as a closed system, but some
systems are more closed and some systems are more reliant on the flow of external inputs
and outputs. With those that are more reliant on external flows, there is less predictability.
What if the inputs (chemical fertilizers or remittances) stop coming? What if the outputs
(export commodities or human labor) are rejected?
In a sort of chicken or egg question, we might ask what drives social change: is it a
group dynamic or is it an ideology? If we analyze the resistance movements discussed in
this study, we might see disparate answers to this question.
On the one hand, Landcare emphasized that communities do not need to be told
what to do. They simply need to be pushed to organize and think about their challenges, so
they will be able to develop solutions that are best suited to them. Landcare feels no need
to be dogmatic about what types of strategies people ultimately use. Thus it is the
existence of the community that is the starting point for social and ecological change.
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Figure 8.1: A Landcare farm near Claveria in Misamis Oriental province in northern
Mindanao (photo by author).
On the other hand, Makakabus based itself on an environmental philosophy and a
technique rather than acceptance of a geographically organized unit of women
agriculturalists and their families. The leadership adhered to a strict program of
agricultural change and eliminated most of the members of its organization when they did
not live up to the ideal. So, here we can see an example where ideology acted as the
foundation for a new social structure. Makakabus did not rely on the cohesion of a social
structure to be the organizing principle that would then guide an ideological
transformation. If the opposite had developed—a broader‐based, but more aimless
organization—then the change in the social structure and the change in the scale of the
reproduction of environmental conditions would arguably not have occurred.
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Although Makakabus and Landcare have differing opinions on the importance of
orthodoxy, we can see that they both engage very carefully and adeptly with the issue of
how they scale their projects. Furthermore, they both recognize the importance of
interpersonal relationships in the group dynamic for making their projects work.
One interesting thing I found in my conversations with national leaders of MASIPAG
was that they were skeptical of approaches where money is thrown at a problem. They
said solutions need to come from the ground up. If an NGO uses money to try to get a
farmers organization started, then they believe the project is doomed to fail. The members
of the farmers organization will come to depend on outside financial aid and will not learn
to be self‐sufficient. Instead, they feel that the role of NGOs is to offer support services and
education, but not direct financial aid. PDAP (The Philippine Development Assistance
Programme) is similar to the extent that they will only give loans to existing organic
farmers organizations rather than trying to seed new ones.
Broad and Cavanagh (2012) drew the historical comparison that farmers “need
public investment to facilitate their shift to organics, just as governments and international
aid agencies initially subsidized the transition to chemical agriculture.” Investment would
be significant in the short term, but once the transition is completed, the program would
run itself. This one‐time investment stands in contrast to the schemes to provide chemical
fertilizers, high‐tech seeds, and biocides to boost growth, since that strategy simply puts
the growers on a track where they will perpetually need more inputs, potentially costing
governments much more money.
When I was in Cabangkalan, I asked the chemical farmers if they would be
interested in a hypothetical program (governmental or otherwise) to assist them during a
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conversion to organic farming.95 The unanimous answer was yes. What would help make a
program like this successful? One of the key components would be for someone to act as a
guaranteed buyer of a farmer’s agricultural output for a pre‐determined period (perhaps
two years) while the soil is rejuvenated, which should enable farmers to make the
transition successfully. I am imagining four partners in this project. Local government
units can use the municipal agriculture offices to spearhead the program. Their two main
objectives would be to identify (or stimulate the creation of) farmers organizations in their
municipality as potential participants, and to facilitate long‐term marketing strategies for
the organic products.96 The farmers organizations would of course be the sustained groups
who would carry the project not only through the conversion phase, but on through the
post‐conversion phase by acting as a local market consolidator (as in the model of
Makakabus). Philippine NGOs (such as MASIPAG or Landcare) can act as consultants and
technical advisors, who would help train farmers on organic practices and help ensure,
through spot visits or testing, that no chemical methods are being employed. Foreign NGOs
or philanthropic foundations would act as funders of the program. The funding would
come in the form of acting as guaranteed buyers of the farmers organizations’ products
during the two‐year conversion process. The amount would be negotiated ahead of time as
necessary to give an adequate standard of living for the farmers. Additional funding might
be needed to cover the expenses of the Philippine NGOs’ training and inspection services,

Conversion should mean a net gain in income to growers in the long run, however, there
would be potential short‐term losses in income since the soil needs time to re‐establish
organic matter.
96 Provincial and regional personnel can also facilitate local and regional market options for
organic producers.
95
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but if organic certification is eventually accomplished through farmer‐led Participatory
Guarantee Systems, then long‐term costs can be minimized.
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources offices have set penalties for
violations of labor and environment regulations at a level that is meaningful for Philippine
firms. However, the amounts are not significant to large multinationals like Dole and Del
Monte. They are just a cost of doing business to these companies. Provinces might
consider establishing a two‐tier set of penalties that is higher for foreign multinationals
and lower for domestic companies. Furthermore, the municipalities where plantations are
located should consider piggybacking on the fines so that they are compensated for the
long‐term environmental damage, such as soil erosion, that occurs within their
jurisdictions. If such programs are to succeed, authorities must be willing to terminate an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) if it is being violated. In order to prevent
companies like Chiquita from subverting the requirement for an ECC (by using contract
growers in plantations smaller than 100 hectares), provincial governments could change
the regulations to require any export business to file for an ECC.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has pressured the Philippines to disband the
NFA (National Food Authority), which the ADB considers an inefficient state trading
enterprise (STE), but the NFA’s ability to restrict imports is necessary to control the price
of rice and corn in the domestic market (Glipo and Pascual 2005). Furthermore, my
research showed the NFA’s price support programs for rice and corn should be expanded
rather than curtailed, since the support is very important for keeping farmers engaged in
staple production. The government’s fall 2011 decision to purchase only 1.55% of internal
production was widely seen as a serious move in the wrong direction (Mora 2011; Despuez
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2012). I agree with the Task Force Food Sovereignty suggestion to purchase 10% of
internal production, since that is an amount that effectively alters market prices. The NFA
buffer stock is also an important safeguard for guarding against hunger if there are sudden
shortages of rice on international markets. Retaining the Quantitative Restriction (QR) on
the importation of rice can ensure that imported rice does not flood the domestic market
and destroy the ability of Filipino rice farmers to sell their harvests.
The World Bank (2011a) has continued to criticize the Philippine drive toward rice
self‐sufficiency, claiming that the Philippines is losing an opportunity to be a more
competitive exporter of other agricultural products. The expansion of export crop
plantations in Bukidnon, however, is actually a destabilizing force because it disrupts the
continuity of land control for smallholders who form the backbone of the rural economy
(or at least formerly did). Broad (1988) found that even World Bank personnel knew that
export oriented development could lead to more, rather than less, rural poverty. Mindanao
is more tied to the export paradigm than Luzon or the Visayas and its rates of hunger are
far higher (Feranil and Teves 2011). During the era of trade liberalization and membership
in the WTO, the Philippines moved from being approximately neutral in its agricultural
import/export balance in 1995 to having an extreme trade deficit by 2010.
My research suggests that the national government should preserve some level of
protectionism in regard to staples; ensure price supports when necessary; provide farm‐to‐
market roads; maintain irrigation projects; coordinate land policies; and guide the nation’s
progress toward the self‐sufficiency goal. If local‐scale sustainable staple production is
made the focus for the Philippines, it can work toward a greater degree of food sovereignty.
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8.4 General concerns
When we are contrasting the food sovereignty and the neoliberal approaches to
food security, we might in the first case, see a virtue‐based ethics that is based on duty and
respect to those with whom one has actual personal relationships, standing in contrast to
the second case, where there is a more universal ethic that is based on duty to others in the
abstract. The problem with the former might be a danger of parochialism and exclusion,
yet the danger with the latter is that out‐of‐sight may mean out‐of‐mind.
The World Bank (2007: 245) stated, “Agriculture remains one of the most promising
instruments for reducing world poverty.” This is a peculiar statement, in the sense that it
seems to ignore agriculture’s primary purpose, which is feeding people. It is as if the World
Bank sees agriculture as simply another market relation that can generate exchange value.
In the first chapter, I asked if the neoliberal approach is trying to solve a production‐
consumption problem, while the food sovereignty approach is trying to solve social justice
and ecological sustainability problems. Development programs and projects must address
both labor issues (producing income) and environmental issues (protecting the
sustainability of resources) (Nightingale 2006). One might argue that by addressing
poverty, the World Bank is addressing social justice concerns. However, referring to
agriculture as a “promising instrument” portrays it as a new economic strategy. In reality,
agriculture and social justice have been in tension for thousands of years, since the
distribution of agricultural goods is at the heart of whether people experience hunger or
not. In the food sovereignty paradigm, food and agriculture are social justice. The
conversations I had with agribusiness representatives indicated that their objective was to
increase production. This could be entirely appropriate, even in a food sovereignty context,
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in the sense of feeding people. Yet, if production becomes simply an end in itself, then
social justice concerns can be left behind.
A second statement by the World Bank (2007: 95) I believe showed too much faith
in food systems based on trade:
Today, agriculture’s ability to generate income for the poor…is more important for
food security than its ability to increase local food supplies.
Neoliberal agriculture can actually hinder the self‐determination of producers since
ownership of the means of production (land, seeds, machinery, and irrigation water) are
increasingly put under the control of corporations (Menser 2008). The World Bank’s point
is well taken that incomes need to rise for farmers97, but I think that achieving this through
the means of more international trade of food can be shortsighted and risky.
World hunger is largely a problem of rural poverty. Smallholders generally do not
have secure land tenure. They have problems with debt that are linked to the agro‐
industrial inputs they are encouraged to use, and they do not receive fair prices for the food
they grow. For consumers who can afford to pay for food, paying the price for sustainably
produced food will be the means by which a more socially just transfer of wealth can occur
toward peasant producers, since they have been undercompensated for their labor in
recent decades. In the mean time, more assistance is needed for those who are in poverty,
such as agricultural wage laborers, whose wages and opportunities are too low to feed
their families, and the urban poor, many of whom used to live in rural areas, but fled to the
cities. Expanding the social safety net and strengthening rural communities are going to be

Expanding youth participation in farming is going to be increasingly important (Republic
of the Philippines Department of Agriculture 2011), since the average age of farmers is
increasing. Young people need to see income opportunities in farming.
97
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the keys to fighting hunger. Increasing food production through industrial agriculture is all
for naught if a large and growing segment of the world’s population is both unable to afford
the food and unable to grow it themselves.
The peasantry is an anachronism according to the neoliberal paradigm (McMichael
2008b). Arguably, it is because economies of scale frequently produce greater efficiencies
in industrial production, that the same logic bleeds into conceptions of what should be
productive in agriculture as well. Modernization and capitalization in agriculture are seen
as self‐evident pathways to greater yields, greater incomes, and reductions in poverty. The
food sovereignty paradigm challenges these assumptions on both factual and theoretical
grounds. Global scaling of agricultural economies can be detrimental to sustainability. Ken
Conca (2001) asserted:
[T]o the extent that global economic restructuring increases the spatial and social
distance between production and consumption, it does further harm to the already‐
damaged negative feedback mechanisms that are an important dimension of
sustainable economies.
Communities can better measure their successes in terms of their environmental
health, human health, social equity, and economic stability rather than in terms of things
like tax revenues and corporate investment. McMichael (2005) calls the food sovereignty
movement a “direct symptom of [the] socio‐ecological crisis” that the corporate food
regime has created. UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier DeSchutter (United
Nations Human Rights 2011: 1) said:
We won’t solve hunger and stop climate change with industrial farming on large
plantations. The solution lies in supporting small‐scale farmers’ knowledge and
experimentation, and in raising incomes of smallholders so as to contribute to rural
development.
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How should the food sovereignty movement proceed on international scales? The
Doha Round of the World Trade Organization may be currently stalled, but WTO
regulations stemming from the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) still influence a great deal
of agricultural trade. A radical approach is to pressure national governments to drop out of
the WTO. Yet, however many qualms there may be about the agricultural policies within
the WTO, most national governments are not willing to risk being ostracized from general
trade agreements. A less drastic approach is to focus on the issues that hurt developing
countries specifically in agricultural trade and food sovereignty. An entry point into a
broader critique is to concentrate on the Minimum Access Volume (MAV) stipulations that
are currently part of the AoA. The MAVs are not free trade. They are devices to facilitate
dumping by the United States and other big exporters, which can be extremely dangerous
to importing countries if the price of a commodity goes below the farmgate prices that their
domestic farmers receive, since that would mean that they cannot sell their harvests. Food
sovereignty advocates can expose MAVs and campaign to end them. This may be easier
than some other battles, since it can still be argued using the logic and language of free
trade. Alternately there could be efforts made to negotiate with the WTO to make global
Northern governments stop the production subsidies that drive prices so low.
How I might differ with the food sovereignty ‘establishment’ such as La Via
Campesina (LVC) is that I would consider trying to work with the World Bank rather than
vilifying them. Instead of ‘expose and oppose’ (Borras 2010), perhaps LVC could modify
their critique of the World Bank to ‘expose and propose’—exposing what the Bank is doing
that is wrong and then proposing how to work with them to reorient rural development in
ways that are more socially just and conducive to food sovereignty. LVC may be able to
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make better inroads into the FAO too if they do not make their relationship with the World
Bank (one of the FAO’s main funders) exclusively adversarial. The WTO may be
fundamentally inimical to the protectionist strategies that food sovereignty advocates will
need to employ, but the World Bank is a more pliable institution that could potentially
become an ally to the cause of food sovereignty. For example, the World Bank’s mission in
the Philippines in the late 1980s was actually pushing the government to do more radical
land reform than was being proposed by the government that succeeded the Marcos
dictatorship. The World Bank (2007) also recently expressed some tentative support for
community titling in some land redistribution schemes. Furthermore, the World Bank
(2007) has recognized some of the ecological damage caused by Green Revolution
technologies and suggested more sustainable techniques for retaining soil fertility and
combating pests.
In summary, some of the key things for food sovereignty advocates to work for in
order to achieve more socially just and sustainable rural development are:
•
land reform that is truly redistributive, but still achievable;
•
agricultural support services for sustainable farming methods that protect
soil fertility and give better income opportunities for small farmers;
•
facilitation of local marketing so farmers can specifically address the food
needs of their communities and regions;
•
gender equity and education that will allow women as well as men economic
independence;
•
medical care, sanitation, and clean water resources that will promote
increased productivity and income and decreased infant mortality, which will in
turn result in declines in birth rates (Lappé et al. 1998);
•
social safety nets that allow for food entitlements when access to proper
nutrition is difficult;
•
and an end to WTO involvement in agriculture, or in lieu of that, continuation
of tools of protectionism such as Quantitative Restrictions and import tariffs, and an
end to forced trade through Minimum Access Volumes.
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Food sovereignty is increasingly known as a global movement, linked especially to
the organizing efforts of La Via Campesina. However, the food sovereignty movement is
composed of innumerable smaller groups that are scaling their efforts at various levels.
National struggles deal with issues like stopping trade liberalization, preserving
protectionist measures, and gaining self‐sufficiency in staples. Regional and provincial
groups deal with issues like land reform, environmental sustainability, and market
planning. Finally, even smaller groups scale their efforts at municipal levels or even just a
dozen or more families. Landcare groups, MASIPAG farming cooperatives, and collectives
like Makakabus are demonstrating leadership in creating community‐based food
sovereignty. It is these groups that operate on a personal level that are so vital to the
integrity of the movement as a whole since their members are involved directly in the
localized tasks of agricultural production, social reproduction, and the reproduction of
environmental conditions. Scaling food security and agricultural strategies to more locally
oriented solutions will be a way of promoting not just food sovereignty, but also more self‐
determination for all people.
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Appendix A: Questions for agriculturalists
What year were you born? Were you born in this area or in a different part of the
Philippines? How long have you lived in this area? How long have you lived in this village?
Tell me about your family history, especially the work that you, your family, your parents,
and your grandparents have done. Do you own land? Did your parents own land? When
and how was it acquired? Have you sold, rented, or pawned land? Do you work as a tenant
farmer? Do you do sharecropping? Do you do wage labor?
How many adults and how many children are in your household? What are their ages and
genders?
Tell me the income producing activities of each of your household’s members. For
example: farming your own land, farming someone else’s land, doing plantation labor,
raising animals, providing transportation, sales, services, seasonal labor, sporadic labor,
etc.
How much income is produced by each of these activities?
How many hours per day or per week are spent on each of these income‐producing
activities? Does this change from week to week or from season to season? How has this
changed over the last ten years?
[For wage laborers only]: How many landowners do you work for during the year? Who
pays you? Do you get paid by the hour? By the day? For piecework? How do you find out
where the work is? Is there an organized structure for finding employment? Do you get
paid in goods rather than money for any of the work that you do?
What crop(s) do you plant or work with?
How much land is devoted to each of these crops?
Quantitatively describe the past year’s output of each of your agricultural products (your
yields) and how this differed from previous years.
How much do you spend on farming inputs like fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides? How
much do you spend on outside labor? If you hire people, how much do you pay them?
How far do you travel to get to each of your work sites? How do you get there? What
changes have there been in the last ten years in the amount of time you or other people in
this area travel for work?
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Where do you market your products? Who buys your products and do you know to whom
they sell them or what they do with them? Would the answers to these questions have
been different 10 years ago?
What price(s) do you get for the products that you sell?
How have price fluctuations affected your income from selling agricultural products?
Do you see the people in your community in recent years relying more or less on farming
for their income than they used to?
Is your community changing by growing more crops for local consumption or is it changing
by growing more cash crops? Specifically which crops have been increasing and which
ones have been decreasing?
Is part of your household income derived from the remittances of OFWs (Overseas Filipino
Workers) or relatives in other parts of the Philippines? Has your household lost any
members to regional or international migration? When did this occur?
Can you describe your family’s diet in detail?
Where do you buy food and how much do you allocate for certain items? Can you describe
your overall food budget?
How have price fluctuations in items that you purchase affected your cost of living?
Do you make adjustments in your activities or your consumption patterns when times are
good or when times are bad? How do seasonal variations affect you?
Which of the foods in your diet do you grow yourself? What percent of your diet comes
from food that you grow yourself?
Do you feel the level of food security is improving for your community or is it getting more
difficult for the members of your community to ensure that they are getting a wide enough
mix of sufficient foods for their sustenance? If things are changing, why are they changing?
Do you know people in your community who have experienced malnutrition or not getting
enough food? What percent of your community do you think experiences malnutrition? Do
certain people (age, gender, or occupation) experience hunger more often?
Do you grow a greater or lesser variety of crops than you did 10 years ago or compared to
what your parents grew in the past?
What is good about each of the crops you mentioned that you work with? What is bad
about each of the crops you mentioned that you work with? Why have you chosen to grow
the crop(s) that you grow? What or who influences your decisions?
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Is there anything distinctive about the land on which you work? Do you feel that you have
special knowledge about the particular crop(s) or the particular piece(s) of land that you
are working on?
What changes have you witnessed in the environment or the level of biodiversity?
Is soil erosion a significant problem for you? If so, what is done to combat this erosion?
What is done to fertilize the land on which you work? From where is this fertilizer
purchased and of what does it consist? Do you create any of your own fertilizers?
Do you use crop rotation, intercropping, or let fields lie fallow to enhance the health of the
soil?
What kinds of problems with pests occur on the land on which you work? What strategies
do you or others use to combat the pests?
Have you or other people you know experienced health problems that you think are linked
to pesticides, fertilizers, or other farming inputs used in the area in which you live or work?
Do you save seeds or buy new seeds with every planting? What type of seeds? Where do
you get your seeds and what influences you in your choices?
Have you heard about genetically modified seeds? Has their introduction been an issue in
your community? How do you feel about genetically modified organisms (GMOs)? Have
you used them yourself or would you be interested in using them?
What agricultural policies of the national or provincial government have been significant or
relevant to your work activities?
What programs from the local government affect you or your community? Do these
programs help everybody equally?
What changes have you seen in the local landscape in the last ten years?
Have you seen significant changes in the land‐ownership arrangements in the area? If so,
why have these changes occurred?
Have there been significant migrations in your community due to changing economic
arrangements?
Have family or household structures in your community changed due to migratory work?
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Have you seen women’s or men’s roles or responsibilities change in the local farming
economy? What is different about the work that women or men do now than in previous
years?
How does your life differ from that of your parents? What would you like to see for the
lives of your children or the next generation? Is there anything that you think needs to
change?
Do you have any other thoughts to share about your experiences in the local agricultural
economy?
Please draw a map of what is important to your work.
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